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Abstract
The first part of this Thesis analyzes the impact of financial constraints (FC) on industrial 
structure. Chapter 1 presents a model tha t disentangles several effects of FC on entry, 
turnover, productivity and firms size distribution. The framework is applied in Chapter 
2 which develops an industry equilibrium model of vertical integration under contractual 
imperfections with specific input suppliers and ^eternal investors. I assume tha t vertical 
integration economizes on the needs for contracts with specific input suppliers at the cost 
of higher financial requirements. I show th a t the two forms of contractual imperfections 
have different effects on the degree of vertical integration, and tha t contractual frictions 
with external investors affect vertical integration through two opposing channels: a direct 
negative, investment, effect and an indirect positive, entry, effect. Using cross-country- 
industry data, I present novel evidence on the institutional determinants of international 
differences in vertical integration which is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
model. In particular, I show that countries with more developed financial systems are 
relatively more vertically integrated in industries that are dominated by large firms.
The second part (Chapter 3) asks whether vertical integration reduces or increases trans­
action costs with external investors. I build a model in which a seller produces a good 
that can be used by a buyer, or sold on a spot market. The buyer and the seller have no 
cash, need to finance investments for production, and can not foresee in advance whether 
the input is most efficiently traded on the spot market or among each other. I assume 
that ownership of physical assets gives control over contracting rights to those assets, tha t 
financial streams get transferred with ownership and tha t returns can not be perfectly 
verified. The net balance of the costs and benefits of integration in terms of pledgeable 
income depends on the relative intensities of a positive "profits-pooling" effect against 
a negative "de-monitoring" effect. I find tha t larger projects, more specific assets, and 
low investors protection are determinants of vertical integration. I discuss joint liability 
contracts between non integrated firms and how contractual externalities among investors 
favor integration.
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34- Busca por el agrado de buscar, no por el de encontrar...
40. No juzgues al arbol por sus frutos ni al hombre por sus obras; pueden 
ser peores o mejores.
Fragmentos de un evangelio apocrifo, Jorge Luis Borges
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Preface
Countries largely differ in terms of their level of income per capita and productivity. The 
richest countries in the world are as 50 times richer than the poorest countries in the world. 
Historically it is true that most of the countries managed to raise their per capita income 
levels and reduce poverty through (a phase of) industrialization. An emerging consensus 
within economics points towards the importance of institutions in explaining international 
differences in income per capita. One im portant challenge for current and feature research 
is to improve our understanding of how institutions affects income differences, i.e. the 
mechanisms through which institutional imperfections shape economic performance in 
general, and the industrialization process in particular.
This Thesis explores the mechanisms through which financial market imperfections shape 
industry structure and firm boundaries. While the underlying motivation and the "right 
hand side" variables of this work (contractual imperfections in the financial market), come 
from the fields of Development Economics and Corporate Finance, the focus on industry 
structure and firm boundaries as "left hand side" variables comes from an older tradition 
in Industrial Organization. Consequently, this Thesis is divided into two parts.
The first part provides a simple theoretical framework to analyze how financial market 
imperfections shape industry structure, in terms of entry, turnover and intraindustry 
factor re-allocation. I than embed into this framework a simple theory of firm boundaries 
(vertical integration) and jointly determine industry structure and firm boundaries as 
functions of financial market imperfections. The second part focuses on the relationship 
between financial market imperfections and firm boundaries. In particular, I provide a new 
theoretical approach to the long standing question of what determines firm boundaries 
and show tha t firm boundaries are an im portant tool to ease the process of raising funds 
from external investors.
While most of the work in this Thesis is theoretical, I have tried to link the theory to exist­
ing or original empirical evidence. It turns out th a t while there already exists im portant
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6empirical work on the relationship between financial constraints and industry structure 
tha t supports the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, the relationship between financial 
market imperfections and vertical integration has received almost no empirical attention. 
Chapter 2 fills this gap in the literature, and provides original evidence on the relation­
ship between vertical integration and financial market imperfections. Empirically, I rely 
on cross country and industry variation, which explain why the empirical contribution 
is paired with the industry equilibrium framework of Chapter 2. It turns out tha t the 
theoretical material presented in the second part, while consistent with existing, mostly 
anecdotal, evidence, would require data of a substantially different nature, most likely to 
be collected in appropriate future fieldwork.
The first part presents an analysis of the effects of financial market imperfections on 
industry structure.
Chapter 1 presents a simple theoretical framework to disentangle several effects of financial 
constraints on entry, turnover, productivity and firms size distribution. The theoretical 
framework combines recent work on industry structure with heterogeneous firms devel­
oped in trade theory with a simple parametrization of financial market imperfections.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the institutional determinants 
of vertical integration. I find that contractual frictions with suppliers of intermediate 
inputs and with external investors have a radically different impact on the degree of ver­
tical integration. I develop an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms that 
combines a simple theory of vertical integration with a convenient parametrization of con­
tractual frictions in input and financial markets. Fewer contractual imperfections with 
input suppliers unambiguously reduce vertical integration while fewer contractual imper­
fections in financial markets reduce vertical integration in industries tha t are dominated 
by small firms. I find empirical support for these predictions in an analysis of cross- 
country-industry data for the manufacturing sector. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I 
also document tha t there is no evidence of higher vertical integration in less developed 
countries.
The second part presents theoretical models of firm boundaries and financial market 
imperfections.
In Chapter 3, I build a model in which a seller produces a good that can be used by a 
buyer, or sold on a spot market. The buyer and the seller have no cash, need to finance 
investments for production, and can not foresee in advance whether the input is most 
efficiently traded on the spot market or among each other. I assume th a t ownership of 
physical assets gives control over contracting rights to those assets, tha t financial streams
7get transferred with ownership and that returns can not be perfectly verified. The net bal­
ance of the costs and benefits of integration in terms of pledgeable income depends on the 
relative intensities of a positive "profits-pooling" effect against a negative "de-monitoring" 
effect. I find that larger projects, more specific assets, and low investors protection are 
determinants of vertical integration. I discuss joint liability contracts between non inte­
grated firms and how contractual externalities among investors favor integration.
W ith respect to the relationship between financial market imperfections and organiza­
tional form, the field of corporate finance has recently provided insightful analysis on the 
efficiency properties of conglomerates, and (horizontally) diversified firms. In contrast, 
the work in this Thesis mainly focuses on vertical relationships. When it comes to the 
analysis of horizontal differentiation, it is appropriate to leave the industry equilibrium 
framework which is the main focus of this work, and consider a general equilibrium frame­
work. For this reason I have decided not to report here the results of some preliminary 
work in which I explore - theoretically and empirically - the relationship between financial 
market development and horizontal differentiation. Similarly, the work in this Thesis only 
tangentially deals with certain important aspects of the financial system and their rela­
tionship with industry structure or organizational forms. While the analysis in Chapters 
3 sheds some preliminary light on the relationship between trade credit and firm bound­
aries, this, and other important themes such as the relationship between bank vs. market 
based financial systems and industry structure, are left for future research.
The reader of this Thesis will not find an analysis of the policy and political economy 
implications of this work. Why countries do not exert more effort to improve the func­
tioning of their financial markets? Some very interesting work has been recently done 
on the political economy of financial market reform, but it is not discussed here. At a 
more substantial level, the aim of this work has been to provide a general framework to 
understand the mechanics of the relationship between financial market development and 
industrial development. W ith respect to policy implications, evil is in the detail. I hope 
tha t a careful analysis of the interaction between the forces underlined in this work and 
the characteristics of the particular setting under examination will however prove useful.
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Chapter 1
Credit Constraints and Industry  
Structure: Introduction
1.1 In trodu ction
There is now sound evidence that firms in developing countries suffer from scarce avail­
ability of financial resources. The results of the enterprise surveys at the World Bank 
show important cross-country variations in terms of the availability of external financial 
resources in the developing world. The average loan in many countries requires a collat­
eral often above the value of the loan itself. Similarly, in many countries firms report that 
as much as 80% of investments are financed with internal funds.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to analyze the implications of financial market 
imperfections on industry structure. To do so, I develop a simple industry equilibrium 
model with heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz (2003).1 As in Melitz (2003), I 
assume tha t firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity. The baseline model keeps 
productivity as the main source of heterogeneity across firms in order to make this frame­
work as comparable as the one successfully used in many recent studies on the evolution 
of industrial structure in developing countries tha t did not focus on financial market im­
perfections. I embed into this framework a simple param etrization of financial market 
imperfections. The baseline model takes the supply of entrepreneurs in the industry as 
given, and consider the case in which financial market imperfections simply hinder the
JI follow Melitz (2003) in analyzing a model of (Dixit-Stiglitz) monopolistic competition. While it 
turns out that such formulation has convenient analytical properties, most of the key results follow from 
the "business stealing" effect of the formulation. Other frameworks, could in principle, deliver alternative 
results.
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creation of new firms. Poor financial markets prevent the entry of new competitors in the 
industry. Because of the "business stealing" effect inherent to the monopolistic compe­
tition model, firms tha t operate in industries in which financial constraints are relevant 
tend to be larger. On average, better financial markets increase production in the indus­
try but do not increase productivity, since better financial markets will enable relatively 
low productivity firms to  enter the industry.
I then analyze several variations of the baseline models tha t explore the endogenous supply 
of entrepreneurs in the industry and the consequences of heterogeneity in financial market 
access. This last extension brings the theoretical framework closer to an older "develop­
ment economics" tradition, in which access to wealth or informal networks is central in 
determining financial market access (see e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Banerjee and 
Munshi (2004)). Finally, I propose an extension in which financial market imperfections 
directly affect firm’s size. The framework is then suited to derive implications on firm’s 
size distribution.
I do not review here an important empirical literature on financial constraints. Banerjee 
and Duflo (2004) provides an interesting proof of the existence of credit constraints in 
India, while Levine (2005) contains several references on research exploring the effects of 
cross-country financial development differences in shaping industry growth and structure.
1.2 T h e b aseline m odel
1 .2 .1  S e t U p
Environment
I consider an economy with population L  that produces goods using only labor. There are 
J  -1-1 sectors. One sector provides a single homogeneous good. This good is used as the 
numeraire, and its price is set equal to 1. It is produced under constant return to scale, 
with a technology employing 1 unit of labor to produce 1 unit of the homogeneous good. 
Provided that the economy produces the homogeneous good, the wage will be w = 1. In 
the remaining part of this chapter, I will assume tha t this is true. The other J  sectors 
supply a continuum of differentiated goods. In each of these sectors there is a fixed set 
of potential entrepreneurs described later. Each firm is a monopolist over the variety it 
produces.
The workers are the only consumers, each endowed with 1 unit of labor. They all have the
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same CES preferences over the differentiated goods. A consumer tha t receives qo units of 
the homogeneous good, and q{9) of each variety 6 6 Oj (to be determined in equilibrium) 
of the differentiated goods produced by industry j  G {1, . . j , .. J} , gets a utility U
^ f
U =  q l - J v T \ (  q(6)a’ d6Y>
j=i
where &j =  1_1a , >  1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of the differ­
entiated goods in industry j.
If all varieties in the set ©j are available at a particular price p{9) these preferences yield 
aggregate demand functions
q{9) =  Ajp{B)-£i
where p{9) is the price of a particular variety 9 and
<pL
(JeeGjPW Qj£jd9)
The monopolist of variety 9 in industry j  treats Aj as a constant, and so perceives a
_i
constant elasticity of demand Ej. I denote Pj =  JeeQ .pj(9)~ai£id9 “ as the price
index in industry j .  The price index is inversely related to the level of "competitition" 
in the industry. Competition is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the number of varieties 
produced in the industry, and decreasing in the (average) price charged by competitors.
Since the set of potential entrepreneurs in each industry is, for now, taken as exogenously 
given, and production of the homogeneous good in the economy implies w = 1, indus­
tries can be treated independently. Therefore, I suppress the subscript j  from industry 
variables.
For now, I assume that in each industry there is a fixed pool of potential entrepreneurs 
that are heterogenous with respect to their productivity 9. Each entrepreneur draws her 
productivity level 9 from a distribution with associated continuous cumulative function 
G{9) and observe her productivity before deciding whether to start production. To sim­
plify, I also assume that the mass of potential entrepreneurs is equal to L in each industry. 
I take the distribution of the productivity param eter 9 as exogenous. For analytical pur­
poses, it is convenient to focus on the case in which G(9) follows a Pareto distribution, 
i.e. G{9) = 1 -  for 9 > 1.
I now turn to  the description of firms’ technology. In order to enter the industry, the firm 
has to pay fixed costs / .  After having paid the fixed costs, the production function of a
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firm is
q{6) =  Ox
where I denote by x  the labor employed by the firm.
I now turn to the determination of the industry equilibrium. In order to solve the industry 
equilibrium, I first compute the profit functions for a firm. I then define the industry 
equilibrium.
From the demand equation it is clear tha t firms charge a constant mark up determined 
by the elasticity of substitution of consumer demand. We thus have
1
aO
By substitution in the demand equation, we obtain the variable profits as
11(0) =  a a£A0Q£(l -  a)
The industry equilibrium is uniquely defined by a threshold 6e such that firms with 
0 > 6e enter the industry since they are productive enough to cover their fixed costs. The 
threshold 0e is uniquely identified by the solution to
a a£A($e)a£( 1 — a) = f
Recalling the expression for A, this last equality can be rewritten as
ipL
i™e™dG(6)
Assuming a > as, when G(0) follows a Pareto distribution with shape param eter cr, we 
obtain 0Q£dG(0) = ^  (Qe)a£~a =  u  (0e)Qe- CT , and thus
e ipL
u  f  .
In equilibrium, conditional on being active in the market, the size of a firm with produc­
tivity 0 (in terms of labor) is given by
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We note that, the size of the firm is increasing in the size of the market ((pL), in the 
level of firm productivity (9) and in the level of fixed costs ( /) . Note also tha t if 9 is 
distributed according to a Pareto distribution with shape parameter a, then x(9) also 
follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter a — as.
1 .2 .2  C red it C o n stra in ts
I now introduce financial market imperfections. I assume tha t fixed costs have to be paid 
up-front, i.e. before production takes place and tha t firms have no liquidity and need to 
borrow from external investors in order to finance the fixed cost investment. I assume for 
simplicity tha t the risk free interest rate in the economy is equal to zero, and tha t a large 
supply of risk neutral investors lend capital at this interest rate.
However, because of contractual imperfections, credit markets are not perfect. I model 
credit constraints in a rather crude, but simple, way. Specifically, I assume tha t the 
fixed costs /  need to be financed in advance, and are in fact composed of a continuum 
of small investments. I assume that a fraction 1 — A of this investments is contractible: 
external investors can easily make sure that the capital is effectively invested in the project 
(for instance renting corporate buildings, acquiring specific machines, etc.). In contrast, 
the remaining fraction A is not contractible, in the sense tha t the external provider of 
finance can not make sure that the capital is effectively invested in production (e.g. 
hiring the appropriate product designer, purchase of some specific services, etc.). While 
A certainly captures characteristics of the industry, it also depends on the availability of 
legal instruments protecting external investors, such as borrowers’ public register, courts, 
etc. Since industries can be treated in isolation, lower A has to be interpreted as a decrease 
in the industry-country specific degree of contractual frictions between firms and external 
investors.
After borrowing from external investors, the entrepreneur can choose among two different 
behaviors. She can invest the borrowed cash to pay the fixed costs and s ta rt production. 
Alternatively she can divert the cash corresponding to the fraction A of non-contractible 
investments. For simplicity, I assume that such a diversion of cash occurs at no cost.
From this simple model, it follows tha t an entrepreneur with productivity 9 can enter 
the industry if and only if the variable profits n($) are such tha t n($) > (1 +  A)/.When 
A =  0 financial markets are perfect, and any firm with variable profits n(0) can enter 
the industry as soon as the variable profits are greater than the fixed costs. When A >  0 
financial markets are not perfect, and some firms with variable profits n ( 0) > /  may
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not be able to enter the industry and start production. In this sense, some projects with 
positive net present values will not be financed, giving rise to financial constraints. Below, 
I discuss some alternative ways of introducing financial market imperfections.
The industry equilibrium will now be modified. It will be defined by a new threshold 
9 such that
a a£A { T ) a£{ I - a )  =  (1 +  A)/
and hence we obtain
(pL
_uj (1 +  A) /
In equilibrium, conditional on being active in the market, the size of a firm with produc­
tivity 9 (in terms of labor) is given by
\  —
x(G) =  a-  ^  " nae
UJ e f (  1+A)
It is clear from this expression, tha t conditional on entry in the industry, firms are larger 
the greater is A, i.e. the more severe the financial market imperfections. In other words, 
a first effect of financial markets imperfection is to shelter firms from competition. This 
naturally leads towards an increase in firm’s size (measured in terms of labor, or revenues).
With respect to productivity, it is useful to define two different concepts. Omitting for 
simplicity fixed costs, and taking real output per worker 9 as a measure of productivity 
we can define the average intra-firm productivity as the unweighted average of output per 
worker ratios in the industry, i.e.
_  j f  0dG{6) _  («“)
± i n t r a  —
1 —<7
(7
1 - G { 6 ) a — 1
Similarly we can define industry productivity ("inter-firm") as the labor-weighted average 
of output per worker ratios in the industry, i.e.
_  i f a cAeEdG(e) _  ^ a - a e - g e
mlfr ~  f f  a-A0u-dG(0) ~  (gey e~a <7 -  e
a—ae  ^ J
We can now state the following result
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Proposition  1.1 Financial market imperfections
i) reduce entry > 0),
ii) conditional on entry, increase firms size (9°q^  > Oj 
in) increase firm productivity (Qj^ - > 0)
Discussion
The model above formalizes two simple ideas. First, financial market imperfections act as 
a barrier to entry in the industry. Second, firms that, despite financial market imperfec­
tions are active in the industry, benefit from lower competition and are thus larger (and 
earn higher profits). Apparently the more controversial result from the framework is the 
fact that financial market imperfections tend to increase the productivity of firms in the 
industry. First of all, note that this does not mean that efficiency in the economy will be 
higher. Some factors, in particular entrepreneurial talent (0 < 9 ) remain underemployed. 
Secondly, note that this result follows from the fact tha t financial constraints systemati­
cally prevent the entrance of relatively unproductive firms in the industry. Some of the 
extensions in the next session provides examples in which this is no longer the case.2
1.3 E xten sion s
1 .3 .1  E n d o g en o u s  en try
In this subsection I modify the previous model in the following way. I assume tha t in order 
to discover her own productivity 6, an entrepreneur needs to pay up-front a fixed cost F.
2 It is important to understand whether this crucial feature of the model depends on the particular 
way financial markets imperfections are modelled. As a matter of examples consider the case in which 
financial markets imperfections are modelled through a standard moral hazard problem. The entrepreneur 
has to exert some effort m  that increases the probability p(m)  of a success, in which case profits 11(0) are 
realized. Under the alternative scenario of a failure, let us assume that no profits are realized. Assume 
that profits are contractible, but the effort is not. The entrepreneurs borrow cash / ,  and commit to repay 
an amount B  in case of success. If she has no wealth to post as collateral, in case of failure she repays 
nothing. Denoting by m e the equilibrium level of effort, the zero profits constraints for the lender implies 
p( me)B =  f.  It is straightforward to check that m e is increasing in 11(0),and that there exists a critical 
0e such that entrepreneurs with 0 < 0e are not financed. A similar model endogeneizes the probability of 
success (i.e. the observed distribution of productivity), and implies that relatively unproductive firms are 
left outside the market. The model would however generates further feed-backs. Better financial markets, 
by fostering entry, would reduce 11(0) for some firms, which would in turn leads to higher interest rates 
for those firms. Due to the non-linear interaction between 0 and m, it is hard to analytically solve this 
model. Similarly, financial markets imperfections could be introduced through adverse selection on (some 
other than 0) underlying characteristics. I believe this would not change the main insights.
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These fixed costs have to be financed, since the entrepreneur again has no cash. I assume 
that, once 9 is revealed, both the bank and the firm observe it. The setting is interesting 
since it highlights other effects of financial constraints on entry and productivity.
In particular it will be possible to underline different effects tha t financial constraints 
impose on firms depending whether the financial imperfections are at the "entry" or at 
the "production" stage.
The game, has to be solved backward. First of all, for a given mass Me of entrepreneurs 
in the industry, it is easy to show that - as before - there exists a unique threshold 9 such 
tha t only firms tha t have productivity 9 > 9  receive finance to continue their operations 
and hence survive in the industry. Let B  denote the amount of debt tha t the firm has 
to repay to the investor tha t financed the entry stage in the industry. Following the 
derivation in the previous section, it is straightforward to show tha t
u  (f L
7 [(1 +  A ) f  + B \ W e
A  first implication is that the larger the mass of entrepreneurs in the industry Me, the more 
productive the entrepreneurs must be in order to survive in the industry. Note th a t with 
respect to the corresponding equation in the previous section, there are two differences. 
First, the "effective" size of the market must now be "normalized" Me. Ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the number of firms in the industry, is equivalent to  a reduction in market 
size. Secondly, the firm has to repay an original amount of debt B.  The higher L?, the 
harder will be to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for the financing decision 
at the production stage. It is this force that generates the interesting interactions between 
financial constraints at the entry and at the production stages.
An entrepreneur thus, after observing her productivity 9 will remain in the industry with 
probability 1 — G{9 ), i.e.
P r ob > 9
to (p
Denoting by M  the mass of firms tha t are active in the industry, we obtain that
M = ( i - G(y ) ) M e ^ M  =  ^ [ ( i + y / + j ? 1
Note th a t the mass of firms tha t are active, i.e. produce, in the industry depends on B. 
The higher B , i.e. the more difficult has been to finance the entry in the industry, the
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smaller will be the number of firms producing in the industry.
We now have to compute the ex-ante expected profits He for the entrepreneur, when he 
pays the fixed costs F  in order to discover her productivity 0. These profits are given by
EL =  E n(0)|0 > e
o
n (6)dG(6) - ( /  +  £ ) [  1 -  G{6')\
The first term simply captures the fact that, in a given industry equilibrium, the en­
trepreneur will receive variable profits Ef(0) that depends on her productivity. However, 
conditional on remaining active on the industry, which happens with probability 1 — G(9 ), 
the entrepreneur has to repay the debt with which she financed the entry stage, as well 
as the fixed costs associated with production / .  Note that B  > F, as the zero profits 
constraints of the lender at the entry stage must take into account the fact the firm may 
not be able to survive the industry. Instead, the debt at production stage is necessarily 
equal to / ,  as once 0 is discovered, there is no longer any uncertainty on the profits that 
will be realized by the firm (provided the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied).
Assuming that a fraction Ae of the fixed costs F  can not be monitored by the external 
lender, ex-ante, the number of entrepreneurs that receive finance is implicitly given by 
the equation associated with the financial constraints,
u(fL OJ L > A PF
The repayment B  must satisfy the expected zero profits constraints for the lender, i.e.
P r ob 9 > 6 x B  > F
Perfect competition among lenders drives B  down till the point in which the above in­
equality is satisfied with equality, implying
B =  (1 +  A ) { F
Combining the two inequalities hence yield an expression for the number of firms tha t
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receive finance, M e which is implicitly given by the unique solution to
=  XpFx P r ob
sM e (1 -f- A) y s M e
— (1 +  \ e)F
For the particular case in which A =  0, so that financial market imperfections are present 
only at the entry decision, the equilibrium number of firms is given by
I f  = y [ ( l  +  A)(l +  Ae) - l ]
We summarize the results of this model in the following
P roposition  1.2 Higher financial market imperfections at the entry stage (higher Xe)
i) reduce the number of firms that enter the industry a n d  survive in the industry ( ^ -  < 0 
and
ii) increase the probability of surviving in the industry, conditional on entry (^ j-  < 0) 
Hi) decrease the average productivity in the industry
Higher financial market imperfections at the production stage (higher X)
i) increase the number of firms entering the industry but reduce the number of firms 
surviving in the industry ( ^ -  >  0 and < 0)
ii) reduce the probability of surviving in the industry, conditional on entry ( ^ -  > 0) 
in) increase the average productivity in the industry conditional on survival
Discussion
The model underlines the different implications of financial market imperfections (FMI) 
on industry entry and exit rates. Financial constraints at the entry stage reduce the
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number of firms in the industry, and create a softer environment for firms that have good 
productivity draws. This implies tha t not only entry rates, but also exit rates will tend to 
be relatively small. This has profound implications for the productivity of the industry. 
Because of low entry, even firms which are not so productive can survive in the industry: 
the selection process is not very strong.
FMI at the production stage instead have quite opposite effects. First of all, they tend 
to raise the profits of surviving firms. However, they also have a direct effect on the 
number of firms that exit the industry. As in the first section, financial constraints at 
the production stage makes the selection process more competitive increasing the average 
productivity in the industry. FMI at the production stage also increase entry in the 
industry. This result is entirely due to the business stealing effect of the monopolistic 
competition framework we are using: FMI at the production stage increase profits by 
limiting competition. This effect dominates over the higher probability of having to exit 
the industry, and in total expected profits go up.
1 .3 .2  H e te r o g e n e ity  in cre d it co n stra in ts
I now modify the previous analysis to allow for a second source of heterogeneity. I assume 
that in the population there are two groups of entrepreneurs: the "insiders" and the "out­
siders". I assume tha t a fraction n  of the population are insiders and a fraction 1 — fi are 
instead outsiders. I assume that the insiders have an advantage when it comes to  access 
external finance. Insiders can be thought as entrepreneurs which are embedded into local 
community networks th a t make it easier to raise external finance. Alternatively, it may 
be tha t insiders are simply richer entrepreneurs that have access to savings accumulated 
in other sectors of the economy. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in terms of produc­
tivity, as well as "institutional access". The environment described in this subsection 
is inspired by some empirical work done by economic historians on entrepreneurship in 
XIX° century New England (Lamoureux (1996) and Porter and Livesay (1971)) and by 
similar environments described in modern India (see e.g. Banerjee (2005) and Banerjee 
and Munshi (2004)).
To keep the analysis close to the framework in the previous section, I will consider the 
case in which the financial market imperfections A differ across the two groups and, for 
simplicity, I will set Xi =  0 and A0 =  A > 0. A part from the distinction with respect 
to the exogenous differences in financial market access, the two groups are identical, in 
particular Gi(9) =  G0{9) =  G{9) at any 9 >  1.
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In equilibrium there will be two thresholds 9i and 0o implicitly defined by
a ae A(6 g)a£ (1 — a ) =  (1 +  As) /
where g 6 {z, o}. Entrepreneurs with productivity 9 belonging to group g can enter the 
industry if and only if 9 > 9g. Moreover, recalling the expression for A (and keeping the 
assumption tha t G(-) follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter a), we have
t * J z ° P ( e ) - ° ^ d G ( e )  +  ( i  — m) J £ p ( 0r ^ d G ( < ) )  = uaac[M
Noting tha t from the definition of 90 and 9i we necessarily have =  (1 +  \)<*e > 1  and6i
hence we can solve for the equilibrium as
ipL
u j [ h  +  (1 — jT) ^ i ( l  +  A ) ^^
which becomes
u j <pL
and
UJ
+  (1 -  g )(l +  A)1 /
(pL
(^ fl( 1  +  A ) o e  +  ( 1  — ^ ) ( 1  +  A ) ^  /
Some interesting properties of this framework deserves comments. First of all, it is clear 
th a t since ^  >  1 the insiders are, conditional on being active in the industry, less produc-Qi
tive than the outsiders. Second, there are now two ways of conceptualizing a reduction 
in financial market imperfections. An increase in /i, raises the proportion of firms with 
perfect financial market access. I will refer to an increase in fi as an increase in "financial 
depth". The second way to think about better financial market is a reduction in A, as in 
the previous section.
W hat are the effects of better financial markets on entry, firm’s size and productivity 
levels in the industry? To tackle the issue of entry, we start noting tha t the to tal number 
of firms active in the industry is given by
M(m, A) =  JU(1 -  G(di)) +  (1 -  M)( l  -  G(d„))
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Figure 1.1: Heterogeneity in Financial Access: Entry
/ i  +  ( 1  — n)( 1 +  A )  <*<:- * / i  +  ( 1  — / i ) ( l  +  A ) « ^  * 
which, recalling the equilibrium values of 9{ and (90, can be rewritten as
W W ipL (  fl +  (1 -  /i)(l +  A) ^
M (/i ,  A) =  -
£ f  I fj, +  (1 — a0(1 +  A)1
It can be easily seen from this expression, that both higher financial depth (higher /i) and 
lower contractual imperfections (lower A) increase entry in the industry, as illustrated in 
the figure. An increase in financial depth expands the mass of firms that are not financially 
constrained, by increasing the proportion of insiders in the industry. Note however that 
this beneficial effect on entry is partially offset by the fact that, because of increased 
competition, it will be harder for firms to remain in the industry, and hence both 90 
and 9i go up). An increase in contractual imperfections decreases entry by reducing the 
number of outsiders in the industry. Again, this effect will be partially offset by the fact 
that, because of lower competition, more insiders firms will be able to enter the industry. 
For the case of an identical Pareto distributions across the two groups however, the first 
direct effect always dominates.
I now turn to the issue of firm size. Recall that the size (in terms of labour) of a firm 
with productivity 9 is given by a function x{9, A) such that and > 0. From the
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Figure 1.2: Heterogeneity in Financial Access: Firm ’s Size 
expression above, it is easy to see that
 gt£
A  =  K  yg 4- (1 — /i)(l +  A)1 J 
for some positive constant K.
Improvements in financial markets have unambiguous effects on firm size. An increase 
in financial depth (higher g) or a reduction contractual imperfection (lower A) reduce 
firms’ size by fostering the entrance of new firms in the industry and hence increasing 
competition.
Finally, I turn to the issue of average productivity. As before I compute Pintra as the 
unweighted average of the productivity levels of active firms in the industry, i.e.
0dG{6) +  (1 -  m) 5f0 0dG(O) M ^ i +  Moeo 
,n‘ra ~ M ( l  -  G ® j )  +  (1 -  M) ( l  -  ~
where M g and 6g represent the mass and average productivity of firms that are active in 
the industry for the two groups g € {z, o}. An increase in financial market depth (higher 
g) or a reduction in contractual imperfections (higher A) will have subtle effects on the 
productivity at the industry level. Consider the case of a decrease in A. A first effect will 
be that more firms of the outsiders will be able to enter the industry. These firms are
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less productive than the average outsider firm, implying tha t 90 will go down. On the 
other hand, more outsiders firms will be in the industry, and hence M 0 will go up. On 
the other hand, insider firms will face higher competition, implying tha t some of the least 
productive firms will exit the industry. This implies tha t 9{ will go up, and Mi will go 
down. Since we know that 90 > 9i, it is possible that, if the effect on to tal entry in the 
industry Mi +  M 0 is small, average productivity goes up .3
We conclude summarizing the results as follows,
P roposition  1.3 Fewer contractual imperfections fo r the outsiders (lower X)
i) increase entry < 0),
ii) conditional on entry, decrease firm ’s size > 0)
in) have ambiguous effects on industry productivity ^  0)
Higher "financial depth " (higher p )
i) increase entry ( ^ f  > 0 ),
ii) conditional on entry, decrease firms size (dXQ ^ < 0)
Hi) have ambiguous effects on industry productivity
1.4 C onclusions
In this introductory chapter, we have presented a simple framework tha t helps in under­
standing the effects of financial markets on industrial structure. In particular we have 
focussed on the effects of financial market imperfections on entry levels, firms’ size and 
industry productivity levels, in a context in which firms differ in terms of productivity. 
The analytical framework disentangles several aspects of financial market imperfections.
While I have shown that financial market imperfections tend to increase firm’s size by 
reducing entry and competition in the industry, the model also emphasized th a t it is
3It turns out that, under the assumption of a Pareto distribution however, total entry always increases, 
and this effect always dominates.
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im portant to distinguish how financial market imperfections are conceptualized. I have 
proposed a distinction between financial constraints at the entry stage and at the produc­
tion stage. Financial market imperfections at the entry stage reduce the number of firms 
tha t enter the industry a n d  survive in the industry, increase the probability of surviving 
in the industry conditional on entry and decrease the average productivity in the industry. 
In contrasts, financial market imperfections at the production stage increase the number 
of firms entering the industry b u t  reduce the number of firms surviving in the industry, 
reduce the probability of surviving in the industry conditional on entry and increase the 
average productivity in the industry conditional on survival. The difference between the 
two forms of financial constraints is that in the former case financial constraints act as 
a barrier to entry, while in the latter case financial constraints increase the competitive 
pressure - the harshness of the selection process - in the industry.
We have also emphasized a second im portant distinction in the way financial market im­
perfections are conceptualized. In the presence of contractual frictions in the financial 
market, accumulated wealth and access to informal networks are im portant determinants 
of access to finance. Thus, financial market imperfections can be conceptualized as the 
frictions in the contractual environment as well as the "depth" of the local financial sys­
tem, i.e. the proportion of firms that access to external finance. If firms are heterogeneous 
in terms of financial market access, the selection process in the industry implies th a t those 
tha t have privileged access will tend to be relatively less productive. An improvement 
of financial market access for these groups can end up hurting, through increased com­
petition, the firms that have worse access to financial markets: i.e. precisely those firms 
tha t are relatively more productive. It seems tha t these considerations are im portant in 
evaluating the role of financial markets imperfection in situations in which an im portant 
part of the production is carried on in the informal sector of the economy, where access 
to finance may be difficult.
The framework of this chapter could be enriched in several dimensions. F irst of all, it 
would be interesting to consider general equilibrium implications of financial market im­
perfections. Secondly, it would be interesting to consider the effects of financial market 
imperfection in constraining firms growth and technology choice. In the next chapter, 
I consider the jointly determination of market structure and vertical integration. The 
framework can also be used to think about the effects of financial market imperfections 
on technology choice. In the appendix to this chapter I sketch a model in which financial 
constraints directly affect firms’ size. The model is analytically more challenging, never­
theless it underlines some other important aspects of financial market imperfections.
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1.5 A pp en d ix: C redit C onstra in ts and  D isto r tio n s  in F irm s  
Size
/i =  0, only fixed costs have to be paid up-front. In this case credit constraints affects 
entry decisions, but conditional on entry there is no distortion with respect to  the optimal 
size of a firm. This case is the one analyzed in the first section of the chapter. The analysis 
of the general case, while more cumbersome, delivers some additional implications on the 
effects of credit constraints, and it is sketched in this Appendix.
Denoting by the labour used by firms with productivity 9 to produce x(9) units of 
output, and recalling the expression for the revenue function, the financial constraint for 
a firm with productivity 6 is now given by
Profits are increasing and concave in x(6), while the financial constraint is linearly increas­
ing in 6. This implies that,depending on 6, the firm can be in one of the following three
In this appendix I consider the case in which potential entrants in the market do not have 
initial wealth to pay the fixed costs and a part of the variable costs. In order to produce 
they need an initial disbursement of
where fi 6 [0,1] is the proportion of variable costs th a t have to be paid up-front. When
situation. Consider first the optimal x(9) chosen by the firm in the absence of financial 
constraints on firm’s size (i.e. (i =  0). Under this scenario, we know that
x{9) — (aA9)£
while variable profits are given by
U{9) = a a£{ l - a ) A £9a£
It follows tha t if
a a£(l -  a )A £9a£ > (1 +  A )/ +  Xfi ( a A f  9a£ 
the firm can choose the optimal size. This happens if
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An increase in competition, tha t is an exogenous decrease in A, raises the number of firms 
th a t are credit constrained, since ^  > 0.
Second, it can happen tha t a firm has a productivity 0 such that the firm is constrained 
in size. This happens for intermediate values of 0 E [0C,0 * ). When this is the case, the 
financial constraint holds as an equality, and the size of the firm x(0) is implicitly defined 
by it. The value of 0C is implicitly defined by the two conditions,
A(S(0‘) r  = (1 + X) ( f  +  n ^ p - )  and
aA{x(<nr =  (1  +  A )^P~
Solving the two equations, implies that
p c . P ((1 +  A ) / ) ^
a£ ((1 — a) A ) a
Finally, firms with productivity below 0C can not enter the industry. We thus have tha t 
the size of a firm with productivity 0 follows
I (a A 0 f  H 0 > 0 *  x{0) if 0 e [0C,0*)
0 if 0 < 0C
Some properties deserve a comment. First, as stated in the following Lemma, the interval 
[#c, 0*) is never empty, tha t is there are always some firms tha t are constrained in size.
L em m a 1.1 In any equilibrium the less productive firms are always credit constrained
Proof. Suppose not. For a given level of A , the least productive firm  active on the 
market (with productivity level 0C) is such that it earns operational profits equal to / ,  i.e. 
H{x{0c)) — f .  This contradicts A  (x{0))a =  (1 +  A) ( j  +  ■ ■
Second, mark-ups are not constant anymore: firms tha t are constrained in size are smaller 
and charges higher mark-ups. Thus the model endogeneize the degree of price competition 
in the industry. Consumers willingness to pay for the products of size constrained firms 
being higher, the capital n the industry is misallocated. Finally, consider two firms with 
productivity 0\ > 02- When the two firms are not constrained in size it is easy to show
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that the ratio of their sizes only depends on the ratio of their productivity levels, i.e.
p( 2) x{02) 01
When both firms are constrained instead we will have tha t
Pc{0i ,92) =  f{ p ,X ,A )
The relative size of firms is affected by the industry equilibrium and by the degrees of 
financial market imperfections. In this sense, the model endogeneizes the distribution of 
firm sizes. It is possible to show tha t
P ro p o s itio n  1.4 Assume f  > e. Then: - p— > 0, dp >  0 and dp < 0dfj,
Proof. First note that, since x(9) is implicitly defined as a solution to the equation 
A (x(9))a =  (1 +  A) -T P^p-^j , the implicit function theorem implies that
dx(9) (1 + A )p9~2x{9)
> 0
09 (1 +  A )p9 1 — otAx{9)a 1
since (1 +  A)p0~l — a A x(9 )a~1 > 0 is implied by the fact that x(9) is a solution to the 
equation defined by the credit constraint. Take 9\ > 92, 9XqP  > 0 implies that x(9i) > 
x(^2)- Using the financial constraint, this also implies that > x^ 2'-. Moreover the
implicit function theorem together with the financial constraint implies that
dx{9)
OX
f  +  P
x{6)
(1 +  A )p9 1 — aAx(9) a— 1
< 0
Since
we have
'dpc(91,9 2ysign
dA
= sign
\dpc(9l ,9 2)]sign
OX
= sign
OX
dx{9\)
OX
ox
x(e2) - d \
and substituting the expression for dxQ^ , we obtain
f  + »  f t\dpc{91,9 2)]sign
OX
- sign +
f T p 0^ 2
(! +  A)/ifi -  aAx% (1 +  A )/ig  -  oAx%
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From the budget constraint we can substitute A x a =  ( l + A ) ( /  +  / i | ) ,  implying
r<?pc(0i , 02)1sign
d \
= sign
-  Q (z  +  /^fr) ^ f f _ Q ! ( z  +  ^
Since > | | .  The proofs for dp g^,6>2^ and dp are identical.
sign  [ / ( l  - « ) - ! ] >
The Lemma proves that, if we omit the feedback effect that A has on the equilibrium 
level of A, when credit markets get better smaller firms receive relatively more capital 
than bigger firms. Improving credit market conditions improves the relative allocation of 
capital. Higher competition in the industry also shifts capital to the smaller firms, and 
in this sense improves the allocation of capital in the industry.
It is possible to show that there is a unique equilibrium, although an explicit solution is 
hard to obtain. The comparative statics with respect to A is in general ambiguous, and 
depends on the shape of the underlying distribution of 6. In general, improving financial 
markets (lower A) has a direct positive impact on the size of firms with 6 G [9C, 6*) and 
a negative effect on the size of firms that have 9 >  9*. There is also a direct effect that 
tend to increase the entry level, i.e. lower 9°. This is however not a general property 
of the equilibrium. Since better financial markets allow some firms to become larger, 
competition in the industry increase. This effects makes it harder for firms to borrow, 
and hence finance entry. If the distribution of 9 is such tha t an im portant mass of firms has 
productivity in the interval 9 G [i9°, 9*), entry may actually decrease with better financial 
markets. In other words, financial market imperfections, by constraining the growth of 
productive firms, allow inefficient firms to survive in the industry.
In the absence of financial market imperfections, if 9 is drawn from a Pareto distribution, 
than the distribution of firm’s size would also be Pareto. In the presence of financial 
market imperfections however, the distribution in firms size will be distorted. Large firms 
will be even larger, while some firms that would have middle size are smaller. In this 
sense, financial market imperfections provide in this model a rationale for the so called 
"missing middle" feature of the firms size distribution in developing countries.
Chapter 2
Contractual Institutions, Financial 
Developm ent and Vertical 
Integration: Theory and Evidence
2.1 In trod u ction
This chapter analyzes the different implications of contractual imperfections with suppli­
ers of specific inputs and with external investors on the degree of vertical integration at 
the industry level. The main results are that contractual imperfections with specific input 
suppliers and with external investors have different effects on vertical integration. In par­
ticular, financial market imperfections affect vertical integration through two opposing 
channels: a direct negative, investment, effect and an indirect positive, entry, effect. I 
develop an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms th a t combines a simple 
theory of vertical integration with a convenient parametrization of contractual frictions 
in specific input and financial markets. The model provides guidance on how to disen­
tangle the opposing effects empirically. Using cross-country-industry data, I find robust 
correlations which are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. In par­
ticular, I show that countries with more developed financial systems are relatively more 
vertically integrated in industries tha t are dominated by large firms. This work presents 
novel evidence on international differences in the organization of production and their 
institutional determinants, complements the existing literature on the determinants of 
vertical integration, and raises new theoretical questions on the long standing issue of 
what determines firm boundaries.
33
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Anecdotal evidence, as well as theoretical considerations, suggests the possibility of im­
portant cross-country differences in the organization of production in general, and in the 
degree of vertical integration in particular. For instance, the transaction cost approach 
to vertical integration (see e.g. Williamson (1975, 1985)) argues tha t when it is difficult 
to write detailed contracts, trading at arm’s length results in excessive transaction costs. 
Vertical integration, by replacing the bargaining process with authority, reduces transac­
tion costs and becomes, ceteris paribus, more likely when contracts are hard to  write and 
enforce. Since less developed countries are characterized by poor contractual enforcement, 
firms in those countries are often thought to be larger and more vertically integrated (see 
e.g. Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000)).
In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2005) provide evidence on the cross country deter­
minants of vertical integration and cast some doubts on these views. They show that 
countries with worse contractual institutions have higher degrees of vertical integration 
but these findings are entirely driven by industrial composition. W ithin industries, there 
is no evidence that countries with worse contractual institutions have higher degrees of 
vertical integration. Figure 1 confirms Acemoglu et al. (2005) findings using an alterna­
tive measure of vertical integration. It plots (the log of) the unweighted average of the 
ratios of value added over outpu t1 across 25 industries in the manufacturing sector against 
the (log of the) GDP per capita of each country. Figure 1 does not support the view that 
there is a higher propensity for firms to vertically integrate in poorer countries, and is 
instead consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting tha t subcontracting arrangements 
are fairly extensive in the developing world and in late industrializing countries.2
Motivated by this evidence, this chapter investigates whether contractual insitutions, and 
in particular financial markets imperfections, affect vertical integration differently across 
industries. Since contractual imperfections severely affect the efficiency of transactions 
in financial markets3, contractual imperfections with specific input suppliers and with 
external investors may be highly correlated requiring an analysis th a t disentangles their 
different roles.
To provide such an analysis, I develop an industry equilibrium model of vertical integration 
with contractual imperfections in specific input and financial markets. I make one key
1 Since Adelman (1955), a commonly used proxy of vertical integration in the industrial organization 
literature.
2See, for example, the experience of Italian industrial districts or the clusters in the early computer 
industry in Taiwan (Levy (1990)). Further examples from developing countries are given by the cotton 
industry in Tiruppur in southern India, the Guadalajara shoe cluster in Mexico (Woodruff (2002)), or 
the Sinos Valley in Brazil (Schmitz (1996)). Andrabi et al. (2004) provide an insightful analysis of the 
subcontracting arrangements of a large tractor producer in Pakistan.
3 Cross-country studies show that measures of financial development are strongly correlated with legal 
origin and other aspects of the legal system (see e.g. LaPorta et al. (1998)).
Av
er
ag
e 
Ve
rti
ca
l 
In
te
gr
at
ion
 
(L
og
)
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 35
Figure 2.1: Vertical Integration and GDP Per Capita
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assumption: vertical integration economizes on the needs for contracting with specific 
input suppliers at the cost of higher contractual needs with external investors. I embed 
this model of vertical integration in an industry equilibrium model in which firms are 
heterogeneous with respect to their productivity levels, as in Melitz (2003).
The model shows tha t contractual frictions in the intermediate input market and in the 
financial market have radically different implications for the extent of vertical integration 
in the industry. Since fewer contractual frictions in the intermediate input market miti­
gate the hold-up problem associated with arm ’s length transactions, the first part of the 
assumption implies tha t better contractual institutions reduce vertical integration in the 
industry.
The second part of the assumption nicely captures the fact tha t contractual frictions 
in financial markets affect vertical integration in the industry through two conceptually 
distinct and opposed channels and is consistent with acnedotal evidence from case stud­
ies from developing countries and American business history tha t suggest tha t external 
finance availability is an important determinant of vertical integration. For instance, 
Porter and Livesay (1971) document how only (entrepreneurs linked by various ties to) 
rich merchants where able to pursue a strategy of backward integration into the pro­
duction stages.4 Financial market imperfections thus have a direct (investment) impact 
on vertical integration: since vertical integration implies higher financial needs, less de­
veloped financial markets allow less firms to become vertically integrated. The industry 
equilibrium of the model naturally captures a second indirect (entry) effect of financial 
markets on vertical integration. Contractual frictions in financial markets deter entry, and 
thus increase the profit base tha t allows firms to vertically integrate. This second effect 
is also consistent with acnedotal evidence from the ninetheenth century texitle industry. 
For instance, Temin (1988) and Brown (1992) shows tha t firms in less competitive envi­
ronments created by financial underdevelopment and /  or trade barriers were significantly 
more vertically integrated. Haber (1991) convincingly demonstrate tha t financial mar­
ket imperfections have been an im portant barrier to entry in ninetheenth century texitle 
industry.5
Since the "investment" and "entry" effects have opposite sign the net impact of financial
4In a similar context, in a very detailed study of the Tiruppur cotton industry, Banerjee and Munshi 
(2004) analyze the effects of better access to local capital markets by different groups of entrepreneurs and 
conclude that entrepreneurs with better access to local finance are more vertically integrated and have 
greater control over the production process.
5These evidence is conssistent with the historical experience of other industries. For instance, Helper 
(1996) and Langlois and Robertson (1989)) discuss the case of the early American car industry. The 
absence of a positive trend in vertical integration in American manufacturing industries during the nine­
teenth century (a period that also witnessed the gradual development of capital markets and contract 
laws) is also consistent with the mechanics of the model (see, e.g., references in Perry (1989)).
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market frictions on vertical integration is ambiguous. One of the key contributions of 
the model is to clarify in which industries the investment or the entry effect should be 
expected to be relatively stronger. The model implies tha t the "investment" effect is 
relatively more im portant, and hence better financial markets lead to higher vertical 
integration, in industries dominated by large firms, in which financial constraints are not 
a primary source of entry barriers. On the contrary, the "entry" effect is stronger, and 
hence better financial markets lead to lower vertical integration, in industries dominated 
by small firms, where financial market imperfections are more likely to be a powerful 
barrier to entry.
In section 3 ,1 use cross-country-industry data  to provide econometric evidence on the rela­
tionship between contractual imperfections and vertical integration. I find some evidence 
tha t better contract enforcement institutions affect vertical integration at the industry 
level consistently with the theoretical predictions. Most importantly, I show tha t coun­
tries with more developed financial markets are relatively more vertically integrated in 
industries that are dominated by large firms, as predicted by the theory.
This work is closely related to several strands in the literature. On the theoretical side 
there is a large literature on vertical integration and firm boundaries. The two dominant 
theories of firm boundaries are the transaction costs theory (TC) developed by Williamson 
(1971, 1975, 1985) and the property rights theory (PR), developed by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The model in the theoretical section is most closely 
related to  the former.6
While most of the theoretical work on firm boundaries presents partial equilibrium models, 
a new and rapidly growing literature analyzes models of firm boundaries and organization 
in industry equilibrium. The model in this chapter is more closely related to this literature, 
and in particular to Grossman and Helpman (2002). W ith respect to their framework, 
I introduce firm heterogeneity and credit market imperfections. The heterogeneity of 
firms is essential in generating the predictions on the differential effects of credit market 
imperfections on vertical integration across industries.7 In his classical analysis of vertical 
integration and market imperfections, Williamson (1971) informally argued tha t in the
6While the two theories are conceptually different and have different empirical content (see e.g. Whin- 
ston (2003) and Gibbons (2004)), the adoption of a TC framework is not essential for our main results. In a 
PR tradition, Aghion and Tirole (1994), Legros and Newman (2004), and Acemoglu et al. (2006) consider 
settings in which ex-ante transfers are banned, an extreme form of financial markets imperfections.
7Antras (2003) and especially Antras and Helpman (2004) are also closely related. The latter in 
particular, analyzes an industry equilibrium model in which heterogeneous firms choose between FDI and 
outsourcing in a property rights framework. Other important recent contributions analyzing the internal 
organization of firms in industry equilibrum are Grossman and Helpman (2004, 2005) and Marin and 
Verdier (2002). Acemoglu et al. (2006) analyze an industry equilibrium model of the division of labor, 
while Acemoglu et al. (2003) analyze vertical integration in a Shumpeterian endogenous growth model.
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presence of financial market imperfections, vertical integration may be used as a barrier to 
entry. The model in this chapter takes a different angle on the relationship between credit 
constraints, entry barriers and vertical integration and leads to different conclusions.
On the empirical side, Acemoglu et al. (2005) is a parallel and independent study that is 
most closely related to this chapter. In contrast to their work, the theoretical model in my 
chapter allows to separate different opposing channels through which financial develop­
ment affects the degree of vertical integration across industries and countries. To do so, I 
focus in the empirical part on relative differences across industries within countries, while 
they mostly focus on industrial composition and within industries propensities towards 
vertical integration. The two works are thus highly complementary.
Antras (2003), Acemoglu et al (2004) and Aghion et al. (2006) are recent examples of 
cross-industry studies of vertical integration. Antras (2003) links firm boundaries to trade 
flows while Acemoglu et al (2004) exploit a very rich dataset on British manufacturing 
establishments to investigate the links between technological intensity and vertical in­
tegration. In a similar context, Aghion et al. (2006) analyze the relationship between 
vertical integration and competition.8
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the theoretical model. 
Section 3 presents empirical evidence on the cross-country determinants of vertical inte­
gration using country-industry data. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. Proofs 
and details about the main variables in the empirical analysis are in the Appendix.
2.2 M od el
In this section I develop an industry equilibrium model of the relationship between ver­
tical integration and contractual frictions with suppliers of specific inputs and external 
investors. The model shows that the two types of contractual frictions have different 
effects on vertical integration, that contractual frictions with external investors have an 
ambigous impact on vertical integration, and clarifies in which industries we should expect 
better financial markets to lead to more vertical integration.
This section is divided into three subsections. I first set up the model and introduce the 
contractual imperfections in input and financial markets as well as the distinction between
8 There is a large literature on the determinants of vertical integration in specific industries in the 
United States (see Whinston (2003)). A large part of this literature focussed on testing the TC theory 
of the firm. I am not aware of empirical papers that systematically examine the relationship between 
vertical integration, and credit markets. Fee et al (2005) analyze corporate equity ownership in vertical 
relationships in the United States.
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vertical integration and non-integration, and discuss the main assumptions. I then derive 
the industry equilibrium. In the third part I derive the effect of contractual imperfections 
on the degree of vertical integration in the industry and discuss the main results.
2 .2 .1  S e t U p
Environment
I consider an economy with population L  th a t produces goods using only labor. There are 
J  +  1 sectors. One sector provides a single homogeneous good. This good is used as the 
numeraire, and its price is set equal to 1. It is produced under constant return to scale, 
with a technology employing 1 unit of labor to produce 1 unit of the homogeneous good. 
Provided that the economy produces the homogeneous good, the wage will be w = 1. In 
the remaining of the chapter, I will assume tha t this is true. The other J  sectors supply a 
continuum of differentiated goods. In each of these sectors there is a fixed set of potential 
entrepreneurs described later. Each firm is a monopolist over the variety it produces.
The workers are the only consumers, each endowed with 1 unit of labor. They all have the
same CES preferences over the differentiated goods. A consumer tha t receives qo units of 
the homogeneous good, and q{9) of each variety 9 e ©j (to be determined in equilibrium) 
of the differentiated goods produced by industry j  6 {1, . . j , .. J} , gets a utility U
J r jl
U = Qq~ FT( I q(0)a>de)°i (2.1)
“  JeeSj
where ej =   ^j 1— > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of the differ­
entiated goods in industry j.
If all varieties in the set ©j are available at a particular price p(9) these preferences yield 
aggregate demand functions
q(0) = Ajp(6)~£j
where p(9) is the price of a particular variety 9 and
ipL
A? —
aiCJde)
The monopolist of variety 9 in industry j  treats Aj  as a constant, and so perceives a con-
i
stant elasticity of demand £j. I denote Pj =  J9eQ .pj(9)~Qj£jd9  as the price index
in industry j. The price index is inversely related to the "competitiveness" in the industry.
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Competitiveness is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the number of varieties produced in the 
industry, and decreasing in the (average) price charged by competitors.
Production and Firm Organization
I now turn to the description of firms’ technology and modes of organization in the 
industry. Since the set of potential entrepreneurs in each industry is exogenously given, 
and production of the homogeneous good in the economy implies w — 1, industries can 
be treated independently. Therefore, I suppress the subscript j  from industry variables. 
W ith a slight abuse of notation, I assume that each differentiated final product y{6) is 
produced under a constant marginal cost technology according to
y(9) = 91 (2.2)
where I  is a specialized component described below.9 I also assume tha t the specialized 
component must be exact in its specifications, and th a t different final goods require dis­
tinct components. An input must also be of suitably high quality in order to  be useful 
in the production of the final output. Furthermore, I assume tha t there are fixed costs 
associated with entering the market.
Final goods may be produced by vertically integrated firms, or by specialized producers 
that purchase their inputs at arm ’s length from external suppliers (outsourcing). In either
case I assume that an intermediate input of low quality can be produced at no cost.
The intermediate specific input is produced undertaking specific investments in a unit 
measure of (symmetric) tasks, each entailing a constant marginal cost c. The (quality of) 
the intermediate input is then a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
I  — exp ( ^ J  lnx(z)di^j (2-3)
where x ( i) denotes the level of investment in task i.
I consider a setting with incomplete contracting where investments in some tasks i can 
be observed by suppliers and the customers, but cannot be verified by a court. Because 
of this lack of verifiability, contracts specifying a certain price for a given quantity cannot 
be enforced since the supplier would have strong incentives to reduce her investment in 
some task i. Because of the contract however, the buyer would be forced to buy the input 
at the stipulated price.10
9It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for labor as an additional factor in the production 
of y, by having a production function of the form y =  y^ -^)
10The literature however discusses alternative solutions to contractual incompleteness (see e.g. Maskin
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Legal institutions vary greatly across countries. In order to capture the effects of different 
contractual institutions on vertical integration, I follow Acemoglu et al. (2006) in parame­
trizing the quality of the contract enforcement institutions in the following intuitive way. 
I assume that a measure p, of the tasks necessary to complete the intermediate input can 
be perfectly contracted upon, while a measure (1 — p) can not be contracted upon. While 
product and industry characteristics certainly affect the degree of contractual incomplete­
ness in intermediate inputs transactions, contract enforcement institutions also affect the 
degree of incompleteness of contracts. In countries with better contracting institutions 
p  tends to be higher, i.e. it is relatively easy to enforce contracts tha t give appropriate 
incentives to undertake ex-ante investments.
There are two alternative ways of organizing the firm. Under vertical integration the 
entrepreneur retains control over all non contractible investments. Vertical integration 
entails centralized control, and thus the entrepreneur (efficiently) decides all the relevant 
investments x{i).
Alternatively, the entrepreneur may decide to outsource to an independent supplier the 
production of the intermediate input. Under outsourcing the independent supplier re­
tains control over the non-contractible investments. The absence of ex-ante enforceable 
contracts exposes parties to a hold-up problem. Once a supplier specializes its inputs to 
a particular final product, these inputs have higher value within the relationship than in 
any alternative uses. Assuming for simplicity tha t the value in alternative uses is zero, 
the downstream producer can then threaten to refuse the transaction with the upstream 
supplier, unless the price, negotiated once the investments are sunk, is low enough. This 
leaves the upstream supplier in a relatively weak position. Anticipating this situation, the 
upstream supplier has insufficient incentives to invest in the non-contractible tasks L11
I assume tha t the marginal cost of investment x ( i) is equal to c =  1 in both vertically 
integrated firms and independent suppliers.12
The price for the intermediate input among two independent firms is negotiated ex-post.
and Tirole (1999) and Aghion et al. (1994)). I do not provide micro-foundations and take imperfect 
contracting as description of real commercial life.
11 As in the property rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)) I 
assume that (some) tasks x(i )  are not contractible. However, in contrast to the property rights framework, 
I assume that control over tasks is contractible and transferable, as in Baker et al. (2004). This brings 
the theory of the firm in this model closer to Transaction Costs theories of the firm (see e.g. Williamson 
(1975, 1985) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)).
12 When labor is an additional factor of production the results in the model can be obtained regardless 
of the contractibility of L. It would also be possible to allow differences in marginal costs of investment in 
task x [ i ) across organizational form, and in particular c <  1 for specialized suppliers, without affecting the 
results. Specialized suppliers may be more efficient than vertically integrated firms due to diseconomies 
of scope, or the excessive bureaucratic costs associated with a more complex, vertically integrated firm.
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Ex-post, once the non contractible investments have been undertaken and the specific 
input produced, the two parties bargain over appropriable quasi rents which are given by 
the amount of profits tha t can be obtained using the specific input to produce the final 
good. To simplify, I assume tha t in the ex-post bargaining process the downstream firm 
retains a share (1 — j3) of the revenues derived from the transaction, while the upstream 
firm retains the remaining share /3. Treating industries in isolation, it is correct to interpret 
a higher /i as better contractual enforcement in the country, while a lower (3 parametrizes 
the extent to which the industry relies on contracts with suppliers. If (3 is high, the hold 
up problem is not particularly severe, while if (3 is low the hold up problem is very severe 
and significant underinvestment in the non-contractible tasks results as a consequence of 
contractual imperfections.
I assume that in each industry there is a fixed pool of potential entrepreneurs tha t are 
heterogenous with respect to their productivity 9. Each entrepreneur draws her produc­
tivity level 6 from a distribution with associated continuous cumulative function G{9) and 
observe her productivity before deciding whether to start production. To simplify, I also 
assume tha t the mass of potential entrepreneurs is equal to L  in each industry. I take the 
distribution of the productivity parameter 9 as exogenous.13
I assume that there is a large supply of homogenous external suppliers. This assumption 
implies tha t a firm deciding to "buy" the intermediate input always find a partner.14
Fixed costs and financial constraints
In order to start production, firms incur fixed costs, such as the costs of entering the 
market and setting up the organization and of designing the differentiated product, as 
well as those fixed costs associated with the equipment necessary to perform assembly 
operations. These costs have to be paid by all firms, regardless of the organizational form, 
and are denoted by / .  In addition, firms that decide to  become vertically integrated have 
to acquire control over the extra equipment needed to produce the intermediate inputs. 
I assume tha t the cost of this additional machinery is equal to fc, and tha t both /  and 
k are strictly positive. It is crucial that k > 0. This assumption introduces a trade-off 
between the two organizational forms which is central for the results. Vertical integration 
reduces the distortions associated with imperfect contracting in input markets, but comes 
at the cost of higher financial requirements for the firm. For our purposes, it is irrelevant
13However the marginal cost of producing one unit of the final good depends on the organizational 
form. Since firms with different 0 choose different organizational forms, the distribution of measurable 
productivity is endogenous and is determined by the same forces shaping the organizational form choice.
14The assumption that suppliers are homogeneous implies that there are no matching /  sorting issues 
between heterogeneous (in terms of 6) downstream and homogeneous upstream units, and is made for the 
sake of analytical tractability.
CH APTER 2. CREDIT CO NSTRAINTS AND VERTICAL IN TEG RATIO N 43
whether a firm deciding to become vertically integrated incurs the extra cost k in order to 
acquire one of the existing suppliers, or instead builds at cost k the necessary equipment 
from scratch.15
I assume that fixed costs have to be paid up-front, i.e. before production takes place and 
th a t firms have no liquidity and need to borrow from external investors in order to finance 
the fixed cost investment. I assume for simplicity th a t the risk free interest rate in the 
economy is equal to zero, and that a large supply of risk neutral investors lend capital at 
this interest rate. I model credit constraints in a rather crude, but simple, way. I assume 
th a t the fixed costs /  and k need to be financed in advance, and are in fact composed of 
a continuum of small investments. I assume that a fraction 1 — A of this investments is 
contractible: external investors can easily make sure th a t the capital is effectively invested 
in the project (for instance renting corporate buildings, acquiring specific machines, etc.). 
In contrast, the remaining fraction A is not contractible, in the sense tha t the external 
provider of finance can not make sure that the capital is effectively invested in production 
(e.g. hiring the appropriate product designer, purchase of some specific services, etc.), 
and can be poketed by the entrepreneur.16
Denote with TlfiO) and F{ the variable profits and financial requirements of firms under 
organizational form i E {i>, o}.17 In the Appendix I proove
Lem m a 1
An entrepreneur with productivity 0 obtains funding to set up a firm  with organizational 
form  i E {v, o} i f  and only if  11 (^0) >  (1 +  A )F{.
Lemma 1 describes the effects of the contractual frictions in the financial market associated 
with the two different organizational forms. If A is equal to zero, credit markets are 
perfect, and all projects tha t generate (variable) profits in excess of the fixed costs (i.e. 
with positive net present value), are financed. However, if A is positive, some projects
15 The assumption that vertical integration entails higher fixed costs is common in the literature (see 
e.g. Williamson (1971), Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antras and Helpman (2004)). The assumption 
can be justified on different grounds such as, for example, "managerial" diseconomies of scales. Here I 
emphasize that in order to effectively acquire control over the production of the intermediate input a firm 
has to build its own plant, or must acquire an upstream supplier. In either case, these operations are 
assumed to be relatively more costly than dealing with an already established external supplier whose 
fixed costs are at least partially sunk.
16The case of a specialized assembler is slightly more complicated, since the relationship between the 
external investors and the entrepreneur is also affected by the presence of the independent supplier. Since 
fixed costs /  have to be financed before the specific match with the supplier is realized, I focus on bilateral 
contracts.
11 Fv =  f  + k and F0 =  /  are the financial requirements of vertical integration and outsourcing respec­
tively.
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that would generate positive net present value cannot be financed because of the form of 
moral hazard introduced by contract incompleteness in the capital markets18.
To summarize, the timing of events is as follows. Entrepreneurs with heterogenous pro­
ductivity 0 decide whether to enter the market, as a vertically integrated firm or as a 
specialized manufacturer of final goods. Those that choose vertical integration as the or­
ganizational form of their firm and find external investors willing to finance them, borrow 
from external investors and pay the corresponding fixed costs, /  and k and undertake 
production decisions. Those that decide to enter as assemblers of final good and find 
external investors willing to finance them, are matched to a supplier. Suppliers can make 
ex-ante transfers to attract assemblers. The assembler and the supplier write an ex-ante 
contract specifying an initial transfer from the supplier to the assembler, and investments 
on the fraction fi of contractible tasks. After this contract is signed, the supplier under­
takes non-contractible investments i. Finally, bargaining over the surplus takes place, the 
final goods are produced and sold, and external investors are repaid.
2 .2 .2  In d u str y  E q u ilib r iu m
I now turn to the determination of the industry equilibrium. In order to solve the industry 
equilibrium, I first compute the profit functions for a vertically integrated and for a non­
integrated firm respectively. I then analyze the organizational form and entry decision of 
entrepreneurs with productivity 9, and define the industry equilibrium. The derivation 
of profit functions and proofs of all the results are reported in the Appendix.
In the Appendix I show that the variable profits of a vertically integrated firm are given 
by
IIv(0) -  a a£A6a£{ 1 -  a) (2.4)
while the profits of a non-integrated firm are equal to
IIo(0) =  a a£Q{l3, ii)A9a£{ 1 -  ot) (2.5)
where 1) =  1, Q(/9, 0) =  and > 0. Under both organizational forms,
profits are increasing in the productivity index 0, and increasing in the index A, i.e.
18The formulation relies on a form of ex-ante moral hazard. However one could imagine that, once
firms realize revenues, the owner of the firm can hide (a share of) profits at some per unit cost A < 1,
avoiding to repay the external investors. This form of ex-post  moral hazard would generate a form of 
credit constraints equivalent to the one introduced in the text.
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decreasing in the number of firms active in the industry. 
We have
Lem m a 2
There exists a unique threshold 9V such that a firm  with productivity 6 > 0V earns higher 
profits choosing vertical integration rather than non integration. The opposite is true for  
9 < 9V.
In particular the unique threshold 9V is determined by the equality
n„(?„) - ( /  + *> = iu?„) - / < = * ? , =  "  (2-6)
Note tha t the threshold 9V is decreasing in A. This implies that, ceteris paribus, in more 
competitive markets 9V is higher, i.e. fewer firms find it profitable to integrate vertically. 
This is simply due to the fact that in order for vertical integration to be profitable, a 
firm must generate enough profits to repay the additional fixed costs. Vertical integration 
reduces inefficiencies caused by contract incompleteness, and is relatively more attractive 
for entrepreneurs with higher 9 (lower marginal costs): as a result vertical integrated firms 
are larger and more productive.
Firms however, are not unconstrained in their choice of organizational form. When A > 0 
financial constraints prevent some firms from adopting the optimal organizational form. 
Substituting the profit function of a vertically integrated firm into the respective financial 
constraint, we obtain that a firm with productivity 9 can enter the industry as a vertically 
integrated firm if and only if
i
e — 1
11.(9) >  (1 +  A )(/ +  k) ^ 6 > 6 V = {  1 (2-7)
The relative position of the two thresholds 9V and 9V determines whether financial con­
straints affect the vertical integration decision of firms. If 9V <  9V, financial constraints 
are irrelevant when making a vertical integration. However, if 9y > 9y instead some entre­
preneurs who would like to enter the industry as vertically integrated firms are prevented 
from doing so by the existence of financial constraints. In the remaining part of this 
chapter I will focus on the case in which (1 -f A)(l — Q(/?, p:)) > (k+f) ’ and hence 9V >  9V, 
so that some entrepreneurs are constrained in their organizational form decision. A first
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implication of lower contractual frictions in the financial markets is tha t more entrepre­
neurs will be able to vertically integrate. Financial market imperfections thus impact 
vertical integration through a direct "investment" effect.
Finally, in order to solve for the industry equilibrium of the model I have to  derive 
the thresholds determining whether an entrepreneur can enter the industry as a non­
integrated firm. Combining the financial constraint inequality for a non-integrated firm 
with its respective profit function, it is obvious tha t an entrepreneur with productivity 9 
can enter the industry with a non-integrated firm if and only if
n oW  > (i +  a ) /  <=3- o > 8 e = ( Aaac( t +a ) m , ) ) ^  w
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the industry.
P ro p o s itio n  3
I f  (k+f) — there exists a unique equilibrium defined by two thresholds 6e and
9V, such that entrepreneurs with 9 < 9e do not enter the industry, entrepreneurs with 
9 G [9e,9v) enter the industry as specialized assemblers, and entrepreneurs with 9 > 9V 
enter the industry as vertically integrated firm s .
I f  (k+J) > there exists a unique equilibrium defined by the threshold 9V, such that
entrepreneurs with 9 < 9V do not enter the industry, and entrepreneurs with 9 > 9V enter 
the industry as vertically integrated firm s .
The model generates an endogenous sorting of firms with heterogeneous productivity 
into organizational forms: only relatively more productive firms generate enough variable 
profits to cover the extra financial requirements necessary to vertically integrate. When 
jk+j) ^  ^(/^i I1)-: distortions associated with outsourcing are relatively mild, and both
organizational forms coexist in equilibrium. On the other hand, when > ^((3,pb),
the inefficiencies caused by incomplete contracting are so strong tha t the industry only 
displays vertically integrated firms. A firm trying to enter the industry as a non-integrated 
firm would not generate enough profits to credibly commit to repay external investors.
The endogenous sorting of firms into organizational forms implies a positive correlation 
between firm’s size and vertical integration. Moreover, since the specialized component 
is useless outside the relationship, quasi-rents are entirely determined by the scale of 
operation of the firm. The model thus predicts a positive correlation between quasi-rents
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and vertical integration. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal as well as more 
formal evidence.19
Large, and perhaps vertically integrated firms, are often believed to have easier access to 
financial markets, suggest the possibility that A may vary with the organizational form of 
the firm, and in particular Xv < Xa. The main predictions of the model would be robust 
as far as j ^  < D((3, /x). The model, however, suggests an alternative explanation for 
the presumption tha t vertically integrated firms, being larger, find easier access to finance. 
The underlying heterogeneity in productivity implies tha t vertically integrated firms are 
larger, and, while vertical integration requires more external finance, in a cross-section of 
firms vertically integrated firms are less likely to be financially constrained. This would 
also be true if instead of k > 0 we assumed tha t it is more difficult to monitor large and 
complex organizations, i.e. A^  > A0 (as argued in Williamson (1971)).20
2 .2 .3  M a in  P r e d ic t io n s  o f  th e  M o d e l
I now turn to the analysis of the role that the institutional variables // and A play in 
determining the extent of vertical integration in the industry.
Following the seminal contribution in Adelman (1955), the empirical literature has often 
measured vertical integration as the ratio of valued added over sales. Intuitively, the ratio 
tells us the percentage of the value of production tha t is carried on within firm boundaries. 
In our model, the ratio of valued added over sales is equal to 1 for vertically integrated 
firms, and is instead equal to (1 — ft) for non-integrated firms.
At the industry level, a convenient index of vertical integration is given by the average 
index of vertical integration of firms active in the industry. Denoting by N v and N 0 
the number (measure) of vertically integrated and non-integrated firms respectively, the
19Acemoglu et al. (2005b) report positive correlation between size and vertical integration. The im­
plication that vertically integrated firms are more productive, while not necessary for the results, is also 
consistent with empirical evidence (see e.g. Hortacsu and Syevrson (2005) on the cement industry in the 
U.S.). It is a common finding in empirical work in the transaction costs literature that higher quasi-rents 
are associated with higher vertical integration (see e.g. Whinston (2003) for a survey).
20 While common in the literature, assuming k  >  0 does not provide a satisfactory explanation of firm 
boundaries (see e.g. Gibbons (2004)) . On the other hand, assuming Xv >  A0 raises the interesting question 
of why vertical integration makes the monitoring by external investors more difficult. Macchiavello (2006) 
argues that vertical integration, by bringing the bargaining process inside the firm, reduces the amount 
of information that can be used by external investors to monitor the firm. Inderst and Mueller (2004), 
Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) analyze models in which the organizational form of the firm affects the 
financial constraint of the firm, (see also the survey in Stein (2004)).
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industry level index of vertical integration is given by
I  N T  =  +  Ny ' 1 =  1 — (3__ — __  (2 9)
N a + N v P N 0 + N V
I focus on the more interesting case fy+j) < >u), in which both organizational forms
coexist in the industry. When this is the case, in the industry equilibrium there is a mass 
of non-integrated firms equal to G(0V) — G(0e), and a mass of vertically integrated firms 
equal to 1 — G(0V). The average index of vertical integration in the industry is then given
I  N T  =  1 — <3G(^  (2-10)
As is clear from this expression, the industry level index of vertical integration critically 
depends on the shape of the underlying distribution of productivity, G(0). I make the 
following assumption
A ssu m p tio n
0 is distributed in the population according to a generalized Pareto distribution, i.e.
c (g) = i - ( i + (1! g ) g : ! ) )~i  (2-u )
with 0 > 1, 0 > 1 and o 6 (0, l ).21
The average productivity of the potential pool of entrepreneurs is parametrized by 0, 
while the shape of the distribution is conveniently parametrized by a. For a given 0, the 
effect of different a is depicted in 2.2.
When <7 =  1 — =, the distribution is a standard Pareto distribution. For cr < 1 — =, the
6 0
distribution has relatively lower density at low levels of 0, and higher density for large 0. 
The opposite is true for <j > 1 — =. Proxying the size of the firm with revenues, equations 
2.4 and 2.5 show tha t more productive firms (higher 0) are larger. Industries with low a 
are dominated by (relatively) large firms, while industries with high a are dominated by 
small firms.
21The density of a generalized Pareto is given by g(6) = ^(1 + c r ) ~ 1~  ^. In order to perform 
comparative statics on ths shape parameter o  without simultaneously changing average productivity G, I 
have fixed 6 =  9dG{B) =  ^1 +  substituting for the scaling parameter (  to obtain the expression
in the assumtpion.
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Figure 2.2: Generalized Pareto Distribution, for 0 = 2, and a 6 {3, |}
Since this chapter is mainly concerned with identifying the role of contractual institutions 
on vertical integration, Propositions 4 and 5 provides comparative statics results with 
respect to contractual imperfections with input suppliers (//) and external investors (A).22
With respect to industry parameters, it can be shown that vertical integration is increasing in 6 and 
decreasing in /3 and a.
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Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics and Industry Equilibrium (1)
P ro p o sitio n  4
A ssu m e  <  D ((i,p ) .  B e tte r  con tractual in s ti tu tio n s  in  in p u t m a rke ts  (h igher p )
unam big u o u sly  reduces vertica l in tegra tion  in  the in d u stry .
Proposition 4 considers the effects of changes in contractual institutions p  on the degree 
of vertical integration in the industry. There are two effects: a partial equilibrium effect 
and an industry equilibrium effect. The partial equilibrium effect is that the profits of 
a non-integrated firm increase, thus making non-integration relatively more profitable. 
This effect is illustrated in figure 2.3.23 The figure reports the profits of firms with 
productivity 9 under integration and non-integration. C eteris  pa rib u s , better contract 
enforcement leads to a decrease in vertical integration in the industry, in the sense that 
fewer firms are vertically integrated. The industry equilibrium effect is due to the fact 
that, since non-integrated firms are relatively more efficient because of better contractual 
institutions, vertically integrated firms face higher competition. This implies that the 
profits of each firm with productivity 9 > 9V decrease and this further shifts towards the 
right the threshold 9V. The industry equilibrium effect thus pushes further away from
2J Since the industry equilibrium effect goes in the same direction as the partial equilibrium effect, it is 
not illustrated in Figure 5 in order to keep the analysis simpler.
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vertical integration.24
Note that an implication of the model is tha t countries with better contract enforcement 
(higher p) are relatively more vertically integrated in industries tha t heavily rely on 
contracts (low j3). When j3 is very low the hold-up problem is so severe that non-integrated 
firms can not survive in the industry (remember tha t when (3 is too low, (k+f) ^  A1))-
The vertical integration index is very high (in the model equal to one) regardless of 
contract enforcement p. Industries with higher j3 instead will not be completely vertically 
integrated, and, as stated in proposition 4, will be more vertically integrated in countries 
with worse contract enforcement.
Proposition  5
Assume pg+yy < 0,(/3,p). Better contractual institutions in financial markets (lower X) 
increase vertical integration if  o < 1 — = and decrease vertical integration i f  a  >  1 — =.
Proposition 5 considers the case of better capital markets (i.e. lower A) and delivers 
the main prediction that I will test in the empirical section. As in the case of better 
contractual enforcement there are two different effects: a partial equilibrium effect, and 
an industry equilibrium effect.
The effects of imperfect financial markets are illustrated in figure 2.4. First, whenever A > 
0 some firms are credit constrained and cannot integrate vertically. Because of the sorting 
effect, only firms with productivity above a certain threshold are vertically integrated. 
When capital markets improve, the threshold moves towards the left, as it becomes easier 
to raise external funds. Since lack of financial resources is the only constraint on vertical 
integration, better financial markets have a positive (partial equilibrium) "investment" 
effect on the degree of vertical integration. However, better financial markets also favor 
the entry of new competitors in the industry. First of all, the marginal entrant is a non- 
integrated firm, an effect that counterbalances the previous effect. More importantly, new 
competitors in the industry implies that each firm earns fewer profits. This effect implies 
tha t fewer firms can become vertically integrated.
Proposition 5 states that the effect of better financial markets on vertical integration, 
while a priori ambiguous, crucially depend on the shape of the underlying distribution of 
productivity in the industry and thus clarifies when we should expect the "investment"
24This can be easily shown for the case in which 9 follows a Pareto distribution in the industry. Under 
this circumstance the index of vertical integration only depends on the ratio 9e/ 9 v, it is easy to show that 
an increase in yu, raising 0(/3, >u.), reduces 6e and thus implies lower vertical integration.
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Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics and Industry Equilibrium (2)
or the "entry" effect, to be stronger. Better financial markets increase vertical integration 
in industries that have relatively high densities at high 6 , since the "investment" effect 
is relatively stronger in such industries. These industries are, for technological reasons, 
dominated by large firms, in the sense that a large share of output is produced in large 
firms. On the other hand, better financial markets reduce vertical integration in industries 
that have relatively high densities at low 9, since in those industries the "entry" effect is 
relatively stronger. These industries are instead dominated by relatively small firms, in 
the sense that a large share of output is produced by such firms.
This second effect differentiates the mechanics of the response of vertical integration to 
better contractual institutions in the capital markets compared with the effect of better 
contractual institutions in the specific input market. In the specific input market the in­
dustry equilibrium effect works in the same direction as the partial equilibrium effect, and 
the total effect is thus unambiguous. The model clarifies why contractual imperfections 
with suppliers of specific inputs, and with external investors impact vertical integration 
in radically different ways and provides a candidate explanation for why we do not find 
evidence that countries with better contractual institutions have lower degrees of vertical 
integration within industries (see Acemoglu et al. (2005)).
The fact that the relationship between credit constraints and vertical integration depends
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT CO NSTRAINTS AND  VERTICAL IN T E G R A TIO N 53
on other determinants of the firms size distribution in the industry is reminiscent of older 
informal arguments in the literature. In his pioneering paper on vertical integration and 
market failures, Williamson (1971) argues that, if borrowers are confronted by increasingly 
adverse rates as they increase their finance requirements, costs may not be independent of 
vertical structure. He goes on arguing that "established firms may use vertical integration 
strategically to increase finance requirements and thereby discourage entry if potential 
entrants feel compelled, as a condition of successful entry, to adopt the prevailing structure 
- as they may if the industry is highly concentrated" (Williamson (1971), pp. 119). 
The formal argument in the model reverses the perspective on vertical integration as a 
barrier to entry in the presence of financial markets imperfections and leads to different 
predictions. Since financial markets act as powerful barriers to entry, I show tha t poor 
functioning financial markets can lead to higher vertical integration if the industry is not 
highly concentrated.25
It is often argued that vertical integration may be a response to the difficulties of finding 
suitable and reliable suppliers. To the extent tha t institutional failures in developing 
countries hinder the development of upstream industries, it is expected th a t firms in the 
developing world are relatively more vertically integrated. The model developed so far 
assumed tha t a downstream firm always finds a potential supplier in the market. It is 
straightforward to relax this assumption in order to consider the effects of contractual 
imperfections in financial markets on the degree of vertical integration by examining 
the effect on the development of upstream industries. In the presence of credit market 
imperfections input markets become tighter, and it is more difficult to find a supplier 
for a non-integrated downstream assembler. This effect reduces the relative returns of 
non-integration in the industry, and is thus equivalent to a reduction in f i n  the 
model in the previous subsection. We can state26
P roposition  6
Better contractual institutions in the financing of upstream industries reduce vertical in­
tegration in the downstream industry
In the next section I exploit cross-country variation in contractual institutions and cross­
industry variation in contractual needs with specific input suppliers and with external 
investors to provide some evidence on the relationship between vertical integration and
25 In the model the size of a firm is determined by the productivity parameter 0. Qualitatively similar 
results would be reached if wealth, instead of productivity, was the source of heterogeneity in firms size.
26 A variation of the model presenting this argument formally is available upon request.
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contractual imperfections. I mostly focus on the theoretical results in Proposition 5, which 
predicts that
1. Fewer contractual imperfections with external investors (lower A) increase vertical 
integration in industries dominated by large firms, and decrease vertical integration 
in industries dominated by small firms.
Since contractual imperfections with external investors (A) and with input suppliers 
(/r) are likely to be highly correlated across countries, Proposition 4 suggest that 
we need to control for the additional effects of contractual imperfections with input 
suppliers. When we do so, we expect that
2. Countries with better contract enforcement are relatively more vertically integrated 
in industries with high contractual needs
Finally, proposition 6 suggests tha t we also need to control for the additional impact 
tha t financial market development has on vertical integration through the develop­
ment of upstream industries. In other words, we also expect that
3. Better credit markets reduce vertical integration by allowing more firms to enter 
upstream industries.
2.3  E m pirical E v idence
In this section I use data on cross-country-industry differences in vertical integration in 
the manufacturing sector to provide formal empirical evidence on the relationship between 
financial market development and vertical integration. This section is divided into three 
subsections. I first describe the data, and in particular the indexes of vertical integration. 
I than discuss the specification used to test the main prediction of the model. I finally 
presents the main results and robustness checks. An Appendix contains details on the 
construction of the industry level variables used in the regressions, as well as further 
robustness checks.
2 .3 .1  D a ta
The main measure of vertical integration in industry i in country c comes from the UNIDO 
database. Following the industrial organization literature (see e.g. Adelman (1955)), I
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measure vertical integration in industry i in country c as the ratio of value added over 
output, i.e.
V A
IN T ic = ^  (2.12)
ic
At the firm level, the measure captures the proportion of the production process that is 
carried out within firm boundaries. A higher value of the index is therefore associated 
with a higher degree of vertical integration.27
The data used to compute the index of vertical integration are from the 2001 edition 
of the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database. D ata are available for the manufacturing 
sector, and are aggregated at the three-digit level of the second revision of the ISIC Code 
classification system. This gives a total of 29 manufacturing industries. The data  were 
supplied by national statistical offices and supplemented with estimates generated by 
UNIDO whenever necessary. The 2001 edition of the database covers 175 countries for 
the period 1963-1999. However, since period coverage as well as item coverage differ from 
country to country, I focus on a sample of 88 countries using the years from 1990 to 1998 
inclusive. Since the analysis does not exploit time variation, I use only the average of 
the variable of interest for the period between 1990 and 1998. In the entire sample the 
index of vertical integration spans essentially all the unit interval. Table l.a  shows the 
average degree of vertical integration for each industry in the sample, and Table l.b  lists 
the countries used in the analysis.
In order to check for the robustness of the results, Table 6 reports results using a second 
measure of vertical integration in industry i and country c. This second measure is con­
structed from firm level information provided in Worldbase, a database maintained by 
Dun & Bradstreet, and follows the procedure in Acemoglu et al. (2005a). It exploits firm 
level information on primary 4-digit SIC code, and up to five other 4-digit SIC codes of 
secondary product lines for the firm, combined with input-output data  from the United 
States. I describe in Appendix B the construction of this alternative measure in greater 
detail. I also restrict attention to the manufacturing sector and to the same sample of 
countries as for the UNIDO measure. The main advantages of the first measure are that 
it is a well known index of vertical integration and tha t data come from industrial sta­
tistics relying on Census information. While issues of comparability across countries and 
aggregation may introduce measurement error, the data  are overall representative. The 
second measure instead has the advantage of being constructed from a very large firm 
level database, and exploit information on firms activities. Moreover, the industry clas­
sification allows me to consider two-digit input-output classification system, i.e. to  break
2' Because of data availability, I am constrained to use the index at the industry level. This aggregation 
may introduce measurement error. For example, the index is sensitive to the degree of intra-industry 
trade between vertically disintegrated firms within the industry.
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT CO NSTRAINTS AND  VERTICAL IN TEG RATIO N 56
up the manufacturing sector in 52 industries. However, the construction of the firm level 
index hinges on the use of input-output information from the United States, and large 
countries tend to be over represented in the sample.
I use two main different types of right-hand-side variables.28 A first set of variables are 
various industry characteristics in the United States. The main ones are external financial 
dependency (Rajan and Zingales (1998) and author’s calculations), importance of small 
firms, measured by the share of employees working in establishments with less than 100 
or 500 employees (author’s calculations from 1992 US census of industries), contractual 
needs, as proxied by the Herfhindal index of input shares (author’s calculations) and ex­
ternal financial dependency of upstream industries (author’s calculations). The Appendix 
describes the construction of these variables.
The second set of variables are country level measures of financial development and con­
tractual institutions. The preferred measure of financial development is the average ratio 
of bank credit over GDP during the nineties, and it is taken from Levine (2005). Levine 
(2005) also provides alternative measures of financial development that I use in Table 
5. Finally, I proxy contractual institutions with suppliers of specific inputs with (minus) 
the number of procedures mandated by law or court regulation demanding interactions 
between the parties or between them and the judge. I take this measure from the Do­
ing Business database at World Bank available online, which follows the methodology in 
Djankov et al. (2003).
Table l.c provides basic summary statistics for the industry level variables at the 3-digit 
ISIC level as well as for the country level variables in the sample.
2 .3 .2  S p ec ifica tio n
I test the hypothesis that more developed financial markets increase vertical integration 
in industries dominated by large firms and decrease vertical integration in industries 
dominated by small firms. Since the model treats industries in isolation, the parameter 
for contractual imperfections in financial markets Aic can be thought as industry-country 
specific. Since I do not have data on exogenous variations in the supply of credit to 
industry i in country c, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and proxy for \ c using an 
interaction between the degree of external financial dependency of industry i in the United 
States EDi and a variable capturing the level of financial markets development F D C in
28Whenever possible, I control for other variables at the industry country level (such as average firm 
size, number of establishment, average mark-up). Results are never affected by the inclusion or exclusion 
of these additional controls. Henceforth, I omit to discuss them in the remaining of the text.
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country c.
The model predicts that the effect of Aic should be allowed to depend on other tech­
nological determinants of firm’s size distribution in the industry, and in particular on 
the relative importance of small and large firms. In the main specification, I proxy the 
degree to which industry i relies on small firms with the share of employees working in 
establishments with less than 500 employees in industry i in the United States, SFi.
Denoting by IN T ic the degree of vertical integration in industry i and country c, the 
baseline specification is given by
IN T ic = (3q +  /?i (EDi x F D C) +  /32 (EDi x SFi x F D C) -I- (SFi x F D C) +  rji +  n c +  Sic
(2.13)
which can be rewritten in compact notation as
IN T ic +  fiX ic +  rji +  /rc +  eic (2-14)
where r/i and fic are a set of industry and country dummies and (3Xic is a compact notation 
for the interactions of interest. I also include as controls a measure of average size and 
the number of firms in the industry. Since the regression includes country fixed effects, 
the estimate of the vector of coefficient (3 identifies relative propensity towards vertical 
integration. The coefficient /31; for instance, tells wether countries with more developed 
financial markets are relatively more or less vertically integrated in industries that depend 
on external finance. W hether industries in countries with better financial markets are on 
average more or less vertically integrated can not be identified in the regression, because 
of the inclusion of the country fixed effects /xc. In other words, the specification tests the 
empirical validity of the main predictions of the model by exploring whether country level 
measures of contractual imperfections have a differential impact across industries.
The use of industry characteristics from the United States to differentiate industries along 
technological characteristics deserves some comment. The interaction term proxing for Aic 
captures the specific channels through which it is reasonable to expect financial market 
development to affect vertical integration in a given industry (external financial depen­
dency). The results reported below on the baseline specification and on a number of 
robustness checks document robust correlations which are consistent with the predictions 
of the model, and that show tha t financial markets impact vertical integration differently 
across industries. The use of industry characteristics in the United States can be thought 
as a convenient device to describe correlation patterns in the data.
The use of industry characteristics in the United States, introduced in the influential work
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by Rajan and Zingales (1998), has been extensively used in the literature on industrial 
development and finance (see for a survey Levine (2005)), and in recent papers on the 
determinants of trade (e.g. Nunn (2005)). This literature claims tha t under two distinct 
sets of assumptions, the use of industry characteristics from the U.S. allow for a causal 
interpretation of the coefficients estimated with equation 2.13. First, to the extent tha t 
markets in the United States are unregulated and well functioning, equilibrium variables 
in the U.S. can be taken as good proxies of technological characteristics inherent to the 
production process of a given industry. Second, if the ranking of industry characteristics 
in the United States is the same than in other countries, the technological characteristics 
of industry i in the U.S. are representative of technology in other countries. Under 
those two assumptions, the effect of financial development works through the specific 
channel of financial needs, thus increasing the likelihood of capturing a causal impact of 
financial markets development on vertical integration.29 Since the validity of those two 
"identification assumptions" is hard to test empirically, I hope tha t the several robustness 
checks I include in the analysis will neverthless convince the reader tha t the correlation 
patterns I document in the data are robust to different specifications.30
In light of the theoretical predictions, I expect > 0 and /?2 < 0. When the technology 
of industry i is such that only a small fraction of employees work in small firms, the model 
predicts that better financial markets will lead to more vertical integration, and hence 
Pi +  @2SFi > 0. When instead the technology of industry i is such th a t a big fraction of 
employees work in small firms, the model predicts tha t better financial markets will lead 
to less vertical integration, and hence (3l +  @28^  < 0-
2 .3 .3  R e su lts
Table 2 presents the main results. Column I reports the coefficient on the interaction of 
financial development and external financial dependency. As argued above, the model has 
ambiguous predictions on this coefficient, since better financial markets in industry i and 
country c can lead to higher or lower degrees of vertical integration depending on whether 
the industry is dominated by large or small firms. While the positive coefficient indicates 
tha t, on average, countries with better financial systems are relatively more vertically
29Note also that, even if measures of external financial dependency and firm’s size distribution were 
available for industry i in country c, these measures should not be used in the analysis because these are 
likely to be endogenously determined and to be dependent on vertical integration.
30In line with the spirit of the main identification assumption, I run the regressions using the ranking 
of the industry level variables in the United States. Moreoever, I use the natural logarithm for the 
left-hand-side variables, and for all the country level variables used in the analyis.
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Figure 2.5: Differential Effect of Better Credit Markets
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integrated in industries that heavily depends on external finance, the relationship is not 
statistically different from zero.
As argued in the theoretical section, the effect of better financial markets on the degree of 
vertical integration should be allowed to depend on some proxy of other determinants of 
the size distribution of firms in the industry. Column II reports the results of estimating 
equation 2.13, in which I proxy the degree to which industry % relies on small firms 
with the share of employees working in establishments with less than 500 employees in 
the United States. In light of the theoretical predictions, I expect (31 > 0 and fi2 < 
0.31 Consistently with the theoretical predictions, I find tha t in industries th a t rely on 
small firms, better financial markets have a negative impact on the degree of vertical 
integration (fi1 + (3 2SFi < 0), while in industries th a t rely on large firms, better financial 
markets have a positive impact on the degree of vertical integration ((31 + (3 2SFi > 0). 
In other words, Columns II finds a positive, direct effect of financial development on 
vertical integration (the first coefficient increases with respect to Column I and becomes 
statistically significant). However, because the second coefficient is negative, larger, and 
statistically significant, the total effect is weaker (and for some industries negative), for 
industries tha t employ a large share of workers in relatively small establishments.
Figure 2.5 explains the differential impact of better credit markets on vertical integration. 
For any given industry, the total effect of the interaction between financial development
31 Regressions in Columns II to VI in Tables 2 include the interaction between the variable SFi and 
financial development to saturate the equation. I omit /?3 from the Table.
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and external financial dependency is given by the sum of the coefficient in the first line 
of Table 2, plus the coefficient in the second line multiplied by the ranking of the in­
dustry with respect to the share of employees working in establishments with less than 
500 employees. The y-axis reports the appropriate linear combination of the estimated 
parameters, while the x-axis reports the corresponding ranking. The Figures also reports 
the appropriate interval of confidence on the estimated total effect of better financial 
markets. The total effect is positive and statistically different from zero for the ten indus­
tries with the highest share of employees working in establishments with more than 500 
employees. These industries include, for example, tobacco, iron and steel, transportation 
equipment and glass. The effect is instead negative only for the 4 industries for which 
the share of employees working in establishments with less than 500 employes is highest 
(wood manufacturing, leather, metal and non-metal products).
Columns III to VI present a first sequence of robustness checks.
A first concern is that, as discussed at the end of the theoretical section, countries with 
better financial markets may have industries which are less vertically integrated, since 
financial market development fosters the development of input markets. Financial mar­
ket frictions could thus induce more vertical integration through this separate channels. 
The inclusion of country fixed effects in the regressions controls for the possibility tha t 
better financial markets reduce vertical integration through the development of upstream 
industries only if these effects are the same across all the industries. However, industries 
largely differs in terms of their input requirements, and these differences may be correlated 
with the external financial dependency or the importance of small firms in the industry. 
Omitting to control for this additional channel would result in the coefficients of interest 
being biased.
In order to control for the possibility that financial market development impacts vertical 
integration through the development of upstream industries, I compute for each industry 
i a weighted average of the external financial dependency of the industries th a t sell inputs 
to industry i. I construct the weights using information from the input-output table of 
the United States. Denoting by E D j  the external finance dependency in industry j  and 
by Vij the share of use of input j  in the production of i from the input-output table, the 
measure of external financial dependency of upstream industries for industry i is given by
EDUi  =  S jjziVij x E D j
The intuition is that, ceteris paribus, better financial markets should affect vertical inte­
gration relatively more in those industries th a t purchase inputs from industries tha t are,
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Figure 2.6: Quantitative Effect
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on average, highly dependent on external finance.32
In column III I add to the specification in Column II the interaction between financial 
market development in country c and the external financial dependency of upstream in­
dustries. The inclusion of this further interaction reinforces the results in Column II, since 
the absolute values of the coefficients and /32 go up. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
interaction between financial market development in country c and the external financial 
dependency of upstream industries (/34) confirms the intuition informally discussed at the 
end of the theoretical section. I find that countries with more developed financial systems 
are relatively less vertically integrated in industries that use inputs from industries that 
are more externally financial dependent.
What is the magnitude of the effects we are identifying? Figure 2.6 provides an answer 
to this question. In Column III the country level measure of financial development affects 
vertical integration through four different, and opposing, channels (estimated by the vec­
tor of coefficients j3 = [/3 /34]). Figure 2.6 reports, for each industry, the average percentage 
change induced in the index of vertical integration by an increase in the index of financial
i2Similarly to the identification strategy discussed above, the use of U.S. Input-Output table is justified 
by concerns that, because of various sources of input markets imperfections correlated with financial 
markets imperfections, industries in country c may substitute inputs in ways which are correlated with 
other determinants of vertical integration. I further describe the construction of the average external 
financial dependency of upstream industries in the data Appendix.
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development of one standard deviation. In our sample, a difference of one standard de­
viation in the index of financial development is equivalent to the difference between the 
index of financial development in Algeria and South Korea. Figure 2.6 identifies tha t for 
some industries the net effect is positive (e.g. textile and transport equipment) while for 
other industries is negative (e.g. footwear), and is in the order of 3-5% points.33
An im portant concern with the regressions in Columns I to III is that, within industries, 
countries at different stages of the development process produce goods that differ in terms 
of factor intensities and value added. If those "within" industries product mixes differs 
systematically across industries with the level of financial development, the results in 
Columns I to III could be capturing those differences along with the effect of financial 
development on vertical integration.
Related to this concerns, since financial development is highly correlated with GDP per 
capita and with broader institutional quality it is possible that the coefficients in Columns 
I to III are also picking up the effects of other institutions on vertical integration that 
work differently across industries in a way which is correlated with the industry variables 
(external financial dependency and importance of small firms) included in the regression. 
While the relatively high level of aggregation makes it difficult to control for these within- 
industry compositional effects, Columns IV to VI try  to  address some of this concerns.
In Column IV I add the interaction between the degree of vertical integration in the United 
States in industry i and GDP per capita in country c. The idea of the interaction is to 
directly control for the possibility tha t richer countries produce goods tha t are relatively 
more similar to the goods produced in the United States, and should tend to be relatively 
more vertically integrated in the industries that are integrated in the US. Column IV shows 
that the results on the effects of financial development on vertical integration are stable 
to the inclusion of this further control, and moreover confirm the intuition th a t richer 
countries are relatively more vertically integrated in industries th a t are more vertically 
integrated in the United States, consistently with the idea that product mixes within 
industries changes systematically with respect to their degree of vertical integration as 
countries achieve different development stages.
Column V is more directly concerned with the possibility tha t financial development is 
capturing the effect of broader institutional quality on vertical integration. I control 
for the possibility tha t financial development is simply picking up the effects of broader
33While the effect identified in Figure 2.6 is the net effect of four coefficients working in different 
directions, each single effect has a larger magnitude. The inclusion of country fixed effects prevents the 
identification of the average effect of financial development on vertical integration. The effect depicted 
in the figure imply a change in the ranking of industries in terms of vertical integration (for the average 
country) for 9 out of the 26 industries in the sample.
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institutional quality by controlling for the interaction between GDP per capita, a proxy 
of institutional quality, and all the industry level interactions used in Column III. Results 
are once again very robust, suggesting that financial development is not picking up the 
effects of the higher quality of other institutions on vertical integration. Moreover, none 
of the (unreported) interactions between the industry level variables and GDP per capita 
is statistically significant from zero, suggesting th a t the industry variables proxy for the 
appropriate channels through which financial development impacts vertical integration.
Finally, Column VI adds interactions between industry dummies and GDP per capita. 
This is done to capture the fact th a t industries are engaged in different production across 
countries, and more broadly tha t there may be broader omitted institutional factors tha t 
have differential impact across industries working through specific channels which are 
different from, but correlated to, external financial dependency. I find tha t the results 
are robust to the inclusion of these additional twenty-six controls. Quite remarkably the 
magnitude as well as the statistical significance of the coefficients are virtually unchanged.
The theoretical model emphasizes the differential impact of better contractual institutions 
in specific input markets versus contractual imperfections in financial markets. Table 3 
investigates empirically the relevance of this distinction. Beyond exploring the robustness 
of the evidence in favor of the credit market story to the inclusion of additional controls 
considering contractual institutions, Table 3 presents some results tha t are of separate 
and independent interest.
I proxy better contract enforcement in country c (the parameter fi in the model) with 
(minus) the number of procedures mandated by law or court regulation demanding in­
teractions between the parties or between them and the judge. I take this measure from 
the Doing Business database at World Bank, which construct the measure following the 
methodology in Djankov et al. (2003). I interact this measure of contractual enforcement 
with a measure of contractual intensity at the industry level in the U.S. I use as measure 
of contractual needs in industry i the (negative of the) Herfindahl index of input use. 
The rationale for using the Herfindahl index instead of the number of inputs used is that 
the number of inputs used would overestimate the importance of inputs th a t contribute 
only marginally to the production process. Instead I assume tha t industries tha t rely on 
a less concentrated set of suppliers are more exposed to hold-up problems (lower /? in the 
model), and thus require more contractual provisions to mitigate hold-up problems.34
Column I shows tha t countries with better contractual enforcement are relatively more
341 describe the details for the construction of this measure in the data Appendix. This measure 
of contractual dependency has been previously used in the literature (see e.g. Levchenko (2005) and 
Blanchard and Kremer (1997).
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vertically integrated in industries th a t have higher contractual needs. The coefficient 
between contractual enforcement and contractual needs is positive, large and statistically 
significant. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction of the model. Industries 
that have very high contractual intensity (low (3) are so severely exposed to  the hold-up 
problem tha t non-integrated firms can not survive in the industry (remember tha t when j3 
is too low, (fcipjy > D((3,fT)). The vertical integration index is very high (in the model equal 
to one) regardless of contract enforcement fi. Industries with lower contractual intensity 
(higher /?) instead will not be completely vertically integrated, and will be more vertically 
integrated in countries with worse contract enforcement. It follows tha t countries with 
better contract enforcement are relatively more vertically integrated in industries tha t 
heavily rely on contracts.
Before re-introducing financial markets interactions to control for the robustness of the 
insights gained with Table 2 and separate the role of contractual imperfections with input 
suppliers and external investors, Column II checks tha t the relationship in Column I does 
not depend on the size distribution of firms, as the model predicts. I add further interac­
tions with the variable proxing for the importance of small firms and find no statistically 
significant effect.
Column III reintroduces the interactions linking financial development and vertical in­
tegration through the two opposite and distinct channels emphasized in the theoretical 
section.35 Results are again highly robust, and the coefficients clearly identify the different 
role of contractual imperfections with input suppliers and external investors in shaping 
vertical integration.
Since financial development and contract enforcement are highly correlated, Column IV 
adds the cross-interactions between financial dependency and contractual enforcement, 
and financial development with contractual intensity in order to check th a t the two mea­
sures of contractual imperfections with suppliers and investors are indeed working (exclu­
sively) through the appropriate channels.35 Once again, Column IV shows th a t the results 
are highly robust both in terms of magnitudes and statistical significance. Moreover, the 
coefficients on the cross interactions are small and not statistically significant, suggesting 
that the main interactions of interest are indeed disentangling the role of contractual im­
perfections with input suppliers and external investors, instead of simply picking up the 
effects of broader contractual environment.
351 also include, but do not report, the interaction between financial market development in country 
c and the external financial dependency of upstream industries for industry i. The coefficient is always 
negative and statistically significant as in Table 2.
361 also include, but do not report, interaction between contract enforcement and importance of small 
firms, and the corresponding triple interaction with external financial dependency to saturate the equation. 
None of these interactions is statistically significant.
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Finally, Columns V and VI add the same set of controls than the corresponding columns 
in Table 2. Column V adds interaction between the industry level variables and GDP per 
capita, while column VI adds interactions of industry dummies with GDP per Capita. 
Results are once again highly robust to those two alternative specifications.37
To summarize, the available data recommended the use of interactions of industry vari­
ables in the United States with country level variables proxing financial development to 
investigate the effects of contractual imperfections with external investors on vertical in­
tegration at the industry level, in a cross-country perspective. While this methodology 
requires strong identification assumptions to interpret the resulting evidence as causal, the 
results presented in this section and the further robustness checks reported in the Appen­
dix, present very robust cross-country-industry correlations th a t are consistent with the 
main predictions of the model and shed some light on the ambiguous role of contractual 
institutions in general, and financial development in particular, in shaping international 
differences in vertical integration.
2.4  C onclu sion
This chapter shows that contractual imperfections with suppliers of specific inputs and 
with external investors have radically different effects on the degree of vertical integra­
tion at the industry level. The main result is tha t financial market imperfections affect 
vertical integration through two opposing channels: a direct negative, investment, effect 
and an indirect positive, entry, effect. Using cross-country-industry data  I find tha t coun­
tries with more developed financial systems are relatively more vertically integrated in 
industries that are dominated by large firms, consistently with the predictions of the the­
oretical model. This work thus presents novel evidence on international differences in the 
organization of production and their institutional determinants, complements the existing 
literature on the determinants of vertical integration, and raises new theoretical questions 
on the long standing issue of what determines firm boundaries.
Much work remains to be done, both on the theoretical and on the empirical side. W ith 
respect to the theory, an im portant avenue for future research is to  explore the general
37Contractual enforcement may also be measured with the percentage costs needed to enforce a debt 
contract. When this is done, the statistical significance of the contract enforcement channel is significantly 
reduced, while credit market variables improve their statistical significance. I have also checked whether 
(minus) ethnic fragmentation and average level of trust in the society are substitutes for poorly functioning 
judicial systems by running the same set of regressions interacting the measures of contractual needs with 
social trust and ethnic fragmentation. The results have the expected sign, but are not strongly statistically 
significant and are available upon request.
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equilibrium implications of the different mechanisms underlined in the model of this paper, 
and their implications for cross-country patterns of industrial structure.
On the empirical front more effort should be devoted to the exploration of interactions 
between the institutional characteristics considered in this paper and the role of other 
institutional variables such as, for example, trade openness, informal networks and hu­
man capital. While the current analysis may improve our understanding of institutional 
determinants of vertical integration across countries, it is eventually of crucial importance 
to understand how differences in organizational forms affect productivity.
2 .5  A p p en d ix  A
2 .5 .1  P r o o f  o f  L em m a 1
Let us first consider the case of an entrepreneur borrowing K  units of capital and signing 
a contract in which she commits to repay B  out of her (variable) profits 11(0). Of the K  
units of capital, a fraction 1 — A has to be invested in the project, since the investors can 
perfectly monitor such investments. The remaining amount AK  can either be invested, or 
it can be diverted by the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur invests, she generates revenues 
11(0), and she repays B. If instead she diverts cash, she obtains AK. She abstains from 
diversion if and only if AK  < 11(6) — B. When this inequality is satisfied, the entrepreneur 
repays the external investors with probability equal to one, since there is no uncertainty 
in production. Since external investors are risk neutral and on the long side of the market, 
B  = K .  The former inequality can be rewritten as
(i +  A ) K < n ( 0)
In this environment, an entrepreneur does not have the incentive to borrow more than 
what is required to finance the fixed costs to start production, and hence w ithout loss of 
generality one can consider K  =  /  +  k for a vertically integrated firm and K  =  /  for a 
firm entering the market as assembler. This proves the result for a vertically integrated 
firm. I now turn to the case of a non-integrated firm.
The sequence of events is as follows. First the final assembler finances the fixed costs /  
borrowing from the external investors, issuing an amount of debt equal to B  =  / .  Then 
she is matched with an upstream supplier. Since suppliers are on the long side of the 
market, they compete in order to attract customers. Since they have deep pockets, they
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offer an ex-ante transfers T{6) to an assembler with productivity 9. Ex-ante competition 
among suppliers, implies that the ex-ante transfers drive their profits to zero. Ex-post, 
the match realizes revenues R{9), and the supplier retains a fraction /3 of these revenues. 
Denoting by C(I)  the costs of producing the intermediate input, ex-ante competition 
among suppliers implies that T{9) +  C (I ) =  /3R(9). External investors hold claims on 
the assembler’s ex-post profits (1 — j3)R(6) and on the ex-ante transfer T(0), i.e. on 
(1 — j3)R(9) +  T(0) = R{6) — C(I)  =  IIo(0). Applying the same reasoning as for the case 
of a vertically integrated firm completes the proof of the Lemma.
2 .5 .2  D e r iv a tio n  o f  P ro fit F u n ctio n s a n d  P r o o f  o f  L em m a  2
Under vertical integration, the firm chooses investments I  to maximize profits
n w(0) = A 1~a6aI a -  C(I)  (2.15)
Since all elementary investments x(i) are symmetric, and profits are a concave function 
of x(i), the firm optimally sets x(i) = x, for all i e [0,1]. The intermediate input becomes 
I  =  exp  ^/J  In xdi^j = x , and hence profits can be rewritten as
ITv(0) =  A 1~a9axa -  x
The first order condition with respect to x yields
x(0) = a£A9a£
Substituting into the profit function yields n v(0) =  a a£A 6a£ (1 — a ) , which is the expres­
sion in the text.
I now turn to the profits of a non-integrated firm. Denoting x c the contractible investment, 
and xn the non contractible investments, profits can be written as
n„(0) =  A 1~aeax ^ x ^ 1- ^  -  nxc -  (1 -  fi)xn (2.16)
The sequence of events is as follows. First, firms contract on contractible tasks. Second,
the upstream firm take the non contractible investements decision as given, and, antici­
pating ex-post bargaining, maximizes with respect to x n her share of profits. I solve for 
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
CH APTER 2. CREDIT CO NSTRAINTS AND  VERTICAL IN TEG RATIO N
The first order condition for the upstream firm gives
1  — a  cx Or
Substituting this expression back into the profit function yields
1 — Q Ct
n o(0) =  A  i—d-M) e a;c1“Q(1~#l) (a(3) 1-ad-M) (l -  (l -  g) (a/3)) -  g Xc (2.17)
The contract, anticipating the choice of x n picks up the optimal x c. The first order con­
dition is gives
x r =
/  \  Qu —MU
(  ------ %------ r ) A 8ac {a/3)a(1- ^ £ (1 -  (1 -  n) (a/3))e(1~a(1~M  (2.18)
VI -  a ( l  -  n )J
and by further substitution in the profits function, I obtain
IIo(0) = A 8° 'a°“ (l -  » W  -  “ W A /* )  (2-19)
When g  —> 0 we obtain
lim no(0) =  A9a£ (1 -  a/3) (a/3)‘n—* o
while when g —»■ 1 we obtain
lim IIo(0) = A9a£a a£( l -  a)n-*\
which are the profits of a vertically integrated firm.
I finally prove tha t profits are monotonically increasing in g. Taking the logarithm of the 
profit function, I obtain
sign <91og n o(<9) =  sign
dg
ea/z+1
dg
Denoting A(/3, g) =  )  » and taking the derivative with respect to g, gives
sign d (log A(/3, g))
dg
= sign In
l - a / 3 ( l - M) \  ( 1 - / 3 )
1 — a ( l  — g) J 1 — a/3(l — g)
> 0
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where the inequality follows from the fact that
sign d2 log A(/3, g)
dgdp
- sign < 0
Note in fact that 9 < 0 implies that reaches a minimum in f3 =  1, i.e.
when dd°gM/3,/x)) _  ancj ^hus js positive everywhere else. I have proved th a t 9^ q ^  >  0.
Combining this observation with the fact that l i m ^ i  n o(f?) =  A9a£a ae( 1 — a) proves 
Lemma 2 in the text.
2 .5 .3  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s it io n  3
The condition ensures that 9V > 9e, and hence tha t the equilibrium is
interior. Since A  is in equilibrium a function of 9V and 9e, the two thresholds 9V and 
6e defines a system of two equations in two unknown. Unicity of the equilibrium follows 
from the fact that the ratio =  j  > 1 is constant, and that, by totally
differentiating the expression for 6e, we obtain
/
d9p =  — ae
lA (ee,0v)(a(3)ae( l - a ( 3 ) \
f
(2 .20)
(ap)ae (1 -  a(3)
m M - ‘ [ ^ ^ dev + d- A M A dSl
d6v dQf
which can be rewritten as
\ — E dA(Qe*@vdSe K A (9e,ev) - ^  
(1 + K A ( 0e, 6v) - ‘ dMg ‘M
since dA{^ f v) > 0 and aA^ f " ) > 0, if ^  > 0.
When f d f )  > iK/J, /./) instead 9V < 9e, and only vertically integrated firms enter the 
industry. The unicity of the equilibrium follows from the fact tha t 6V is decreasing in A, 
and that A  is instead an increasing function of 9V.
CH APTER 2. CREDIT CO NSTRAINTS AN D  VERTICAL INTEG RATIO N 70
2 .5 .4  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s it io n  4
Consider the (unweighted) average level of vertical integration in the industry given by 
the index
' - W ' H  (2.22)
I N T  = l - ^ x - i - G(ee)
Note tha t by taking the derivative w.r.t. g  we obtain
dOy 
diid I N Tsign
dg
■ —sign
9%)%if 9 (0 e ) |f  [1-G(0„)]
[1 -  G(6e)\ [1 -  G(8e)\ [1 -  G(0e)]
< 0
dOy
d^ i
d6edfi
2 .5 .5  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s it io n  5
Taking the derivative of I  N T  w.r.t. A we obtain
- 0 ~  -  i = G ( ^ j  (2-23)
since ^  (to see this, note tha t in equilibrium the ratio Is- is constant and does not depend 
on A). First we note that =  f f  +  implies =  ( i  -  l)  9e ( ^  -  ^ § £ )  and
similarly *§£ = *>£ + implies if f  =  (± -  l)  ( ^ L  -  ^ )  , hence
d0e n
dX _  
dOy fj 
~dX U v
Moreover, imposing tha t G(6) is distributed according to a generalized Pareto distribution 
with mean 0 and shape parameter k, i.e. G(0) =  1 — (1 +  (i-a)~ we °btain
^  0 ^ 9.(1 -  < (1 -  ( T ^ y ^  (2.24)
Since 6V > 0e, the inequality is satisfied if and only if 1— ^ .a )  j- > 0, i.e. if ^1 — > a.
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2.6  A p p en d ix  B
2 .6 .1  D a ta  D e scr ip tio n
V ertical Integration from D un& B radstreet
The Wordbase dataset reports for each firm the primary 4-digit SIC code, and up to five 
other codes of secondary product lines for the firm. I only have access to  information 
at the industry level, constructed in the following way. For each firm /  in industry i in 
country c let Vfic the index of vertical integration,
Vfic =  o rr 2 \IficI
where V{j is the input-output coefficient between industry i and industry j  in the U.S., 
and \Ific\ is the cardinality of the set of industries in which firm /  is active, I f i c. Vertical 
integration at the industry level is given by the unweighted average of the indexes of 
vertical integration of firms in industry i and country c, i.e.
INTic =  J r E f V f i c
•L'ic
where N{c is the number of firms in industry i and country c.
External Financial D ependency
I rely on the data provided in Rajan and Zingales (1998) for the regresssions using UNIDO 
database. For results in Table 6, I have computed the external financial dependency of 
52 two-digit Input-O utput industries. Starting from Compustat data, I have followed the 
methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to compute the external financial dependency 
of 4-digit SIC industries. I have matched 4-digits codes with 10 2-digits codes and taken 
median values.
Small Firm s
The variable "Small firms" is the share of employees working in establishments with less 
than 500 (or 100, in Table 4) employees in the United States. D ata are from the 1992 
Census of Industries. I have matched 4-digit SIC codes with 3-digit ISIC codes in order 
to provide aggregate figures at the 3-digit ISIC level in Tables 1 to  5. For Table 6 I have 
matched 4-digits codes with IO 2-digits codes.
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E xternal Financial D ependency o f U pstream  Industries
From the 1992 input-output table for the US, I construct an average measure of External 
Financial Dependency of upstream industries as follows. I construct input-output shares 
at the 3-digit ISIC level, using only flows within the manufactring sector. Denoting by 
E D j  the external financial dependency in 3-digit ISIC industry j  and by Vij the share 
of inputs purchased by (3-digit ISIC code) industry i from other (3-digit ISIC code) 
industries j,  the measure is given by
EFDUi = Ej^iVij x E D j  
I use the same procedure in Table 6, at the 2-digit 10 level.
C ontractual N eeds
Starting from the 1992 input-output table in the United States, I construct for each 6- 
digit 10 industry the Herfindahl index of input use. Letting Sij be the share of input use 
of industry i from industry j,  the index is given by H R  = Ejsfj .  I then match the 6-digit 
10 industry codes with 3-digit ISIC codes, and take the median value within industry 
groups to generate the measure of contractual needs in Table 3. For Table 6, I perform 
the same excercise at the 10 2-digit level.
2 .6 .2  F u rth er  R o b u stn e ss  C heck s
In this subsection I check the robustness of the results to alternative measures of the main 
variables used in Table 2.
Table 4 presents results when I use different measures to proxy for the importance of small 
firms in the industry. Columns I, II and III present results from the same specifications 
of Columns III, V and VI from Table 2 when the importance of small firms is proxied 
by the share of employees working in establishments with less than 100, instead of 500, 
employees. Results are broadly robust, even if the statistical significance is somewhat 
reduced.
Columns IV, V and VI of Table 4 repeat the exercise when the importance of small firms 
in the industry is proxied by the share of employees working in establishment with less 
than 500 employees in the United Kingdom, and thus checks tha t the main results do not 
depend on the use of industry variables in the United States, and th a t the importance
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of small firms is really capturing technological features of the industry. Results for these 
specifications are very robust, and the magnitude of the coefficients of interest is somewhat 
increased.
Other concerns may arise with respect to the use of the ratio of bank credit over GDP 
as a measure of financial development. Table 5 presents results for the baseline specifi­
cation using alternative measures of financial development. Column I uses the ratio of 
bank assets over GDP per capita. Results are robust to the use of this alternative mea­
sure of financial development. Column II proxies financial development with (the inverse 
of) bank concentration, as measured by the share of deposits of the three largest banks. 
Unfortunately this measure is available only for a smaller set of countries, significantly 
reducing the number of observations. On the other hand, this variable is closer in spirit 
to the anecdotal evidence on the relationship between financial markets and vertical inte­
gration in XIX century New England discussed in the introduction, since it proxies for the 
structure of the financial system. I find once again the main results to be robust to this 
specification. Finally column III reports results when financial development is measured 
by an index of legal rights of investors (from Doing Business database at World Bank). 
The advantage of this type of measure over measures of bank credit is tha t they are less 
directly an outcome variable related to the availability of credit. On the other hand, it is 
plausible tha t the index captures availability of credit with higher measurement error. I 
do not take the logarithm of the index to run the regression, and hence the coefficients 
are not directly comparable to the coefficients in Columns I and II. The main message of 
the analysis is consistent, even if statistical significance is reduced, possibly due to higher 
measurement error in the measure of credit availability.
The last two Columns of Table 5 instead present results for the baseline specification 
when I break the sample between OECD and non OECD countries. The results are once 
again robust, and I find evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions in both sets 
of countries, although the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients for 
the within non OECD countries are reduced. This can be due to the fact th a t vertical 
integration is measured with greater measurement error in poorer countries, and tha t there 
is less variation in financial development among those countries. Results are improved 
when I pool the sample, and impose the same industry fixed effects for OECD and non- 
OECD countries (results are available upon request).
In order to check for the robustness of the results, Table 6 reports results using a sec­
ond measure of vertical integration in industry i and country c. This second measure is 
constructed from firm level information provided in Worldbase, a database maintained by 
Dun & Bradstreet, and follows the procedure in Acemoglu et al. (2005a). As noted above, 
the main advantages of the UNIDO measure are tha t it is a well known index of vertical
CH APTER 2. CREDIT C O N STRAIN TS AN D  VERTICAL IN TEG RATIO N 74
integration and tha t data  come from industrial statistics relying on Census information 
and are thus overall representative. The Worldbase measure has the advantage of being 
constructed from a large firm level database exploiting information on firms activities. 
The industry classification allows me to consider two-digit input-output classification sys­
tem, i.e. to  break up the manufacturing sector in 52 industries. On the other hand, the 
construction of the firm level index hinges on the use of input-output information from 
the United States, and large countries tend to be over represented in the sample.
Table 6 performs the same exercise of Table 2 with the second measure of vertical integra­
tion. Column I presents results from the baseline specification which are highly consistent 
with the theoretical predictions. Column II includes the interaction with external depen­
dency of upstream industries, and Column III further introduces the interaction between 
contractual intensity and contractual enforcement. The magnitude and statistical signif­
icance of the coefficients jd1 and /32 is virtually unchanged, but in contrast to the results 
in Table 2 and Table 3, the two further interactions in the third and fourth lines have the 
appropriate sign, but are not statistically significant.
Finally, Columns IV to VI repeat the exercise of the corresponding Columns in Table 
2, by adding the interaction of vertical integration in the United States with GDP per 
capita (Column IV), the interaction of industry variables with GDP per capita (Column 
V) and interactions of fifty two industry dummies with GDP per capita (Column VI). 
While the statistical significance of the results is somewhat reduced, the magnitude and 
interpretation of the coefficients are once again unchanged.
TABLE 1A
Average Vertical Integration by Industry in the Sample
industry Code 1SIC Vertical Integration Industry Code ISIC Vertical Integration
food products 311 0.29 rubber prductus 355 0.39
beverages 313 0.48 plastic products 356 0.36
tobacco 314 0.56 pottery 361 0.52
textile 321 0.38 glass 362 0.45
apparel 322 0.41 non metal products 369 0.42
leather 323 0.33 iron and steel 371 0.31
footwear 324 0.39 nonferrous metal 372 0.28
wood products 331 0.38 metal products 381 0.38
furniture 332 0.40 machinery 382 0.41
paper and products 341 0.35 electric machinery 383 0.38
printing / publishing 342 0.47 transportation equip. 384 0.36
other chemicals 352 0.38 professional goods 385 0.44
petroleum raffineries 353 0.29 other industrries 390 0.41
TABLE IB
List of Countries in the Sample
Algeria Costa Rica Indonesia Namibia Singapore
Argentina Cote d'Ivoire Iran Nepal Slovakia
Australia Croatia Ireland Netherlands Slovenia
Austria Czech Israel New Zeland South Africa
Bangladesh Denmark Italy Nigeria Spain
Belgium Ecuador Jamaica Norway Sri Lanka
Bolivia Egypt Japan Oman Sweden
Bosnia El Salvador Jordan Pakistan Syria
Botswana Ethiopia Kenya Panama Tanzania
Brazil Fiji South Korea Paraguay Thailand
Bulgaria Finland Kuwait Peru Tunisia
Burundi France Latvia Philippines Turkey
Cameroon Ghana Macedonia Poland Unit. Kingdom
Canada Greece Malawi Portugal Venezuela
Centr. African Rep. Honduras Malaysia Romania Zambia
Chile Hong Kong Mexico Russian Zimbabwe
China Hungary Mongolia Senegal
Colombia India Morocco Sierra Leone
TABLE IC
Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean St. Dev Min Max
Main Industry Variables
Vertical Integration 28 0.50 0.12 0.17 0.75
External Financial Dependency 28 0.24 0.33 -0.45 1.14
Share of Small Firms 28 0.38 0.16 0.06 0.64
External Financial Dependency of 
Upstream Industries
28 0.33 0.10 0.11 0.55
Contractual Needs 28 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.33
Main Country Level Variables
GDP per Capita (Log) 89 8.61 1.04 6.2 10.18
Bank Credit / GDP 89 0.37 0.29 0.03 1.45
Number of Procedures 89 29.29 11.32 11 58
TABLE 2: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Vertical Integration: UNIDO Measure_______________ I__________ II__________III_________ IV_________ V_________ VI
External Financial Dependency x  Financial Development 0.040 0.178*** Q 0.173*** 0.173** 0.168**
[0.030] [0.063] [0.064] [0.066] [0.089] [0.087]
External Financial Dependency x  Financial Development x 
Empl. in Small Firms
-0.264***
[0.091]
-0.285***
[0.094]
-0.256***
[0.097]
-0.245**
[0.113]
-0.240**
[0.109]
External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries x 
Financial Development
-0.049**
[0.021]
-0.041*
[0.022]
-0.061*
[0.034]
-0.059*
[0.034]
Vertical Integration in U.S. x GDP per Capita 0.086*
[0.045]
0.088*
[0.046]
0.067
[0.086]
Industry Dummies 
Country Dummies
Vertical Integration U.S. x  GDP Per Capita 
Industry Characteristics x  GDP Per Capita 
Industry Dummies x  GDP Per Capita
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations
R-squared
1734
0.52
1734
0.52
1734
0.52
1734
0.53
1734
0.53
1734
0.54
***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
are reported in parenthesis. Vertical Integration is the (log o f the) ratio of Value Added over Output at the Industry level (source: 
UNIDO 2001 database). Financial Development is the (log of the) ratio of Bank Credit over GDP (source: Levine (2003)). 
External Financial Dependency (source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Employment in small firms is the share of employees in 
establishment with less than 500 employees (source: author’s calculations). External Financial Dependency o f Upstream 
Industries (source: author’s calculations). I use the ranking o f the industry level variables.
TABLE 3: DISENTANGLING CONTRACTS WITH INVESTORS AND INPUT SUPPLIERS
Vertical Integration: UNIDO Measure I II III IV________ V________ VI
Contractual Needs x Quality of Contract Enforcement 
Contractual Needs * Qual. of Contr. Enforc. x Empl. in Small Firms 
External Financial Dependency x Financial Development 
External Financial Depend, x Financ. Developm. x Empl. in Small 
Contractual Needs x Financial Development
External Financial Dependency x Quality of Contract Enforcement
Industry Dummies 
Country Dummies
Industry Characteristics x GDP Per Capita 
Industry Dummies x GDP Per Capita
Observations
R-squared____________________________________________________
0 .210** *
[0.056]
yes
yes
1734
0.52
0.393**
[0.181]
-0.415
[0.333]
yes
yes
1734
0.52
0 .220* * *
[0.060]
0.273***
[0 .111]
0.249***
[0.070]
0.272***
[0.082]
0.170*** 0.163** 0.149* 0.156*
[0.064] [0.071] [0.085] [0.085]
-0.274*** -0.261** -0.225** -0.236**
[0.094] [0.109] [0.110] [0.109]
0.025
[0.033]
-0.09
[0.118]
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes
yes
1734 1734 1734 1734
0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55
***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are 
reported in parenthesis. Vertical Integration is the (log of the) ratio of Value Added over Output at the Industry level (source: UNIDO 
2001 database). Financial Development is the (log of the) ratio of Bank Credit over GDP (source: Levine (2003)). Quality o f Contract 
Enforcement is (minus the log of) the number o f procedures to enforce a contract (source: Doing Business Database at World Bank). 
External Financial Dependency (source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Employment in small firms is the share of employees in 
establishment with less than 500 employees (source: author’s calculations). External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries 
(source: author’s calculations). Contractual Needs is the Herfindahl index of input use (source: author’s calculations). I use the ranking 
of the industry level variables.
TABLE 4: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR SMALL FIRMS
Vertical Integration: UNIDO Measure I II III IV V VI
External Financial Dependency * Financial Development 0.198*** 0.135 0.141* 0.230*** 0.205*** 0.205***
[0.064] [0.088] [0.085] [0.072] [0.082] [0.084]
External Financial Dependency x Financial Development x
Empl. in Small Firms -0.303*** -0.182 -0.190* -0.342*** -0.298*** -0.299***
[0.098] [0.117] [0.114] [0.104] [0.115] [0.117]
External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries x
Financial Development -0.060*** -0.065* -0.061* -0.044* -0.059 -0.055
[0.022] [0.034] [0.034] [0.024] [0.037] [0.038]
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Characteristics x GDP Per Capita yes yes
Industry Dummies x GDP Per Capita yes yes
Observations 1734 1734 1734 1734 1734 1734
R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.55
***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. Vertical Integration is the (log o f the) ratio of Value Added over Output at the Industry level 
(source: UNIDO 2001 database). Financial Development is the (log of the) ratio of Bank Credit over GDP (source: Levine 
(2003)). External Financial Dependency (source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Employment in small firms is the share of 
employees in establishment with less than 100 employees in the US in Columns I, II, III, and share of employees in 
establishment with less than 100 employees in the UK in Columns IV, V, VI. (source: author’s calculations). External Financial 
Dependency o f Upstream Industries (source: author’s calculations). I use the ranking of the industry level variables.
TABLE 5: ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES AND MEASURES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Vertical Integration: UNIDO Measure I II III IV V
External Financial Dependency x Financial Development 0.194*** 0.420* 0.044* 0.253*** 0.085
[0.073] [0.222] [0.026] [0.096] 0.065
External Financial Dependency * Financial Development x
Empl. in Small Firms -0.294*** -0.670** -0.053 -0.322** -0.185*
[0.104] [0.305] [0.034] [0.161] [0.107]
External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries x
Financial Development -0.042* 0.048 -0.008 -0.059 -0.038
[0.024] [0.131] [0.009] [0.056] [0.036]
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1734 1059 1734 561 1147
R-squared 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.65 0.5
***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
are reported in parenthesis. Vertical Integration is the (log of the) ratio of Value Added over Output at the Industry level (source: 
UNIDO 2001 database). Financial Development is the (log of the) ratio of Bank Assets over GDP in Column I, the (log o f the) share 
of the deposit o f the three largest banks in Column II (source: Levine (2003)) and the index of investor’s rights in Column III 
(source: Doing Business Database at World Bank). External Financial Dependency (source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)). 
Employment in small firms is the share of employees in establishment with less than 500 employees (source: author’s calculations). 
External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries (source: author’s calculations). I use the ranking of the industry level 
variables. Columns IV and V present results from separate regressions for OECD and Non OECD countries respectively.
TABLE 6: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Vertical Integration: Dun & Bradstreet Measure_______ I__________ H__________III_________ IV________v________VI
External Financial Dependency x Financial Development 0.710*** 0.706*** 0.696*** 0.559** 0.623** 0.646*
[0.234] [0.238] [0.238] [0.241] [0.324] [0.347]
External Financial Dependency x Financial Development x 
Empl. in Small Firms
-1.545*** -1.537*** -1.515*** -1.196** -1.029 -1.128
[0.581] [0.593] [0.593] [0.599] [0.792] [0.855]
External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries x 
Financial Development
-0.037 -0.038 -0.004 -0.118 -0.11
[0.169] [0.170] [0.169] [0.192] [0.209]
Contractual Needs x Quality of Contract Enforcement 0.554
[2.256]
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Vertical Integration U.S. x GDP Per Capita yes yes
Industry Characteristics x GDP Per Capita yes
Industry Dummies x GDP Per Capita yes
Observations 2417 2417 2417 2417 2417 2417
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.58
***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
are reported in parenthesis. Vertical Integration is the (log of the) ratio of the index of vertical integration from the Dun & 
Bradstreet Worldbase (source: author’s calculations). Financial Development is the (log o f the) ratio of Bank Credit over GDP 
(source: Levine (2003)). Quality of Contract Enforcement is (minus the log of) the number of procedures to enforce a contract 
(source: Doing Business Database at World Bank). External Financial Dependency (source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)). 
Employment in small firms is the share of employees in establishment with less than 500 employees (source: author’s 
calculations). External Financial Dependency of Upstream Industries (source: author’s calculations). Contractual Needs is the 
Herfindahl index of input use (source: author’s calculations). I use the ranking of the industry level variables. Industries are 
classified as in Table 6.a.
TABLE 6A
List o f Industries: 10 Code
13 Ordnance and accessories
14 Food and kindred products
15 Tobacco products
16 Broad and narrow fabrics, yam and mills
17 Miscellaneous textile goods
18 Apparel
19 Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 
20+21 Lumber and wood products
22+23 Furniture and fixtures
24 Paper and allied products
25 Paperboard containers and boxes 
26A Newspapers and periodicals 
26B Other printing and publishing 
27A Industrial and other chemicals
27B Agricultural fertilizers and chemicals 
28 Plastics and synthetic materials 
29A Drugs
29B Cleaning and toilet preparation
30 Paints and allied products
31 Petroleum refining and related products
32 Rubber and miscellaneus plastics products 
33+34 Footwear, leather, and leather products
35 Glass and glass products
36 Stone and clay products
37 Primary iron and steel manufacturing
38 Primary nonferrous metals manufacturing
39 Metal containers
40 Heating, plumbing and fabric. Struct. Mat.
41 Screw machine products and stampings
42 Other fabricated metal products
43 Engines and turbines
44+45 Farm, construction and mining machinery
46 Materials handling machinery and equip.
47 Metalworking machinery and equipment
48 Special industry machinery and equipment
49 General industrial machinery and equipment
50 Miscellaneous machinery and equipment
51 Computer and office equipment
52 Service industry machinery
53 Electrical industrial equip, and apparatus
54 Household appliances
55 Electric lighting and wiring equipment
56 Audio, video and communication equipment
57 Electronic components and accessories
58 Misc. electrical machinery and supplies 
59A Motor vehicles passangers cars and trucks 
59B Motor vehicles parts
60 Aircraft and parts
61 Other transportation equipment
62 Scientific and controlling instruments
63 Ophthalmic and photographic equipment
64 Miscellaneous
Part II
Financial Constraints and the  
Theory of the Firm
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Chapter 3
Pledgeable Income and the Costs 
and Benefits o f Vertical 
Integration
In trod u ction
There is substantial evidence that firms are constrained in their investment decisions in 
developing and developed countries as well.1 In order to improve our understanding of 
the organization and performance of industries (and vertical relationships in particular) 
in environments in which financial constraints are likely to be binding, this paper asks 
whether vertical integration reduces or increases transaction costs with external investors. 
In doing so, it investigates the circumstances under which firms become a valid instrument 
to facilitate the financing of assets which are linked by input-output transactions.
To analyze these questions, I build a simple model in which a seller produces a good tha t 
can be used by a buyer, or sold on a spot market. The buyer and the seller have no cash, 
need to finance the investments for production, and can not foresee in advance whether 
the input is most efficiently traded on the spot market or with each other (contracts are 
incomplete).
I make two key assumptions. First, I assume that ownership of physical assets gives control 
over contracting rights to those assets, i.e. it determines who has the right to sign trade
^ e e  Banerjee and Munshi (2004), Banerjee and Duflo (2004), Banerjee, Duflo and Munshi (2004) for 
firms in India, Fazzari et al. (1998) for the U.S. and Hubbard (1998) for a review of the literature.
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contracts. I focus for simplicity on two different configurations. Under non-integration 
both sides can veto internal trade. In the absence of a previous enforceable contract, two 
independent firms trade with each other if and only if the two managers agree, possibly 
after a bargaining process. Under (buyer) vertical integration instead the buyer can decide 
the trade configuration by fiat, i.e. she can impose internal trade between the two divisions 
of the integrated firms or impose to both units to trade on the spot market. Second, I 
assume tha t financial streams get transferred with ownership. (Complete) Separation 
between the return streams of the productive assets and the decision rights may not be 
entirely feasible because (part of) the returns can not be verified. This is likely to be the 
case if, for example, control rights entails the right to sign contracts with third parties, 
and contracts can be used to generate private benefits for the party in control, as it is 
assumed here.
I compare vertical integration against non integration in terms of their pledgeable income, 
i.e. the highest expected returns tha t can be delivered to external investors. I show tha t 
the net balance of the costs and benefits of vertical integration in terms of pledgeable 
income depends on the relative intensities of two opposing effects. On the one hand 
vertical integration ensures tha t the investor faces fewer holdups and tha t profits can 
be collectively pledged as collateral ensuring more financing. In contrast, since financial 
streams get transferred with ownership and returns can not be completely verified, non- 
integration multiplies the sources of opportunism and makes the financing process harder. 
I label this first positive effect of vertical integration profits-pooling effect. On the other 
hand, under non-integration, when the two firms trade with each other, they need to 
bargain to determine the price associated with the input transaction. W hen the course 
of action tha t generates private benefits for one trading partner at the expenses of profits 
requires cooperation from the other trading partner, the bargaining process becomes an 
indirect source of information from the point of view of investors. In particular, the seller 
might refuse to trade with the buyer when such trade produces low joint profits, even 
if the buyer would privately benefit from such trade.2 In contrast, vertical integration, 
by centralizing control rights suppresses the bargaining process and allow the manager of 
the integrated firm to implement the course of action yielding higher private benefits but 
lower profits relatively more often. I label this second negative effect of vertical integration 
"de-monitoring" effect.3 Highlighting, and exploring the consequences of this trade-off
2The fact that the two managers do not have cash is important, as it prevents the buyer from bribing 
the seller to accept trade.
3In other words, the "profits-pooling" effect reduces the sources of opportunism related to the possibility 
of hiding profits while the "control-rights-pooling" (or "de-monitoring") effect increases the sources of 
opportunism related to the possibility of implementing a course of action that yields private benefits at 
the cost of lower profits. Since financial streams are transferred with ownership, the vertical integration 
decision weights the benefits of the pooling-profits effect against the costs of the control-rights-pooling 
effect.
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on the decision to vertically integrated is the main focus of this paper.
Factors affecting the net balance of this trade-off are likely to be im portant determinants 
of vertical integration. A higher likelihood that internal trade yields high joint profits,
i.e. a higher degree of specificity linking the two projects, favours vertical integration. 
In other words, assets that are likely to be used together should also be managed and 
financed together. The main reason is tha t when the two units are likely to trade together, 
the monitoring role of bargaining is reduced, and the benefits of non-integration do not 
compensate for the costs. Larger projects (in terms of investment, profits and quasi-rents) 
are more likely to  be financed under the umbrella of a single firm. Non-integration multi­
plies the scope for opportunistic behavior by giving to multiple managers the possibility 
of hiding (part of the) profits. The higher the profits, the costlier this decentralization in 
the opportunities of stealing profits, and hence the more likely is vertical integration to 
ensure higher returns to the investors. By the same logic, vertical integration becomes 
relatively more likely in environments with low investor protection.
As defined above, vertical integration implies joint liability between the two projects 
while non-integration implies separate liability for the two firms. While contractual ex­
ternalities among investors may prevent joint liability contracts to be signed among two 
independent firms, I show that the partial verifiability of profits prevents joint liability 
contracts to completely remove the higher costs of non-integration associated coming from 
the multiplication of the centers of opportunism. Related to these issues, I also show how 
contractual externalities among investors at the financing stage lead to relatively more 
vertical integration or to underinvestment.
The analysis of the determinants of vertical integration has been a central theme in the 
modern literature on the theory of the firm.4 In contrast to the property rights theory of 
the firm developed in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995), 
I de-emphasize the importance of the assignment of control rights in shaping incentives 
to undertake ex-ante non contractible investments, and instead focus on the consequences 
th a t firm’s boundaries have on transaction costs with external investors.5
The assumption tha t control rights can not be (entirely) separated from financial streams 
brings the model close to Holmstrom and Tirole (1987, 1991), although these papers focus 
on how control rights shape incentives provision (see also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994)).
4For an excellent discussion see Gibbons (2004).
5 The property right approach has been applied to the analysis of the financial structure of firms (see 
Hart and Moore (1994), Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Bolton and Sharfstein (1992)). These contributions 
treat the firm as a single entrepreneur and hence can not ask what determines firm’s boundaries. The 
property right approach has also been extended to consider cash constrained agents (Aghion and Tirole 
(1994, 1997), Legros and Newman (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2006)). The general theme emerging from 
this literature is that control rights may be exchanged for cash.
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The model in this chapter is mostly related to Holmstrom (1999) from which it borrows 
the notion th a t control over physical assets gives control over contracting rights to those 
assets, and from such notion derives the costs and benefits of vertical integration in terms 
of pledgeable income. This chapter is also related to transaction costs theories of the firm 
(see e.g. Williamson (1975)). In an important paper, speculating on why investors may 
require higher interest rates on the larger investments required for vertical integration, 
Williamson argued tha t " (...) unable to monitor the performance of large, complex 
organizations in any but the crudest way (...) investors demand larger returns as finance 
requirements become progressively greater, ceteris paribus" (Williamson (1971)). This 
chapter suggests tha t vertically integrated firms are more complex and inherently more 
difficult to monitor because they bring the bargaining process within firm’s boundaries.6
The two main assumptions of our model are motivated by the work of legal scholars and 
business historians. As in Hausmann and Kraakman (2001), the model in this chapter 
defines the firm as an organization with centralized allocation of control rights and joint 
liability of the financed investments.7 The angle emphasized here is one in which the 
firm is a "nexus of contracts" (see e.g. Cheung (1983)) across multiple transactions (the 
intermediate input supply, and the financing of the two projects). This has two major 
implications. First, the firm centrally organizes the nexus of contracts, greatly reducing 
the extent of contractual externalities, at the cost of suppressing valuable sources of 
information. Second, the input transaction (i.e. the make-or-buy decision), is not anymore 
the exclusive focus of the analysis. The organization of one particular transaction between 
two contracting parties depends on the nexus of contracts linking these parties to  other 
economic actors.
Finally, this work is also related to the literature on the working of internal capital markets 
which explores the implications of different organizational forms (typically conglomerates 
versus stand alone firms) on the allocative efficiency of given financial resources (see Stein 
(1997), Sharfstein and Stein(2000), Rajan et al. (2000), Stein (2004) for a survey). In this 
strand of literature Inderst and Mueller (2003) and Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005)
6 On the positive role of disagreement in organizations see also Landier et al. (2006).
'Hausmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that "To serve effectively as a nexus of contracts, a firm must 
generally have two attributes. The first is well defined decision-making authority. More particularly, there 
must be one or more persons who have ultimate authority to commit the firm to contracts" ... "The 
second attribute a firm must have, ... is the ability to bond its contracts credibly .... Bonding commonly 
requires that there exist a pool of assets that the firm’s managers can offer as satisfaction for the firm 
obligations". Similarly, in an analysis of organizational forms in the United States in the nineteenth 
century, Lamoreaux (1998) argued that "no clear economic boundary distinguished ordinary contracts 
from those considered by the law to be firm (...) business people could choose from a range of contractual 
forms that offered varying degrees of firmness". Firmness in turn, is defined along two main dimensions: 
liability and firm’s autonomy, the latter referring to the extent to which the firm had legal existence, - the 
possibility of writing binding contracts - beyond that of its members. Similar issues are discussed in the 
debate on "piercing the corporate veil" (see e.g. Posner (1976) and Landers (1976)).
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compare the pledgeable income of conglomerate vs. stand alone firms and are closest in 
spirit to the present framework. They emphasize how pooling cash flows of independent 
projects facilitates or hinders the financing process, while I focus on projects which are 
vertically related.8
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the main as­
sumptions. Section 3 derives the pledgeable income under vertical integration and under 
non-integration. Section 4 compares the pledgeable income under the two organizational 
forms, and presents the main results on the determinants of vertical integration. Section 
5 discusses joint liability contracts between non integrated firms and how contractual ex­
ternalities among investors make integration relatively more likely. Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks.
3.1 T h e M od el
Set up: Technology and Private Benefits
Consider two managers, a buyer and a seller, j  G {d, u] respectively in charge of two 
different projects: a downstream (d) unit and an upstream (u ) unit. The upstream unit 
produces a good tha t can be used by the downstream unit, or sold to an external market. 
The two managers are aware of the possibility th a t certain features of the input may make 
the input best suited to be traded on the spot market or with each other, but they can 
not foresee in advance the nature of these features, and hence can not write an ex-ante 
contract which is contingent on the nature of ex-post trade.
Trade between the two units (henceforth "internal trade") generates joint profits Vi while 
trade on the input spot market generates joint profits Vm. W hether internal trade or 
trade on the input spot market is more profitable depends on the state of nature. Let 
^  denote the joint profits of the two units and A V  = V —V_ > 0 be the difference
between the two levels of joint profits. I assume tha t with probability 7r internal trade 
generates joint profits Vi =  V  while trading on the spot market generates joint profits 
Vm =  V_. W ith the complementary probability (1 — 7r) joint profits from internal trade are 
Vi — V_ while joint profits from trade on the spot market are equal to Vm = V . I assume 
tha t whenever the two units trade on the market, the downstream unit realizes profits 
equal to j3Vm and the upstream unit realizes profits equal to  (1 — (3)Vm• The parameter 
7r captures the specificity of the relationship. When 7r is close to one, the input is very
8The fact that projects are vertically related greatly reduces the coinsurance motive to pool projects 
together (see e.g. Diamond (1984)).
CH APTER 3. Pleadgeable Income and Vertical Integration 81
specific to the needs of the buyer, and internal trade almost always generates higher 
surplus than trade on the spot market. It is instead useful to think of the param eter (3 
as determined by industry conditions. High (3 is more likely if, when the buyer purchases 
the input oil the spot market, she realizes relatively high profits, perhaps because many 
firms compete in the upstream industry driving down inpu t’s price on the spot market. 
When /3 is relatively small instead, the seller can easily sell the input on the spot market 
at a fairly high price, perhaps because competition among several potential buyers drives 
input’s price up.
Finally, I assume tha t with probability o the buyer derives private benefits b from the trade 
configuration that yields low joint profits V_. These private benefits are inalienable and 
unverifiable. For instance, in designing a product, the buyer may find ex-post profitable 
(e.g. a reduction in non monetary costs) to tailor the good on the specification of an 
existing good readily available on the market even when the seller produces an input that 
would generate higher profits if used in the production process. Alternatively, the buyer 
may find out tha t her capabilities have a better fit, e.g. in terms of acquiring certain skills, 
with the specifications of the input produced by the seller, even if trading on the input 
market would generate higher joint profits. Another example, would be the possibility 
of trading with relatives or other members of a network tha t generates benefits tha t can 
not be transferred to third parties, instead of trading with the partner (possibly on an 
anonymous market) that would guarantee higher joint profits.
Four states of nature can be realized, depending on whether internal trade or trade on the 
spot market yields high joint profits, and on whether the buyer derives private benefits 
from the trade configuration yielding low joint profits. The realization of the state of 
nature is perfectly observed by the buyer, while the seller only observes whether internal 
trade generates high of low joint profits if she has control rights over some assets. Finally, 
I assume tha t third parties, such as investors and courts, do not observe the state of 
nature. I assume for simplicity that private benefits are completely unspecific to the 
relationship, i.e. that the realizations of private benefits and joint profits from the two 
trading configurations are independent. I also assume th a t the seller never derives private 
benefits from the trade configuration that generates low joint profits. It is possible to 
relax these two assumption without gaining much further intuition.9
Ownership
9The level and realization of private benefits is exogenous: they could be affected by factor as diverse 
as technology, belonging to social networks, or legal environment. They are not, however, affected by the 
allocation of control rights. This may not be the case if the allocation of control rights shapes incentives to 
generate private benefits or if private benefits are specific to the organization, in which case the matching 
between the two managers may not be random.
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Ownership determines who has the right to decide on whether trade takes place between 
the two units or on the spot market. I focus for simplicity on two different configurations. 
Under non-integration both sides can veto internal trade. In the absence of a previous 
enforceable contract, two independent firms trade with each other if and only if the two 
managers agree. Under (buyer) vertical integration instead the manager of the down­
stream unit can decide the trade configuration by fiat, i.e. she can impose internal trade 
between the two divisions of the integrated firms or impose to both units to  trade on the 
spot m arket.10
One key difference between vertical integration and non integration is tha t in an integrated 
firm there is no bargaining (one party unilaterally decides the trade configuration) while 
under non integration when the two firms trade with each other they need to  bargain to 
determine the price P  for the transaction. For the bargaining process, I assume tha t the 
buyer has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability a , while with the 
complementary probability the seller has the right to  make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.11
A second im portant difference between vertical integration and non integration is related 
to financial streams. In contrast to Grossman and H art (1986) original contribution on 
the costs and benefits of vertical integration, I assume tha t the financial streams get trans­
ferred with ownership. While it is true that parts of the financial streams and decisions 
rights can be transferred through contracts, in reality there is typically a connection be­
tween the right to decide and the financial responsibility for the outcome of the decision. 
This assumption is consistent with the idea that separating the return streams of the 
productive assets from the decision rights is not entirely feasible, because (part of) the 
returns can not be verified. For example, control rights typically entails the right to sign 
contracts with third parties, and these contracts can be used to generate private benefits 
for the party in control. To formalize these ideas, I assume tha t whenever a manager 
has control, she can hide profits making them unverifiable and keep a fraction 0 of those 
profits for herself. I interpret the parameter 0 as a proxy for the degree of external in­
vestor protection in the economy.12 Under vertical integration, the downstream manager 
has control over the entire profits V, while under non integration the buyer and the seller
10 Since the upstream manager never derives private benefits from the trade configuration that generates 
low joint profits, giving him ownership would be best from the point of view of external investors. To make 
the problem simple and interesting, I assume that this arrangement is not feasible. It is straightforward 
to relax these assumptions (see Macchiavello (2005)).
11 Another difference between integration and non integration is that the seller observes which trade 
configuration yields high joint profits only if the two firms are non integrated. This assumption, while not 
essentia] for the analysis, is reasonable if one assumes that in practice the state of the world is at least in 
part learned through the exercise of contracting rights (e.g. negotiating input prices, hiring consultants, 
etc...).
12External investors’ protection from expropriation is the single most important factor explaining large 
cross-countries differences in the access of firms to external finance (see e.g. La Porta et al. (1997)). An 
alternative interpretation would link 4> to the extent to which firm’s investments are "tangible".
C H APTER 3. Pleadgeable Income and Vertical Integration 83
have control over the profits of their respective firm (/3 Vm and (1 — fd)Vm respectively 
when they trade on the input market, and Vi —P  and P  when they trade with each other). 
Subject to the limits imposed by the possibility of "stealing", profits are contractible, and 
payments to external investors can be made contingent on their realization.
Initial Contract and Timing of Events
I assume tha t the two managers are essential for production, but have no cash. The 
downstream units has a fixed set up cost kd while the upstream unit has a fixed set up cost 
ku. The two managers hence need to borrow in order to start the (two) firm(s). I assume 
tha t the two managers have an outside option equal to zero. There is a unique investor tha t 
contracts with both managers and tha t has all the ex-ante bargaining power.13 Contracts 
are thus designed to maximize the pledgeable income of the two projects.
Given the simplicity of the pay off structure, I focus on simple debt-like contracts. In 
particular I assume that the bank holds a debt-like claim B  over the profits of a firm. 
When the firm is integrated there is a unique B. When the two firms are not integrated, 
the investor holds claims Bd and B u on the profits of the downstream and upstream firm 
respectively. When the two firms are non integrated, I assume for now tha t the repayment 
of each firm is not made contingent on the repayment of the other firm, i.e. I rule out 
joint liability contracts.14
To summarize, the timing of events is as follows. At date 0 all the feasible contracts 
are signed. These are the financial contracts signed with the external investor, and the 
creation of an integrated firm or of two separate firms (the allocation of control rights). 
At date 1, the state of nature is realized and observed by the buyer. If the seller has 
control rights over its unit, she observes which trade configuration yields high joint profits, 
otherwise she observes nothing. Third parties always observe nothing. If the firm is 
integrated, the buyer decides whether the two divisions should trade the input with each 
other or on the spot market. Under non integration instead the two separate firms bargain 
over the price, according to the process specified above. At date 2 profits are realized. If 
the firm is integrated the buyer decides which fraction of profits to hide. If the firm is not
13I discuss the implications of allowing for multiple investors in section 5. Note however that the two 
units might also try to maximize the cash that they can raise from external investors in order to use this 
money to transfer rents according to the initial distribution of bargaining power.
141 discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 5. I also assume that the investor can 
not holds claims which are contingent on the identity of the trading partners. When the firm is integrated 
it seems natural to assume that the investors can not easily distinguish whether the input was traded 
between the two divisions of the firm, or on the spot market. When the two firms are non integrated 
instead, the investor could hold different claims on the profits of the two firms depending on whether the 
two firms trade with each other or not. The two managers may find profitable to sign contracts with third 
parties that would undo these provisions.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of Events
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integrated, each manager decides which fraction of the profits of her firm to hide. Finally, 
on the verifiable part of profits, existing financial contracts are executed. The timing of 
the game is illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2  O rgan izational Form  and p led geab le  In com e
In order to focus on the main results, and to avoid a long taxonomy of cases tha t do 
not add further intuition, I introduce the following assumptions on the parameters of the 
model.
A ssu m p tio n s
A l: ku =  K  — kd and V  < <  V,
A2: max{2 -  j ,0 } A V  < 0AV < b < (3AV
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A3: p V  < A V
A4* 7r <  ^ __7* ^  A V+/3V
The first part of the assumption implies that the two projects have a joint positive net 
present value (K  < (1 — 0)V), but tha t it is not possible to finance both projects by 
assuring an expected return equal to (1 — 4>)V_ < K , which the investor can always 
guarantee for himself.
The second part of the assumption implies that the private benefits tha t the buyer ob­
tains from the low joint profits configuration are larger than the private benefits tha t it 
is possible to create by hiding the difference in the joint profits AV, so that the separate 
agency conflict with the buyer has potentially some bite. On the other hand, the private 
benefits b are sufficiently small so that if the low joint profits trade configuration is im­
plemented, not only transferable profits are lower, but also aggregate surplus is reduced. 
The second part of the assumption also implies that the transaction costs associated with 
hiding profits <fi are bounded, and in particular tha t <f) G [2 — ^,/3], and it is made to 
simplify the analysis.
The third part of the assumption introduces an upper bound on the share of profits that 
the buyer can realize by trading on the spot market and implies tha t the downstream firm 
can not convince the upstream firm to undertake internal trade whenever it generates low 
joint profits (1 — P)V  > V.
Finally, the fourth part of the assumption puts an upper bound on the ex-ante likelihood 
tha t internal trade yields high joint profits. These last two assumptions simplify the 
exposition without affecting the main results.
Before I determine the pledgeable income under the two organizational forms, let consider 
the trading configuration implemented if the two managers have deep pockets.
L em m a 3.1 Integration generates total surplus V  — K. Non integration generates total 
surplus V  — 7r<j(l — q)(A V  — b) — K  if a A V  < b and V  — K  otherwise.
Under integration, the buyer is the residual claimant of the profits of the firm, and the 
second part of the assumption makes sure that V > V  +  b. The unique residual claimant 
of firm’s profits would always implement the high profits action, which also maximizes 
social surplus. Under non integration instead the two firms have to bargain over the
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price P. As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the case a  =  1. Under this scenario, the 
buyer always has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and the ex-post bargaining 
process is efficient. When this is the case, in the absence of non contractible investments, 
the organizational form does not m atter for efficiency. When a  < 1 instead the ex-post 
bargaining process occurs under asymmetric information with probability (1 — a), and 
it is thus, in general, not efficient. In particular, if a A V  > b the seller bargains too 
aggressively to extract the highest possible price at the expense of total efficiency. The 
simple model thus captures the original intuition of the transaction cost literature (see e.g. 
Williamson (1971), (1975)) tha t vertical integration by replacing the bargaining process 
with fiat reduces the inefficiencies caused by contract incompleteness.15 In this context, 
a  is a measure of the degree of inefficiency in the ex-post bargaining process, as well as a 
measure of the bargaining power of the buyer.
In the next subsections I analyze the situation when the buyer and the seller do not have 
deep pockets and need to finance the initial investments k^ and ku. I first derive the 
highest joint pledgeable income under vertical integration and under non-integration. In 
the next section I compare the two organizational forms in terms of pledgeable income.
3 .2 .1  V ertica l In te g ra tio n
Under vertical integration, the buyer decides whether trade should take place internally 
and moreover has control over the joint profits generated by the two units. Conditional on 
implementing the action tha t yields high joint profits, she will repay debt B  if the payoff 
from repaying the debt max{V — £ ,0 }  is larger than the payoff from hiding profits V  
realizing private benefits of value 0V. In other words, she will repay debt if B  < (l - 4>)v. 
Suppose instead tha t she decides to implement the action tha t yields low joint profits. In 
this case, she will repay the debt B  if and only if B  < (1 — 4>)V_. If this condition is satisfied 
however, she will never find it profitable to implement the low joint profits action since 
the payoff from the high joint profits action would always be higher as AV > b. Denoting 
by I G {0,1} an indicator function taking value equal to one when the buyer has private 
benefits b from the low cash flow action, and zero otherwise, if B  6 ((1 — 4>)V, (1 — (f))V) 
the buyer will implement the high profits action if and only if V  — B  > lb > <f)V_. This 
inequality is always satisfied if I = 0. If instead 1 =  1, the inequality is satisfied if and 
only if B  < B  = V  — b — (j)V_, and B  6E ((1 — 0)V_, (1 — 4>)V since b > <f)AV by assumption.
The investors hence maximizes pledgeable income by trading off an higher debt B  with
15If the upstream managers also derives non observable private benefits from the trade configuration 
that yields low joint profits, integration would always dominate. Schmitz (2006) and Matouschek (2003) 
are examples of models of vertical integration with inefficient ex-post bargaining.
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a lower probability tha t the debt is paid back. Denoting by Bint the solution of the 
investor’s problem, the linearity of the problem implies that the solution to the investor 
problem will either be Bint — (1 — <f))V or Bint = B . Denoting by Pint the solution to 
the investor’s problem, i.e. the highest pledgeable income of a vertically integrated firm, 
I can summarize the previous discussion with the following proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  3.1 Under Assumption A 2, Pint =  m ax{(l — </>)(l — a)V , V  — b —
The investor can choose a relatively low level of debt B i n t  =  V  — b — (f>V_ th a t leaves to the 
manager rents equal to the private benefits b +  <pV th a t can be acquired exercising the 
control rights over the financial streams and the trading decisions, or she can instead set 
an higher level of debt Bint — (1 — (f>)V, knowing tha t whenever private benefits b from 
the low profits action are realized the debt will not be repaid.
As expected, the pledgeable income of an integrated firm is decreasing in the level of 
private benefits b (weakly) and in the likelihood of the agency conflict (higher a). More­
over, the pledgeable income of an integrated firm is increasing in the degree of investor 
protection (decreases in <p) and in the joint profits generated by the two firms (higher V). 
However, it is decreasing in V,  a direct measure of the importance of taking the right 
trading decision, but also an inverse measure of the cost of opportunism for the manager.
The pledgeable income does not depend on tt, [3 and a. Pint does not depend on 7r since 
the buyer is the full residual claimant of the firm’s profits, and depending on the level 
of debt Bint, will chose the appropriate trade configuration with either probability 1 or 
(1 — cr). This is a direct consequence of the fact tha t under integration, the two trading 
configurations become symmetric from the point of view of the borrower. The same logic 
also explain why Pint does not depend on (3. The buyer, being the residual claimant, does 
not care about the distribution of profits between the two divisions of the firm. Finally, 
Pint does not depend on a  as vertical integration eliminates all bargaining process between 
the two units.
It is also clear that Pint < (1 — <j>)V < V , and hence there exist profitable investment 
opportunities tha t can not be financed because of the agency conflict. Note also tha t if, 
contrary to Assumption A2, I assumed b < (j)AV, I would have tha t Pint = (1 — (p)V and 
the only agency conflict that would have some bite is the possibility of hiding profits.
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3 .2 .2  N o n -In te g r a tio n
Under non-integration the two units are two independent firms managed by two separate 
managers. Before I present the main result, I describe the investor’s problem. The investor 
chooses debts levels Bd and B u in order to maximize the joint pledgeable income of the 
two non integrated firms. The problem has to  be solved backward. For a given vector 
of debt levels Bd and B u, I first analyze the bargaining game between the two managers 
depending on whether
• internal trade or trade on the spot market produces high joint profits,
• the buyer derives private benefits or not from the low cash flow action, and
• the buyer or the seller has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the price 
of the input.
In any state s (there are eight, i.e. 2 x 2 x 2 ,  states), the bargaining process determines 
the profits of the two firms, and because of the possibility of hiding profits, B u and Bd 
may or may not be repaid. Let Id(s | Bd, B u) € {0,1} and Iu(s | Bd, B u) e {0,1} be two 
indicator functions taking values equal to one if, given B u and Bd, in state s the outcome 
of the bargaining process is such that Bd and Bu are respectively repaid. Let 7rs be the 
probability that state s is realized. The investor solves
max E s7rs ('Eje{d ,u}Bj  • Ij(s | B d, B u))
As for the case of vertical integration, the investor will have to trade-off a higher debt 
levels Bd and B u, with a higher probability that the debt is repaid. The main difference 
with respect to the case if vertical integration, is tha t the profits of the two firms, and 
hence the maximum debt levels that firms can credibly commit to repay, are determined 
by the bargaining process between the two managers.
In order to focus on the main intuition, I present the results for the two polar cases a  =  1 
and a = 0. Denote with Pni(a) the highest joint pledgeable income of two non integrated 
firms as a function of a: We can prove the following result
P roposition  3.2 Under Assumptions A2-A4,
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and
Pn,(0) =  (1 -  <p) [Pmax{V, V(l -  7r)} +  max{(V -  -  a), (1 -  P)V}]
As for the case of vertical integration, the highest joint pledgeable income of the two non 
integrated firms is increasing in the level of investor protection (lower <fi) and in the level 
of joint profits V.  However, certain important differences can be noted with respect to 
the case of vertical integration.
Consider first the case a  = 1. In this case the buyer always makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer, and the bargaining process is efficient. To gain some intuition on how the bargaining 
process influences the choice of debt levels Bd  and B u, consider, as an illustration, the 
case of the seller. The investor can choose a debt level B u = (1 — 0)( 1 — fi)V_ which will 
always be repaid by the seller, since any offer made by the buyer has to be greater than 
(1 — (3)V_i which is the minimum outside option for the seller in the bargaining process. 
Alternatively, the investor can set an higher debt B u =  (1 —  0)(1 — 0 ) V ,  but whenever 
trade should take place internally, the buyer offers such a low price tha t the seller accepts, 
but does not find it profitable to repay the debt B u (this happens with probability^).
As a consequence of this logic, in contrast to the case of vertical integration, when a  = 1, 
Pni is (weakly) increasing in V_. While under vertical integration the profits from the 
low joint profits action are rents that have to be given to the borrower to induce her to 
repay the debt ((j>V_), under non integration a fraction of these profits becomes the outside 
option of the party that does not have bargaining power, and can guarantee a minimum 
level of debt repayment.
Pni depends on the degree of input specificity 7r and on the industry structure, as sum­
marized by (3. Consider again the case a  =  1. P n i  is (weakly) decreasing in i t .  The decen­
tralized allocation of control rights over whether the two firms should trade internally or 
on the spot market, creates a basic trade-off under non integration. On the one hand, the 
buyer does not have enough money to "bribe" the seller to trade internally when trade 
on the spot market produces higher joint profits but the buyer has private benefits from 
trading internally. On the other hand, when internal trade generates high joint profits 
but the buyer has private benefits from trading on the spot market, she has the right to 
impose trade on the spot market. The higher 7r, the less valuable is the option of having 
the seller block a low joint profit trade configuration.
When the buyer has high bargaining power she can extract higher profits from the seller 
if j3 is high. This increases the pledgeable income of the buyer, reducing the pledgeable
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income of the seller. The seller’s pledgeable income however is reduced proportionally to 
the seller outside option, and not to the joint profits. In other words, the higher bargaining 
power of the buyer, helps the investor in pumping out money from the two firms.
The discussion so far focussed on the case in which the buyer has all the bargaining power. 
W hat happens if the seller has all the bargaining power? Before I discuss the result in 
Proposition 3 for the case a  =  0, I present a direct consequence of the discussion above.
C orollary
Assume that the seller observes the realization of b. Then
P n M  =  (1 -  <fr) [(1 -  /?) V +  /3 m ax{y, V(1 -  tt)}]
If the seller has all the power in the bargaining game, and observes the realization of 
the private benefits b, the bargaining game is completely symmetric to the case a  =  1, 
with the exception that the role played by industry structure (3 is inverted. We than 
see that, under efficient bargaining, Pni( 1) is increasing in (3, while Pni{0) is decreasing 
in /3, and the pledgeable income is higher when the buyer has full bargaining power if 
Pni{ 1) > Tm(0), i-e- if (3 > \ ■ From the point of view of the investor, a  and /3 are hence 
complements, in the sense that higher bargaining power of the buyer is good news in 
industries in which most of the value is kept or produced downstream.
When o =  0 and the seller does not observes the realization of b the intuitions presented 
above still hold, but a new effect has to be taken into account. In this case the seller 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the bargaining process may be inefficient. The seller 
may end up bargaining too aggressively, in order to extract an high price from the buyer. 
W ith probability 7rg  however the buyer derives private benefits from trading on the spot 
market and rejects the offer of the seller, which is then left with low profits and does not 
repay the debts. This further effect explains why Pni(0) is potentially non monotonic in 
7r and (3 and why it is increasing in (1 — a). It is interesting to note the following
Corollary
I f  a  =  0 ,7r —> Av+/?vr ant  ^ —<T) ~^ Pageable income under inefficient bargaining
is higher than the pledgeable income under efficient bargaining if  (3 < ^ .
The Corollary makes clear that the inefficiency of the bargaining process between the 
buyer and the seller is not necessarily bad news from the point of view of the investor. If
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the likelihood of internal trade yielding high joint profits is high (high tt), and the chances 
tha t aggressive bargain still lead to debt repayment (low <r), then the aggressive behavior 
of the seller in the bargaining game allows the investor to set a higher B u and to "pump" 
money out of the two firms more easily. This effect will be stronger the lower j3. When 
this is the case, the aggressive bargaining induced by asymmetric information reinforces 
the complementarity between low (3 and a  =  0.
So far I have compared the pledgeable income under non integration with respect to 
different configurations of the bargaining process (buyer vs. seller bargaining power, and 
efficient vs. inefficient bargaining). In the next section I compare the highest pledgeable 
income under integration and under non integration, and derives the main results of the 
chapter.
3 .3  D eterm in a n ts  o f  V ertica l In teg ra tio n
In this section I compare the pledgeable income under two alternative organizational 
forms: vertical integration and non integration. The primary objective of the analysis is 
to shed some light on the determinants of vertical integration. The focus on the pledgeable 
income is relevant since, in environments in which investors have ex-ante bargaining power, 
the organizational form tha t generates higher pledgeable income is more likely to be chosen 
to organize the tow projects.
The next proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions under which vertical 
integration has higher pledgeable income than non integration for the case in which a = 1.
P ro p o s itio n  3.3 Under Assumption A2-A4 Pni( 1) <  Pi if  and only i fn  > min{ &}•
The next proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions under which vertical 
integration has higher pledgeable income than non integration for the case in which a — 0 
and bargaining takes place under asymmetric information.
P ro p o s itio n  3.4 Under Assumption A2-A4 Pni{0) < Pi if  and only i fn  > ^ m in { j j^ = ,  <r, ^
Despite the differences between the two cases analyzed in Proposition 4 and 5, some 
factors affect vertical integration in the same way under the two alternative scenarios
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a = 0 and a = 1. The next proposition summarizes those factors.16
92
P ro p o s itio n  3.5 Under Assumption A2-A4 vertical integration is more likely
1. the higher the level of quasi-rents (higher t t ) ,
2. the higher the level of profits (higher V ) and the losses associated with the low profits
trade configuration (lower V_),
3. the lower the quality o f investor’s protection (higher 4>)
4 . the lower the likelihood (lower a) and the size o f buyer’s private benefits (lower b),
A first key determinant of vertical integration is t t ,  the likelihood that internal trade 
yields high joint profits, i.e. the degree of specificity linking the two projects. When t t  
is high, vertical integration becomes more likely, i.e. assets tha t are likely to be used 
together should also be managed and financed together. The intuition for this result 
directly follows from the analysis of the pledgeable income under non integration. Non 
integration grants control rights over the trade configuration to multiple firms, inducing 
bargaining. This bargaining process generates useful information from the point of view 
of the investors, since the seller can prevent a low profit action to be taken when profits 
are higher if trade takes place on the spot market. The positive monitoring effect of non 
integration is stronger when t t  is low, tha t is when the optimal trade configuration from 
the point of view of the investors is likely to be trade on the input spot m arket.17
This result echoes the property rights results tha t complementary assets should be jointly 
owned. However here the source of complementarity does not derive from the incentives 
to undertake non contractible investments, but is instead determined by the likelihood 
tha t the two assets should trade together. As an example, we expect tha t firms that use 
specific inputs tha t are geographically localized and costly to transport should be jointly 
owned and financed, i.e. vertically integrated. This seems to be consistent with anecdotal 
as well as formal evidence (see the evidence discussed in W hinston (2003)).
16 The proofs of propositions 6 and 7 (as well as the corollary in this subsection) follow from straight­
forward differentiation, and are therefore omitted.
17 As noted above, in this environment seller integration would be optimal. The model can be extended 
to consider the case in which with some probability a u the seller also derives private benefits bu from 
the action yielding low cash flows. When this is done, seller integration is not unambiguously optimal 
anymore. Moreover, it can be shown that an higher degree of correlation in private benefits realizations 
reduces pleadgeable income and favors vertical integration (see Macchiavello (2005)).
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A consequence of this result is also tha t in a cross-section of firms, vertically integrated 
firms will be more likely to trade internally, instead th a t on the market. There are two 
effects that reinforce each other th a t explain this fact. First of all, Proposition 6 suggests 
that assets with high 7r will be owned and managed together. In other words, vertically 
integrated firms are inherently different from non integrated firms since they tend to 
use assets tha t are likely to trade together relatively more often. We can think of this 
first effect as a "selection" effect. The second effect derives from the fact tha t under 
vertical integration trade takes place internally with probability 7r(l — cr) +  (1 — 7t)<j if (1 — 
<j) > and with probability ir otherwise. Under non integration instead, the two
firms trade together with a probability equal to7r when the bargaining process is efficient, 
and with even lower probability when the bargaining process occurs under asymmetric 
information. Since the allocation of control rights directly influences the likelihood of 
internal trade, we can think of this effect as a "governance" effect. Mullainhathan and 
Sharfstein (2001) find evidence which is consistent with these predictions, although, by 
treating the integration decision as exogenous, they do not disentangle the two effects 
emphasized by the model.18
A second im portant determinant of vertical integration is the size of the two projects, 
as summarized by V . Non integration multiplies the scope for opportunistic behavior by 
giving to multiple agents the possibility of hiding (part of the) profits. The higher the 
profits, the costlier this decentralization in the opportunities to steal profits, and hence 
the more likely is vertical integration to ensure higher returns to the investors. This 
result suggests th a t in a cross-section of firms, vertically integrated firms will tend to 
be larger, an observation which seems to be consistent with empirical evidence (see e.g. 
Macchiavello (2006) and the references therein).
The positive relationship between V , 7r and vertical integration, also suggest tha t vertical 
integration positively depends on the level of quasi-rents on which the two firms bargain. 
A useful measure of quasi-rents in our environment is the ex-ante difference in expected 
profits between internal trade and trade on the input spot market, which is proportional to 
R  = (27r — 1) AV, and hence > 0. In an influential paper Whinston (2003) noted tha t 
the transaction cost and the property right theory of the firm are conceptually different, 
and that, while the former predicts a positive relationship between vertical integration and 
the level of the quasi-rents generated by specificity and incomplete contracts, the property 
rights theory of the firm does not have predictions on the relationship between the level 
of quasi-rents and vertical integration. Moreover, he noted tha t virtually all empirical 
work support the transaction cost intuition tha t higher quasi-rents are associated with
18Vertical integration might require more specific assets with lower resale (or collateral) value, making 
financing more difficult.
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either long term contracts or with vertical integration. Our model is also coherent with 
this evidence.
A third prediction of the model is that vertical integration becomes relatively more likely 
in environments with low investor protection (higher <f>). It has been noted tha t, because 
of widespread input and market failures, firms in developing countries are often thought 
to be larger and more vertically integrated (see e.g. Palepu and Khanna (2000)). While 
further empirical work is needed in this area, the model provides a rationale for this 
anecdotal evidence.19
We have noted in the previous section th a t the inefficiency caused by asymmetric infor­
mation in the bargaining game between the buyer and the seller is not necessarily a bad 
news from the point of view of external investors. A direct consequence of propositions 4 
and 5 is the following corollary.
C o ro lla ry
Assume that the seller observes the realization of b. Under Assumption A2-A4 Pi(0) < 
^ni(O) i f  and only i f  7r < |  m i n { ^ ^ = ,  o}.
The corollary clarifies that the cases in which inefficiencies in the bargaining process are 
likely to increase the pledgeable income of two non integrated firms are precisely the cases 
in which vertical integration becomes more likely. Despite the observation in the previous 
section, in a cross-section of firms, the model has the standard prediction tha t higher 
bargaining costs make vertical integration more likely.
The results in Proposition 6 do not depend on the distribution of bargaining power be­
tween the seller and the buyer. In contrast, the next proposition shows th a t the re­
lationship between industry structure and vertical integration crucially depends on the 
distribution of bargaining power between the seller buyer.
P ro p o s itio n  3.6 Under Assumption A2-A4, higher competition in the upstream market 
(high (3) makes vertical integration more likely i f  the seller has bargaining power (a = 0) 
and less likely i f  the buyer has bargaining power (a = 1).
19However recent cross-country-industry empirical evidence on the institutional determinants of vertical 
integration do not fully support this view (see Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Macchiavello (2006)).
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This result shows that industry structure might affect vertical integration in the presence 
of financial constraints. Unfortunately I am not aware of empirical studies linking industry 
structure, vertical integration in the presence of financial constraints.20
3 .4  D iscu ssio n  and E xten sion s
3 .4 .1  J o in t L ia b ility
In the model in the previous section a firm is an organization with centralized ownership 
of physical assets and centralized (i.e. joint) financial liabilities. Non integrated firms 
instead suffer from the fact that in the bargaining process the price might be set at a 
level tha t induces either the seller or the buyer to  default on the loan (by hiding the 
profits). Because of this, parties are induced to bargain too aggressively from the point 
of view of external investors. This effect is absent in the case of a vertically integrated 
firm, where the manager is jointly responsible for both projects (what I have labeled the 
profits-pooling effect of vertical integration).21
While useful to analyze the dichotomy between "markets and hierarchies" from a theoret­
ical perspective, the perfect correlation between centralized ownership and joint financial 
liabilities typical of the firm is far from being the only organizational form observed in 
practice. "Hybrid" organizational forms are indeed relatively common. In this subsection 
I ask whether the negative effect of non integration can be undone by imposing some 
form of joint liability for the two firms. In doing so I analyze the scope for an "hybrid" 
organizational form in which ownership of assets is decentralized, while financial liabilities 
are (partially) centralized.22
In particular, I assume that the financial contracts tha t the investor offers at the financing 
stage specify that if the upstream firm does not repay the debt B u the downstream firm is 
liable for an amount Ld, and similarly if the downstream firm does not pay back the debt
20In a recent paper, Aghion et al (2006) reports the existence of a U-shaped relationship between 
vertical integration and the degree of product market competition, a result that could be consistent with 
an extensions of the current model that allow for separate agency conflict with the seller and considered 
also seller integration (see also Acemoglu et al. (2005)). We feel that further theoretical and empirical 
work is needed on this subject.
21 In an integrated firm the manager of the firm can not easily ’’move” money across units avoiding 
to repay the investors. Under non integration instead the outside options in the bargaining game are 
essentially given by the rents that can be gained by hiding profits. This implicitely introduces a form of 
collusion between the buyer and the seller against the investors.
22 An interesting example is given by micro-finance contracts. In micro-finance arrangements however, 
financed projects are rarely vertically related with each other. We conjecture that needs for diversification 
is at the heart of this practice.
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Bd, the upstream firm is liable for an amount B u. Letting B  =  [Bd,Bu\ and L  =  [Ld,Lu\ 
be the vectors of debt and joint liability contracts respectively, the investor problem can 
be written as
m a x  S s t t s | B , L )  • (B j+ L j • ( 1  -  I r (s | B , L ) ) ) )
As for the case without joint liability contracts, the investor will have to trade-off a higher 
debt levels Bd and B u, with a higher probability th a t the debt is repaid. The investor 
however has two additional instruments to extract money from the two firms. Joint 
liabilities make sure that if one of the two debts is not paid back, the investor still can 
potentially recover some money from the other firm. Moreover, joint liability becomes 
an im portant tool in the hands of the external investor to affect the bargaining process 
among the two units.
The following proposition derives the optimal contract when joint liability is allowed.
P ro p o s itio n  3.7 Assume a = 1. Under Assumptions A2-A3 the optimal financial con­
tracts are given by B* = (1 — <j))( 1 — (3)V, B d — (1 — <f>)(3V, L* =  B d and L*d = 
(1 -  <j>)(l -  0 )A V  if  (1 -  a) > and L * =  (! -  w  -  <t>))A V  -  b other-
wise.
The maximum pledgeable income of two non integrated firms under jo in t liability P ^ ( T )  
is given by
P i L{ 1) =  (1 -  0)(1 -  n )V  T  7r max{(1 -  0)(1 -  a ){A V  +  /3V_), A V  +  (3(1 -  <f>)V -  bj
The proposition implies the following corollary.
C oro lla ry
1. The optimal joint liability contract displays B d > L* > 0 and B* > L d > 0.
2. There exist a unique 7r* < 1 such that P ^ L(1) > Pni( 1) i f  and only i f  tt < tt*.
The first part of the corollary is obvious and implies th a t the pledgeable income of two non 
integrated firms always increases when joint liability contracts are allowed. The optimal
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contract displays positive levels of joint liability. Moreover, the two joint liability amounts 
Ld and L u play very different roles. L*d is used to increase repayments in those states in 
which the upstream firm defaults. Those states occur with probability t v . From the point 
of view of the investor it is better to let the upstream firm defaults in those states, as 
having both firms repaying their debts multiplies the rents that have to be left, as the 
price P  has to compensate more than proportionally the debt level B u. L* is instead 
used to decrease the value of default for the downstream seller. By increasing L* the 
investor makes default for the downstream firm extremely costly, as the price offer P  has 
to compensate for the joint liability amount T*.23
The second part of the corollary instead implies tha t joint liability is not sufficient to make 
non integration always preferred to integration. It shows that, because of the possibility of 
hiding profits, joint liability contracts are not sufficient to create a complete profits-pooling 
effect under non-integration. This happens because the price P  has to compensate more 
than proportionally the debt B u in for the joint liability Ld to be repaid. In environments 
with high external investors protection, 0 is close to zero and non-integration always 
achieves higher pledgeable income than integration. The source of the profits-pooling 
effect is therefore the combination of poor investor protection and joint liability typical of 
an integrated firm. In summary, the intuition and results of the previous section continue 
to hold true even when joint liability contracts between two non integrated firms are 
allowed.24
3 .4 .2  C o n tr a ctu a l E x tern a lit ie s
In section 3, I have solved the model assuming tha t investors maximize the sum of the 
pledgeable incomes of the two separate firms, thus removing all contractual externalities
23 On the ground that the state is not verifiable by third parties, we assumed that agents are restricted 
to contracts that allocates decisions rights over the optimal action to be taken, i.e. we assumed that the 
feasible contracts are highly incomplete. In principle however parties could design an ex-ante mechanism 
in which they report to the mechanism designer messages on the realization of the state of the world, 
and actions are taken accordingly to the reported messages. In Macchiavello (2005) I consider a similar 
model in which <j> =  0 but in which also the seller can derive private benefits from the low joint profit 
action. I show that under Nash implementation, Coalitional Rationality, and Limited Liability, the optimal 
mechanism is equivalent to a simple allocation of control right (integration and non-integration as explored 
here, and external control). The optimal contract always displays joint liability. As in the present contaxt, 
joint liability would however create a negative externality across the two units: opportunistic behavior of 
one unit compromizes the financial returns of the other units and could lead to lower effort. The reader 
can check that Proposition 7 implies that if  ^ 0 non integration with joint liability does always better 
than integration in terms of pleadgeable income.
24It is possible to imagine the symmetric hybrid organizational form, in which the two units are jointly 
managed but not jointly liable from the financial point of view. This seems to be the case in business 
groups and pyramids (see Bianco and Nicodano (2002) and Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) for recent 
theoretical treatement of these hybrids from a financial perspective). I conjecture that this analysis could 
shed some light on tunneling.
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that could originate from separate financing.25 However, it has been argued by legal 
scholars (Kraakman and Hausmann (2001), Cheung (1983)) as well as business historians 
(see e.g. Lamoreaux (1998)) and economists (Holmstrom (1999)) tha t one im portant role 
of firms could be to eliminate contractual externalities associated with various sources of 
financing.26
In this subsection I explore within the framework of the model analyzed in the previous 
section circumstances under which a particular form of contractual externalities between 
investors results "too often" in the creation of an integrated firm or in underinvestment, 
and briefly discuss other potential forms of contractual externalities.
Before I turn to the formal analysis of the financing decisions, I illustrate the fundamental 
source of externalities across the to projects. When the upstream firm does not exist, the 
net present value of the downstream firm is given by
=  (1- — 7t)/3F +  TTydZ -  kd
while the net present value when the upstream firm is financed is given by
Vd = (1 — n)/3V +  n a A V  +  (3V_ — kd
implying tha t the financing of the upstream firm increases the value of downstream firm 
of an amount equal to AV^ = — V6 =  anAV . Obviously, a similar reasoning applies for
the positive externality that the financing of the downstream firm has on the net present 
value of the upstream firm. It is obvious that A V U =  Vu — V6 =  (1 — a:)7rAV, where the 
notation is adapted from the previous expressions to the case of the upstream firm. It 
is thus possible to have parameters configurations in which none of the two projects has 
positive present value, unless the other project is also financed. As the previous expression 
shows, this is more likely to happen when n is high.
To explore how contractual externalities interact with the decision to finance an integrated 
firm as opposed to two non-integrated firms, consider the following modification to the 
model presented in section 2. Suppose that there are two investors, V  and U. I assume 
that V  can only finance the operations of the buyer, i.e. downstream firm, while U can 
only finance the operations of the seller. By this I mean tha t whenever the buyer has 
control over the firm, only V  can recover a positive fraction of the profits. Similarly, when
25 Note that in the model presented above under non-integration, the decisions on the optimal debt 
levels Bd and B u are separable (see proof of Proposition 3).
26That the firm could be a valuable financial intermediary has been argued by the recent literature 
on the working of internal capital markets (see Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and the following 
work reviewed in Stein (2004)). This work sheds important light on incentivs and allocative efficiency of 
internal capital markets.
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the seller has control over the upstream firm, only U can recover a positive fraction of the 
upstream firm’s profits. I formalize this intuition assuming that the parameter <fi is specific 
to the investor-borrower relationship. In particular I assume 4>{U, u ) =  <f)(T>, d(= (f) as in 
Assumption A2, while </>(£/, d) = (f){T>, u(=  1. Although this assumption is presented under 
an extreme form, specific human capital in the monitoring of certain kinds of economic 
activities, past business relationships, reputation, belonging to a common network, and 
other factors imply that investors may not be perfect substitutes in lending relationships.
This assumption implies that V  can finance two kind of projects: a small (non-integrated) 
buyer or a large vertically integrated firm managed by the buyer, tha t produces its own 
inputs. U instead can only finance a (non-integrated) seller. To keep the analysis simple, 
I assume that the two investors get a payoff equal to zero if they do not invest and that 
if U invests when V  finances a vertically integrated firm the nature of competition in the 
industry implies negative returns L o n W s  investment, while V  receive a fraction 5 of the 
returns to vertical integration such tha t 5Pint — K  > 0.27
Finally, I assume that the two investors V  and 1A takes their financing decisions indepen­
dently and non cooperatively. As a justification for this assumption, we can think that, for 
instance, at the financing stage investors do not know the realization of the specific match 
between the buyer and the seller. If initial contracts are hard to renegotiate, multilateral 
contracts will not be effectively signed.28 The two investors V  and U simultaneously de­
cide whether to finance a firm, and in the case of V  whether to finance a large vertically 
integrated firm, or a smaller non integrated firm. They also choose the appropriate debt 
levels tha t maximizes their expected returns. I focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria of 
this game.29
Since this analysis is meant to be purely illustrative, the next proposition presents results 
for a particular parametric configuration of the model presented above. To draw a starker 
connection between contractual externalities and integration I focus on the particular case 
in which the pledgeable income of vertical integration is minimal.
P ro p o s itio n  3.8 Assume a  =  i ,  o —> 1, b = A V  and ir <  4=^. Under Assumption 
A2-A4,
27This could be the case if an additional entry in the upstream industry significantly lowers the profits 
of non-integrated firms, and if the seller can be replaced without incurring eccessive costs.
28 It would be interesting to explore how these considerations interact with the financing of (generic) 
human capital.
29Formally, a strategy for investor T> is a two dimensional vector: an action ax> G At> =  { 0 , D , I }  and 
a debt level B - d  x  5R+ , where 0 , D , I  denote respectively no financing, financiang of a (small) downstream 
firm, and financing of an integrated firms. Similarly for investor U  is a two dimensional vector: an action 
& u  G A u  —  { 0 , B } .
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1. max{Pni, K ]  > Pi is a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-integration to 
be a Nash equilibrium of the financing game, and
2. Pni < max {P i ,K )  is a sufficient condition for integration to be the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the financing game.
As emphasized above, the source of the externality is th a t the financing of the downstream 
firm improves the net present value of the upstream firm and viceversa. W hen the two 
investors V  and U simultaneously decide whether to finance a firm they do not take into 
account these effects. Instead they focus on the individual returns of each firm, and as 
a result vertical integration becomes more likely. F irst of all, it could be th a t V  prefers 
to finance an integrated firm than a smaller downstream firm, even if U finances an 
upstream firm. This in turn induces U to abstain from investing in the first place. Note 
that this can happen even if the joint financial return of two non-integrated firms is higher 
than the one offered by an integrated firm. Under these circumstances however, vertical 
integration is not necessarily inefficient (in fact, under the assumptions in Proposition 
8, vertical integration increases efficiency). Integration simply increases the rents of the 
coalition formed by the buyer and V, at the expenses of the seller and U. Another 
scenario happens when the financial requirements of the two units are highly asymmetric 
(ku is high relative to (1 — /?), while k^ is low relative to /?), in which case either vertical 
integration or underinvestment will occur. Underinvestment in turn, can take two forms: 
no firms being financed, or only a small, non integrated firm, being financed.
Note that the contractual externalities emphasized here operate at the moment of setting 
up the two firms. While I have shown that those contractual externalities make integra­
tion more likely, it is clear from the preceding analysis tha t integration does not remove 
those contractual externalities. In practice, integration could instead remove contractual 
externalities tha t arise once the two projects have been financed.30
30It would be interesting to consider richer environments in which external investors can seize control 
over firm’s assets and even force liquidation in certain states of the world (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) and Bolton and Sharfstein (1992)). We conjecture that in the presence of costly renegotiation, 
integration is less likely to lead to excessive liquidation than non integration, since the value of the entire 
supply chain as opposed to the value of a single firm should be taken more easily into account by external 
investors (for a related point, see XXX (JFinEc. 1981/82)). It has been noted that the financial position 
of a firm may affects the position of the firm vis a vis (potential) competitors. It would be interesting to 
perform similar analysis for the case of vertical relationships.
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3.5  C onclusions
In this chapter I ask whether vertical integration reduces or increases transaction costs 
with external investors. I build a model in which a seller produces a good tha t can be 
used by a buyer, or sold on a spot market. The buyer and the seller have no cash, 
need to finance investments for production, and can not foresee in advance whether the 
input is most efficiently traded on the spot market or among each other. I assume that 
ownership of physical assets gives control over contracting rights to those assets, tha t 
financial streams get transferred with ownership and tha t returns can not be perfectly 
verified. The net balance of the costs and benefits of integration in terms of pledgeable 
income depends on the relative intensities of a positive "profits-pooling" effect against 
a negative "de-monitoring" effect. I find tha t larger projects, more specific assets, and 
low investors protection are determinants of vertical integration. I discuss joint liability 
contracts between non integrated firms and how contractual externalities among investors 
favor integration.
Several dimensions need further theoretical scrutiny. In particular the model could be 
extended to consider the role of trade credit and supply credit. Moreover, non contractible 
investments should be reintroduced in the model in order to make it more suitable for the 
analysis of industries in which skills and human capital are im portant determinants of 
efficiency. The ambiguous prediction on the role of the distribution of bargaining power 
and industry structure should motivate further theoretical as well as empirical effort. 
The exploration of these and other questions constitutes a promising avenue for future 
research.
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3.6  A pp en d ix: P roofs
P ro o f o f Lem m a 1
The case of integration is obvious since b < (3AV and (3 < 1 imply V  > V  +  b.
For the non integration case we have to analyze the bargaining game. W ith probability 
a  the downstream manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer P  for internal trade. Under 
non integration, with probability t t  internal trade generates high joint profits. She will 
choose P  to maximize max{U — P, {3V_+Ib} subject to  the constraint P  > (1 — /3)V, where 
I  E {0 ,1} depending on whether the downstream manager has private benefits b from the 
low joint profits action. The solution to this program is P  =  (1 — fi)V_, and assumption 2 
guarantees that max{U — P, /3U} =  A V  +  /3V_ > (3V_ +  16 and hence internal trade takes 
place. The argument is similar for the case in which trade on the spot market generates 
high joint profits.
W ith probability (1 — a) the upstream manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer P. W ith 
probability tt internal trade generates high joint profits. The upstream manager faces 
uncertainty with respect to the realization of 6, and hence the offer P  is made to maximize 
the expected profits m axE a max{P, (1 — (3)V} . If P  < V  — (3V_ — b the offer is always 
accepted, if P  e [V — (3V_ — 6, V  — (3V] the offer is accepted with probability (1 —  a),  
and finally if P  > V  — (3V_ the offer is always rejected. It follows that the optimal P  
is P  < V  -  PV -  b if V  -  f3V -  b > (1 -  a){V  -  (3V) +  a ( l  -  /3)V, i.e. if 6 < crAU 
and P  =  V — j3V_ otherwise. In the latter case, the two firms trade on the market with 
probability a and generate surplus equal to V  +  6. W ith probability 1 — tt trade on the 
market generates high joint profits. Even the most profitable offer P  =  V  — (3V +  6 makes 
internal trade unprofitable for the upstream manager since V  — f3V -I- 6 < (1 -  /3)F.31
Under non integration, the high joint profits trade configuration is implemented with 
probability 1 — 7t<j(1 — a) while with the complementary probability the low joint profits 
trade is implemented and the realized surplus is given by V_ +  bM
P roof o f P roposition  2
In order to prove proposition 3, we have to solve the game backward. We start by proving 
the following Lemma.
Lem m a
31 Since managers have deep pockets, P  can be larger than V.
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Denote with B % and B * the solution to the investor’s problem, then £ {PY\ (AI^—
b)(l-<f>) + V -,(AV  + 0 V )}  and T^ ) e { ( l - 0 ) V - , ( l - 0 ) V - , ( V - b - 0 V ) - , ( V - 0 V ) }  
Proof:
Denote with Vi and Vm the joint profits realized with internal trade and with trade on the 
input market respectively, and let I  G {0,1} be an indicator of whether the buyer derives 
private benefits b from the trade configuration tha t yields low joint profits.
W ith probability a  the buyer has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We have 
to analyze four different cases, depending on the realizations of the private benefits and 
joint profits.
Case 1: W ith probability 7r(l — <j) we have V{ = V  and 1 =  0.
The buyer makes an offer P  in order to max{F — P  — Bd , 4>{V — P)}. The offer is accepted 
by the seller if m ax{P — B u, 0P} >  max{(l — P)V_ — B u, 0(1 — P)V}- The buyer makes 
the offer if and only if the solution to the bargaining problem gives him an final payoff 
larger than her outside option D  =  max {PV_ — Bd, 4>P¥-}-
Assume first tha t B u < (1 — 0)(1 — P)Y- The outside option of the upstream firm is to 
trade on the input market realizing profits U =  (1 — P)V_ — Bd- The best price the buyer 
can offer is hence P  =  (1 — /3)F, realizing profits D* =  m ax{A F + P Y ~  Bd, 4>(AV +  /3F)}. 
If Bd <  (1 — 4>)PY then Assumption 1 implies D* > D. The offer is made and accepted 
in equilibrium, the two firms trade with each other, Vi =  V  is realized and debts B u and 
Bd are fully repaid. Suppose instead tha t Bd > (1 — 4>)PY_- Then again D* > D , the offer 
is made and accepted, firms trade with each other, B u is fully repaid, while Bd is repaid 
if and only if Bd <  (1 — 0)(A F  +  (3V_)-
Assume instead tha t B u > (1 — 0)(1 — /3)T. Take £d > 0 and eu > 0 such tha t B u = 
(1 — 0)(1 — (3)Y_+£u and Bd =  (1 — 4>)(AV+/3V) — £d- If P  — the offer is accepted and 
B u is repaid, and the buyer gets payoff D =  0 (A F  +  /3V_) + £d ~  and repays the debt. 
However D < <p(AV + fiV) +  £d, which is the payoff she can guarantee herself offering P  = 
(1 — fi)V_ and repaying her debt. The two firms hence trade with each other, however B u 
is not repaid and Bd is repaid as long as £d > 0, i.e. if and only if Bd < (1 -0 )(A V + /3 V ).
Case 2: W ith probability (1 — 7r)(l — a) we have Vm = V  and 1 =  0.
For the tow firms to trade with each other, the offer P  must be such that m ax{P — 
B U,4>P} > m ax{(l — P)V — Bu,<f>(l — P)V} and moreover P  < V. Suppose first tha t 
B u < (1 — 0)( 1 — P)Vi then it must be P  >  (1 — /3)V which is impossible because of
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Assumption 1. Assume instead that B u (1 — 0)(1 — (I^Vj then again P  ^  (1 -  P)V, 
which is impossible. We conclude that the two firms always trade on the input market, 
realizes joint profits Vm =  V, debt B u is repaid if B u < (1 — 0)(1 — (3)Vand Bd is repaid 
if B d < (1 -  <f>)0V.
Case 3: W ith probability 7r<7 we have Vi =  V  and 1 =  1.
The buyer makes an offer P  in order to max{V  — P  — B d, </>{V —-P)}. The offer is accepted 
by the seller if max {P  — B u, cpP} > max{(l — (3)V_— B u, 0(1 — /3)V_}. The buyer makes the 
offer if and only if the solution to the bargaining problem gives him a final payoff larger 
than her outside option D = max{/3F — B d, 4>(3Y_} +  b.
Assume first tha t B u < (1 — 0)(1 — f3)V_. The outside option of the upstream firm is to 
trade on the input market realizing profits U = (1—(3)V—B d. The best price the buyer can 
offer is hence P  = (1 — (3)V_, realizing profits D * =  m ax{A F +  (3V_ — B d, 4>(AV +  /?]£)}. 
Analogously to Case 1, it is easy to see that the buyer repays her debt if and only if 
B d < A V  + (3 (1 -( /> )-b.
Assume instead tha t B u > (1 — 0)(1 — (3)V. Take ed >  0 and su > 0 such that B u =  
(1 — 0 )( 1 — (3)V + eu and B d =  A V  — b + (3( 1 — (f>)V_ — ed- If P  = the offer is accepted 
and B u is repaid, and the buyer gets payoff D = 4>(3V_ +  b + £d — an<^  repays the debt. 
However this proposal is always dominated by offering P  =  (1 — f3)V_ and repaying her 
debt, obtaining a payoff equal to fi(f)V_ +  b +  ed which is also larger than the payoff she 
obtains from trading on the outside market. As before, she offers P  =  (1 — (3)V_, the offer 
is accepted, the two firms trade with each other and realize joint profits Vi = V , B u is not 
repaid and B d is repaid as long as ed > 0, i.e. if and only if B d = A V  — b +  (3(1 — <f>)V_.
Case 4: W ith probability (1 — n)o  we have Vm =  V and 1 = 1
Analogously to Case 2, the two firms always trade on the input market, realizes joint 
profits Vm =  V, debt B u is repaid if B u <  (1 — 0)(1 — (3)Vand B d is repaid if B d <
(i -  4>)fiv.
W ith probability 1 — a  the seller has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We have 
to analyze two different scenarios, depending on the whether she observes Vi =  V  or not.
W ith probability (1 — tt) the seller observes that Vm =  V. Analogously to Cases 2 and 4 
above Assumption 1 ensures tha t there does not exists a price P  < V  tha t makes both 
the buyer and the seller willing to trade with each other.
W ith probability 7r instead the seller observes that Vi =  V. I start by proving the following
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C laim : Regardless of Bd, the seller offers a price P  E {V  — (3V_, V  — fiV_ — b}.
P roo f: If Bd < (3V and P ^  ^  — 1^ 0 ’ depending on the realization of b, the buyer 
accepts an offer P  =  V — (3V_ — 16. If instead P  > V  — the buyer accept the offer 
if and only if P  < V  -  ^  < V  -  ffV_ -  ^  <  V  -  PV -  16. If instead B d > ffV_
and and P  > V  — depending on the realization of 6, the buyer accepts an offer 
P  = V  — (3V_ — 16. Instead if P  < V  — the buyer accepts the offer if and only if
P < V  - B d -  (t>/3V -  16 < V  -  PV -  16.
The claim established tha t the bargaining strategy of the seller does not depend on 
whether Bd ^  /3V_. Given this result, the seller set P  = V  — (3V_ — 16, with 1 =  1 
if
m ax{F - p v - b - B u, <p(V -  (3 V -  6)}
> (1 -  o) m ax{F - P V -  B u, 0 (F  -  f3V)} +  a  m ax{(l -  (3)V -  B u, 0(1 -  /3)V
It follows tha t if B u < (1 — 0)(1 — 0)V_ or B u > (1 — (p)(V — @V_), 1 = 1  if and only if 
o A V  > 6, if instead B u E ((1 — 0)(Vr — /3V_ — 6), (1 — 0)(Vr — /3V_)\ then 1 =  0, and finally 
if B u E ((1 -  0)(1 -  P)V, (1 -  0 )(F  - p V -  6)] then 1 =  1.
We are now ready to establish the maximum pledgeable income when the two units are in­
dependently owned and managed. Let I^(s | Bd, B u) E {0,1} and IM(s | Bd, B u ) 6 {0 , 1} 
be two indicator functions taking values equal to one if in state s, and given B u and Bd 
the outcome of the bargaining process is such that Bd and B u respectively are repaid. 
Let 7rs be the probability tha t state s is realized. The investor solves
max E stts { E j ^ d ^ B j  ■ l j ( s  \ B d,B u))
Since the indicators I j(s  | Bd, B u) are piecewise linear in Bd and B u, the investors solves 
a linear programming problem. Hence the solution of the program will (generically) be 
at a corner.B
The proof of the previous Lemma implies that in each state, the repayment of Bd does 
not depend on B u and viceversa, i.e. I j(s  | B d ,B u) can be rewritten as ly(s | B j). The 
investor’s problem can thus be decomposed into two simpler problems: for j  E {d,u},
m ax 'Es'KsBj ■ Ij ( s  \ B j )
b j
CHAPTER 3. Pleadgeable Income and Vertical Integration 106
Denote with p i(a )  the solution to this problem, and hence Pni(a ) =  P d(a) +  P u(a). 
From the previous Lemma we have
P d(a ) =  (1 — 4>) max{/3V, PV(1 — 7r(l — a)),
(AV +  PV_)a7r(l -  a), (—p— 7-  +  PV)onr}I-4 >
and
P u(a) =  (1 — (f>) m ax{(l — /3)V, (1 — P)V(1  — 7ra),
(V -  /?V)(1 -  o)tt(1 -  cj), (V -  p V  -  6)(1 -  o)tt}
Consider first <a =  1. To determine P d( 1), note tha t assumption A2 implies +
PV_ < A V  +  PV_ and assumption A4 implies p V  > (AV +  PV_)tt. Since (AV +  PV_) > 
max{(AV +  /3V)(1 —cr), ( ^ y ^  +  /3V)} we conclude tha t P d(l) =  p V .lt  is instead obvious 
that P u(l) =  (1 — </>)( 1 — /3) max{ V, V(1 — 7r)}, and hence
Pm(l) =  (1 -(f)) [0V +  (1 - P )  max{ V, V(1 -  tt)}]
Consider now a = 0. It is obvious that P d(0) =  (1 — p)P max{ V, V(1 — 7r)}. To determine 
P u(0), note that assumption A2 implies V — PV_ — b < V  — PV_ — (f>AV, and assump­
tions A2 and A4 imply (1 — P)V > (V  — PV — (f)AV) tt. We conclude th a t P u(0) =  
(1 — (f)) max{(V — PV )7r(l — o), (1 — P)V}  and hence
Pm(0) =  (1 -(f)) [P m axjV , V (1 -  tt)} +  max{(V -  pV )ir(l -  a), (1 -  P)V}\
which concludes the proof. ■
P roof o f P roposition  3
Suppose first tha t 7r > Then Pni(l) =  (1 — (f>)(V_ + P A V ). But than note th a t Pp  1) > 
V  — b — pV_ >  Pm (l) as b < (1 — P{ 1 — (f)))AV is implied by A2. Suppose instead 7r < .
Then Pni(l) =  (1 -  <f>)V(1 -  tt(1 -  P)). If tt >  then P*(l) >  (1 -  0)V( 1 -  0 ) > Pni{ 1). 
If instead 7r < jf-g, then Pm (l) > P i(l) if (1 — 4>)V(l — 7r(l — P)) > V  — b—pVf. Assumption 
A2 implies that V  — b — pV_ > (1 — 0 )V  +  (P — </>)V, and hence 7r > implies
Pni{ 1) < P%{!)• Rearranging terms concludes the proof.■
P roof o f P roposition  4
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To prove the first part, note that (V  — /3V_)tt > (1 — (3)V if t t  > ^  however (3 < ^
implies ^~Z^v)-k > AV+/3V and hence (v  “  J ® 71" < (1 _  P)v - If n > ^  then p m(fy =  
(1 — 4>)[(3V_ +  (1 — (3)V\. However assumption A2 implies P i ( 0 )  > ( 1  — f3)V +  (/? — <f>)V_, 
and A17 > 0 implies (1 — j3)V + (/3 — <j))V_ > P ni ( 0). Suppose instead n < then 
p n i { 0) — (1 — 4>){I — (3tt)V. The results follows as in the proof of proposition 4, since 
assumption A2 implies < ^ r -
The analysis to prove the case (3 > \  is more involved, as Pni(0) is non-monotonic in tr, 
and hence several cases have to be considered.
Case 1: Suppose first that 7r < m i n { ^ ,  Jy ~p y^ _ a^}> then Pn»(0) =  ( 1  — <j>){l — (3 tt)V  
and the analysis is as before.
Case 2: Suppose instead 7T > m a x { ^ ,  and hence Pni(0) =  (1 — 4>)[(3V_ +
(V  — /3V_)tt)(1 — a)]. We know that P ;(0) > V  — b — 4>V_ and tha t ^(l-g) =  (1 — 4>)V if
^  >  T i j g r ’ w hile wB f) =  o if ( i  -  <t) <  S ince (1  _  >  s r f e y  =
(1 — (p){V — PV_)tt > 0, the condition
^(0)|~ q_  x v-b->y > Pm(0),-(1 s V-b-tV (3-1)
1 K > ( l -<t>)v 1 v > ( i -«/>)V
is necessary and sufficient to prove P i ( 0 )  > P n i ( 0 )  for all values of a  when 7r > m a x { ^ ,  ^=-| 
Substituting (1 — o) = in Pni(0), after some algebra we can show that the con­
dition can be rewritten as 7r <  — vnxr y - b-& V -3 (^4>YV ^  hand sj^e js decreasing
V  — p v  V  — b — (f)V
in b and increasing in </>. Hence a sufficient condition is tha t the inequality is satisfied 
when b =  /3AV, and when 4> = max{2 — ^ , 0} =  0, where the last equality follows from
(3 > After the appropriate substitutions, the inequality becomes t t  < y V^ v  y ^ \ - p fp v •
Assumption A4 { t t  < &v^j3v ) imPhes that the last inequality is always satisfied, since
PVtrivial algebra and 0 > i  imply Vl 0yv (i% + p v  >  s A p v  > a V+fSV-
Case 3: Suppose that 7r belongs to the non empty interval ( ^ r ,  case
P m ( 0 )  =  ( 1  —  4>){(3V_ +  ( 1  —  f 3 ) V )  and it is easy to show tha t assumption A2 implies
P < ( 0 )  >  V ( 1  - ( 3 ) +  ( ( 3 -  4>)V  >  P n i ( 0 ) .
Case 4: Suppose that t t  belongs to the non empty interval ( — ay  ^ r ) -  In this case
Pm(o) =  (1 - m v {  1 -  t t )  +  7r(l -  a)(V  -  (3V)). As in e a s e l ,  0 <
if (! -  CT) > and > =  0 if (1 -  cr) To see whether
Pm(0) ^  P*(0) we can focus on the case in which (1 — a) =  . Let ,
i -P)v
■pv)(i- a ]
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condition 3.1 can be rewritten as
V  — BV
$  >  P( 1 — 7r) +  7r $  = 
which after some algebra becomes
P(1 -  TT)
$  >
1 — 7T v - p v
V
since 1 — 7t—= ~- for all 7r < 1. The right hand side is decreasing in 7r, while the left hand
side is decreasing in b. A sufficient condition for 3.1 to be true is therefore >
\ 1 r )  '
P which can be rewritten as V {\ — P{2 — <j>)) > — (P — 4>)V_. Assumption A2 guarantees
that this last inequality is always satisfied, completing the proof.B
P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  7
The proof of proposition 7 mimics the proof of proposition 3. I first derive the outcome 
of the bargaining process in the four states of nature, and then analyze the optimal 
contract. With a minor abuse of notation, I denote with Ij an indicator function taking 
value equal to 1 if firm j  E {d, u] defaults. With probability (1 — 7r), Kn =  V. Since 
PV < A V  trade has to take place on the spot input market, and debts are repaid as long 
as Bu < ( 1 - 0 ) ( 1 - 0 ) V  and B d < (1 — (fppV. Note that in these states of the world it is 
not impssible to do better using joint liability. Suppose the buyer defaults, and Lu ^ 0. 
The seller will not default if and only if Bu + Lu < (1 — </>)(l — P)V.
Let us now consider the case in which Vi =  V  and 1 =  0, which happens with probability 
7 r ( l  — c r ) .
Suppose, without loss of generality, B u > (1—</>)(l—P)V_ and Bd > (1 — <ft)PV_. This implies 
that if trade takes place on the input market, the upstream firm does not pay the debt 
B u. Suppose the downstream firm offers a price P. If P  < (1 — P)V, the offer is rejected, 
and trade takes place on the input market. The payoff of the dowsntream firm is then 
given by v£ m = max{P V  -  B d -  Ld, c/)PV} =  (f>PV. If instead P  e  {(1 -  P)V, 
the seller accepts the offer, but still defaults on her loan. The payoff of the downstream 
firm is gven by =  m ax jF  — P  — B d — L d, 4>{V — P)}- Since in this case the optimal 
P  is equal to (1 — /3)F, we have > V ^ .  This ensures tha t the downstream always 
makes an offer that is accepted. Finally, if P  > , the payoff of the downstream
firm is given by Vd’j  =  m ax{F — P l — B d,(f)(V — P °)}, where P°  is the price that has 
to be paid if 1  ^ =  1 and P l if 1^  =  0. Clearly, if 1  ^ =  0 we have P 1 =  (i-<t>) an<^  
the downstream firm repays the debt if V  — jyzryj — B d > (f>(V — ). By setting
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L u = (1 — (f>)V — B u the right hand side becomes equal to zero, and the two debts are 
repaid if V  — — Bd > V  — (1 — /3)V — Bd — Ld- In an optimal contract, the right
hand side is equal to 0 (A V  +  /3V_). It follows tha t if +  Bd < V {\ — 0) +  0(1 — (3)V_. 
If the latter inequality is not satisfied instead, the downstream firm repays debt Bd and 
liability Ld if and only if Bd +  Ld <  (1 — (f>){AV +  (3V_). Since the problem is linear, we 
know tha t the solution will be at a corner. We start by proving the following Lemma.
B* —  B* —L em m a: The optimum is given by - (3V, = (1 — j3)V.
First note that the two candidate solution on the line
B* —  B*must have either =  (1 — (3)V or =  (1 — (3)V_. In the first case, debts are always 
repaid, which gives a total return to the investor equal t o ( l  — 4>)V — (1 — (3)4>AV. This 
return is always smaller than (1 — tt)(1 — 0)V +  7t (1 — 0)(A V  + /3V_) which can be obtained 
with a contract =  (3V, y ^  =  (1 — /3)V and Ld =  (1 — 0)( 1 — (3)AV. To see this, 
note that the returns associated with this last contract are decreasing in tr, and are 
equal to (1 — 0) avL/3V — @W) +  /3V at their minimum, i.e. when 7r =  A V + / 3 V  • 
the second case, the debts are repaid with probability 7r, and with probability (1 — 7r) 
only the upstream firm repays at most (1 — 0)(1 — (3)V. Returns are thus given by (1 — 
0) \kV  +  (1 -  /3)(1 — 7t)K] . Note that the inequality
7rV +  (1 -  /3)(1 -  7r)V  < (1 -  7t)V  +  tt(A F  +  0V )
is always satisfied since the RHS is decreasing in 7r, the LHS is increasing in tt and the 
inequality is satisfied at tt = Ay+pV This implies that the highes repayment that the 
investor can get out of the two firms is given by the contract The optimum is given by 
^ $  = 0 V , ^  = { 1 - P j V  and Ld = ( 1 -  <j>){ 1 -  0)AV U.
R em ark : The proof for the case in which Vi = V  and I& =  1 is completely analogous, 
and is therefore omitted. In this case, the highest financial return tha t can be extracted 
from the two firms is given by Bd +  Ld = V  — b — cf)V_ — (1 — j3)( 1 — 0 )F  >  (1 — 4>)(3V. 
The last inequality implies that L*d > 0 and B d = (1 — 0)/3V. B u is set at the highest 
level consistent with repayment in states in which Vm =  V, i.e. R* =  (1 — 0)(1 — (3)V. As 
shown above L* =  (1 — 0 )F  — B* =  (1 — (f>)/3V =  B d.
The highest pledgeable income immediately follows. If (1 — o) > ^ is
optimal to set Bd +  Ld = (1 — 0) (AF +  (3V_), otherwise it is optimal to choose Bd +  L*d =  
AV +  /?(1 — 0)F  — b. With probability 1 — t t  the firms jointly repay R* +  Bd, while with 
probability 7r they repay L d +  Bd. This completes the proof.■
P roof o f P roposition  8
CH APTER 3. Pleadgeable Income and Vertical Integration 110
To proove the proposition, we start by prooving the followig Lemma:
L em m a: Assume a  =  o —» 1, b — A V  and t t  < Under Assumption A2-A4 
Pni = ( l - 0 ) F ( l - f ) .
Proof. Since, conditional on the two firms having been separatedly financed, the optimal 
level of debts are determined separatedly, the result in the Lemma presented in the proof 
of proposition 3 holds. Consider the detrmination of B*. First,t t  < implies ^
ruling out B* = (1 — </>)( 1 — (3)V_. Also, o —> 1 rules out B* =  (1 — 4>)(V — (3V_) (which is 
repaid with probability a 7r(l — o)). Hence B* 6 {(1 — 0)(1 — (3)V, (V  — b — f3V_)}. The first 
term is repaid with probability (1 — a 7r) =  1 — the second with probability cr7r =  | .  
Moreover, b = f3AV  implies that V —b—(3V_ =  (1—(3)V, and since t t  < 1, we have 1—|  >  | .  
Clearly, the returns on the upsream firm are given by P u = (1 — </>)(l — /?)(1 — f  )F .
Consider now the downstream firm. An analogous proof shows tha t P d = (1 — <p)(3(l — | ) P  
if, when b = f3AV, the inequality (V  — b — (f)V_ — (1 — (3)V) \  < (1 — 4>)(3V(1 — | )  is 
verified. To see that this is the case, take the highest possible tt =  < Ay+pV
(this last inequality implies < P < The inequality can be rewritten as
2/3VV(l — (p) > (1 — /3(2 — (f>))AV2. If (f> —* 0 this expression is always satisfied. If 
instead 0 —» (3 the inequality becomes < 2^4^- The RHS is increasing in /3, and the 
inequality is always satisfied since it is true when /3 =  Ay 2+ p y ' This completes the proof 
of the Lem m a.I
Denote by P^ and P j  the returns tha t investors V  and U obtain from financing the non 
integrated buyer and seller respectively when the other investor has also financed the 
respective non integrated firm. The previous Lemma implies P j  =  (1 — </>)( 1 —/?)(1 — \ ) V  
and P j =  (1 — 4>)(3(l — f  )Vr. Similarly, denote by P^ and P® the returns th a t investors
V  and U obtain from financing the non integrated buyer and seller respectively when the 
other investor has not financed the respective non integrated firm.
To proove the first part of the proposition, let’s start by considering the case of investor 
U. W ith probability t t  the firm realizes profits (1 — (3)V_, while with probability 1 — t t  
the upstream firm realizes profits (1 — /3)V. Since t t  < the optimal amount of debt 
in this case is (1 — </>)( 1 — f3)V which is repaid with probability 1 — t t . It follows tha t 
P® =  (1 — 4>)( 1 — j3)( 1 — t t ) V  and (symmetrically) P® =  (1 — <f>)(3( 1 — t t ) V .  Hence P j > Pj3 
for j  E {d, u}. The fact tha t non-integration is a Nash equilibrium implies tha t P^ > ku 
(otherwise U best reply would be to not invest), and P j  > m ax {^ , Pint — k }  ^  p j  < kd
V  could ensure a higher payoff by not investing, while if P j  < Pint — ku she would improve 
her payoff by financing an integrated firm). The second inequality implies ku > Pint — P j ,  
and hence the first inequality implies P^ > Pint — P j ,  which rearranged yields Pint <
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P j +  P j =  Pni . This complete the first part of the proof.
R e m a rk  1: To see why Pint < Pni is not sufficient to ensure non-integration, consider 
the case in which kd < P j  < Pint (which happens if (3 is small), and ku —> 0. Then T> 
improve her payoff by financing an integrated firm. If she does so, the best response for 
U is to not invest as L < 0. But Pint > P j implies Pint > P®, and hence the action profile 
in which V  finances a vertically integrated firm while U does not invest is an equilibrium.
To proove the second part of the proposition, it is sufficient to prove tha t Hint ^  Pni —  
P j +  P j implies tha t Pint — K  < P j — kd (the best scenario under which V  chooses 
not to finance a vertically integrated firm) leads to  a contradiction. To see this, Suppse 
tha t Pint — K  < P j — kd, i.e. that Pint < P j  +  ku. Combining this inequality with 
Pint > P j + P j implies ku > P j, which means tha t U  prefers not to invest. A contradiction 
of the equilibrium with non-integration.■
R e m a rk  2: Suppose instead Pint < K , and P j <  k^. Than if ku 6 [P j,P j)  the only 
equilibrium is that no firm is financed, despite the fact that P j < kd does not rule out 
Pni > K , since P j > ku.
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